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The oil palm industry is one of the more successful rural developments in 
Papua New Guinea.  Oil Palm is grown in five areas: Hoskins and Bialla in 
West New Britain, Popondetta, Milne Bay and New Ireland, with over 14,500 
smallholder oil palm blocks.  In 2000, smallholders produced approximately 
531,264 tonnes of FFB (worth K36.5 million) which accounted for 33% of 
total production, the company estates producing the balance.  In 2000 oil palm 
exports accounted for 32% of the total value of Papua New Guinea’s 
agricultural exports, and 5% of total Papua New Guinea exports.  In the same 
year the value of oil palm exports exceeded coffee, traditionally the most 
important commodity crop in terms of foreign exchange earnings. 
 
Whilst there has been a large increase in the total area under smallholder 
cultivation, improving smallholder productivity remains one of the industry’s 
major challenges.  Smallholder productivity per hectare is much lower than that 
of the estate plantations, and village oil palm (VOP) productivity is below that 
of the land settlement schemes (LSS) (except for Popondetta). 
 
In 1999 project funding was approved by ACIAR to research the biophysical 
and socio-economic interactions of factors affecting productivity among oil 
palm smallholders in Hoskins and Popondetta.  The primary aim of the 
research was to help improve smallholder oil palm productivity.  The main 
objectives of the project were to: 
• gain an understanding of the socio-economic constraints on smallholder 
production;  
• evaluate the Mama Lus Frut Scheme;   
• develop strategies for more effective extension interventions; 
• make recommendations for change that might result in further increases in 
smallholder productivity, and 
• produce a work manual for extension officers.  
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With the assistance of OPRA staff, research was undertaken at the Hoskins and 
Popondetta schemes with smallholders the focus of data collection.  Other key 
stakeholders that participated in the research included OPIC, NBPOL, HOPL, 
customary landowners and industry associations, such as the oil palm growers 
associations.  The research employed semi-structured interviews, case-studies, 
questionnaire surveys, workshops, focus groups, analysis of industry 
smallholder data bases and the review of relevant reports and published 
literature.   
 
At the beginning of the data collection phase, workshops with extension 
officers at Hoskins and Popondetta identified the key variables explaining 
variation in smallholder productivity (particularly harvesting practices, rates of 
fertiliser use and levels of commitment to oil palm) as: physical factors; 
agronomic and farm management practices; intra-household relations and 
decision-making; income distribution; time and cash management skills; tenure 
security; economic necessity to harvest; level of interest in oil palm harvesting; 
and the personal characteristics of growers.  Building on this knowledge and 
working closely with smallholders, the study identified the following factors 
affecting smallholder productivity:   
 
1.  Oil Palm is one of many economic activities smallholders 
pursue 
• In addition to oil palm, smallholders are involved in a range of economic 
activities which we define as livelihood strategies. Smallholder livelihood 
strategies promote household economic and social security by increasing 
income and diversifying income sources, strengthening people’s capacity to 
meet their needs, increasing the range of options and choices available to 
households, enhancing food security and reducing household risks.  
• The main smallholder livelihood strategies include managing a range of cash 
crops, wage employment, operating small business enterprises, garden 
production for home consumption and local markets, and indigenous exchange.  
These non-oil palm activities sometimes compete for labour and time with oil 
palm production; at other times they have a positive influence where they 
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contribute to income and food security thereby adding to household well-being 
and broader social stability on the schemes. 
• For many smallholders, access to alternative income sources is necessary to 
meet household needs, especially on highly populated LSS blocks and/or 
during times of depressed oil palm prices. An important reason why 
smallholders pursue income diversification is to even income variations due to 
the fluctuating price of oil palm. 
• For many VOP smallholders in Hoskins and Popondetta, entry into oil palm 
production is relatively recent and many retain holdings of other export cash 
crops, especially cocoa and copra.  In a survey of 100 VOP and LSS 
smallholder blocks at Hoskins, 72% and 26% respectively had access to other 
export cash crops.  Of the Hoskins VOP blocks with cash crops, 83.5% had 
two or more types of cash crops in addition to oil palm.   
• The oil palm plantation estates provide opportunities for short-term casual 
employment and long-term employment of smallholders.  The former often 
provides temporary financial relief for block residents at periods of peak cash 
demand such as when school fees are due, or payments must be made for 
customary obligations. 
• Access to off-block wage employment can add significantly to material 
standards of living on smallholder blocks.  Whether off-block employment or 
self-employment adversely affects oil palm productivity requires further 
research, though the evidence suggests that off-block employment is only a 
problem when it limits labour availability at harvest times.  On the more 
heavily populated blocks at Hoskins, off-block employment provides very 
important supplementary income, and relieves some of the economic and 
population pressures on the blocks.  
• Food garden production is extremely important for LSS and VOP 
smallholders in terms of labour demands and meeting household consumption 
requirements.  At Hoskins labour allocated to gardening exceeds that allocated 
to oil palm and is the dominant activity carried out by smallholders.  This is 
most notable among women who allocate almost 2.5 times as much labour to 
food gardening as to oil palm; for Hoskins men, gardening and oil palm are of 
about equal importance in terms of the amounts of time allocated to each 
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activity.  At Popondetta, men spend more time in oil palm related work than 
gardening, and women spend considerably more time in garden production 
than in oil palm. 
• Approximately 80% of categories of meal ingredients at Kavui LSS and 
Popondetta were from gardens compared with about 50% of meal ingredients 
from food gardens at Gaungo VOP.  The balance at Gaungo is made up of store 
foods, (mostly tinned fish and rice) and fresh fish and meat.  The higher protein 
diets of VOP smallholders at Hoskins are partly a reflection of the wider range 
of income choices available to VOP smallholders and the greater population 
pressure on LSS blocks, where falling per capita incomes from oil palm are 
increasing settlers’ dependence on subsistence food production. 
• The marketing of food crops, coconuts, betel nut, tobacco, processed foods 
and manufactured items at local markets provides a regular additional income 
for women at both Hoskins and Popondetta.  At Hoskins, market income is 
especially important for women from the LSS schemes.  A survey of women 
selling at several markets around Kimbe and Hoskins, revealed that 54% of 
sellers were from LSS schemes and 8% were settlers residing on village land, 
and LSS women were disproportionately over-represented in local markets in 
terms of the values of items for sale, especially garden produce.  At Hoskins, 
VOP women are not as heavily involved in marketing garden produce.  
Average earnings per market visit were K10.91 at Hoskins and K4.64 at 
Popondetta. 
• Most smallholders are involved in various forms of customary production and 
exchange, especially VOP producers.  For many VOP smallholders, the 
motivation to harvest is not so much concerned with accumulating savings for 
capital investments or consumption in the market economy, but with 
redistributing wealth through kin exchange.  Some smallholders with 
intermittent involvement in oil palm production may not harvest for several 
months but will do so to contribute to a communal feast or exchange.  For more 
regular VOP producers, oil palm production may increase significantly when 
customary demands are unusually high.  Thus, the requirements of customary 
exchange can drive people’s involvement in oil palm production. 
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2.  Population growth is creating economic and social pressures 
on the LSSs 
• Population pressure is beginning to emerge on the older LSS schemes such as 
Hoskins (and possibly Bialla) as the second generation marry and establish 
their own households on the block.  Many blocks are now supporting several 
families.   
• Population density per LSS block at Hoskins has increased from 8.6 persons 
per block in 1990 to 13.3 in 2000 with an average of 2.9 families per block.  
The current high numbers of households per LSS block at Hoskins partly 
reflect the difficulties settlers now face in returning to their “home” villages or 
acquiring land or off-block employment in WNB or elsewhere in Papua New 
Guinea. 
• The more populated blocks are complex economic and social units and very 
different to the single families that first settled on the LSSs in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. 
• Social instability and conflict is associated with heavily populated blocks.  
Many multiple household blocks experience economic and population 
pressure, and disputes and violence often occur on payday over the distribution 
of oil palm income.  Inter- and intra-household disputes reduce social harmony 
and can sometimes lead to significant disruption of oil palm production.  In the 
longer term they are a disincentive for smallholder investment. 
• Economic pressure on populated blocks is leading to the development of 
supplementary income sources to maintain household livelihoods.  The trend to 
increased reliance on non-oil palm income sources is likely to continue as 
population grows and as it becomes more difficult through time for second 
generation settlers to return “home”. 
• Acquiring additional land is the primary desire of most smallholders 
experiencing population pressure on their blocks.  However, opportunities for 
second generation smallholders to purchase LSS blocks are becoming 
constrained by limited savings potential and the inflation of LSS block prices.  
In response, some LSS settlers are “purchasing” land from customary 
landowners, squatting illegally on government or private land, seeking land in 
other provinces or moving into informal (squatter) settlements in urban centres. 
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• The growing numbers of smallholders illegally residing on government or 
company land, or “purchasing” insecure VOP land have the potential to 
seriously undermine social stability in the future. 
• There are increasing numbers of under-employed people on blocks, especially 
youth, who are unable to participate fully in oil palm production.  They are an 
under-utilised resource for the industry, and in the longer term may pose a 
threat to the social sustainability of the schemes as they become more 
disaffected and alienated.   
• With population increase it appears LSS smallholders are becoming more 
reliant on garden production, although the Mama Lus Frut Scheme may have 
offset this reliance to some extent in Hoskins.  Those blocks with high 
populations, which do not have alternative sources of income, are reverting to 
more subsistence-like lifestyles in which garden production is assuming much 
more importance. 
 
3. Smallholder household types and patterns of labour 
organisation are diverse 
• As the smallholder sector develops over time, diverse household types are 
emerging.  A major finding of the study is the transition occurring on LSSs 
where the single nuclear family managing a block is being displaced by other 
household configurations.  Single, caretaker and multiple household types are 
all now present on the schemes.  The multiple household block is steadily 
replacing the single household block. 
• Single household blocks are largely found on VOPs and on the LSS at 
Popondetta where population pressures are less.  Thus, on the older LSS 
schemes like Hoskins, single households are being replaced by multiple 
families co-resident on a block.   
• Alongside the diversification of household types new ways of organising and 
remunerating labour are emerging.  The shared wok bung production system 
where all or most family members or co-resident households participate in 
harvesting and block maintenance is no longer the only form of labour 
organisation on the blocks.  
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• At Hoskins, some blocks with multiple households have moved away from a 
shared wok bung style of work organisation (where most adults from all co-
resident households contribute to harvesting), to more individualised units of 
production where harvesting is rotated between co-resident households with 
less shared inter-household labour harvesting and block maintenance.  This 
style of production organisation is referred to as ‘markim mun’ by 
smallholders.  Rotation (markim mun) production usually emerges in response 
to the increasing number of co-resident households on blocks.  
• In the shared wok bung production system, labour remuneration is not 
necessarily commensurate with labour input, but rather payment is governed 
more by gender, age or kinship status.  Labour remuneration on a rotation 
(markim mun) system is usually expected to be commensurate with labour 
input and there is less in-kind payment.  Income distribution is often a source 
of disputes on blocks and can result in the withdrawal of labour, disruptions to 
harvesting or a shift in the production strategy from a shared wok bung system 
to a rotation (markim mun) system. 
• The rotation (markim mun) production system, which appears to be 
increasing, may be less efficient than shared family labour harvests.  There is 
some evidence to suggest that oil palm productivity is lower per hectare on 
highly populated blocks that employ a rotation (markim mun) system than on 
highly populated blocks that continue to practice shared family labour 
harvesting where more adults tend to participate in harvesting.  Also, under a 
rotation (markim mun) system there is a higher probability that block 
maintenance will be neglected or disputed, replanting delayed and greater 
avoidance of loan repayments. 
• The shift to a rotation (markim mun) system on highly populated blocks 
where households are operating more like independent nuclear family units is a 
major socio-agronomic transformation occurring on the LSS at Hoskins (and 
probably at Bialla).  At Popondetta this study did not record the rotation 
(markim mun) system among smallholders, and OPIC staff recalled only a 
small number of blocks that had this style of production organisation. 
• The study of household types and labour organisation reveals that the 
deployment of household labour in oil palm production is an outcome of 
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interactions between household decision-making, income distribution, 
family/gender relations, the range of livelihood strategies pursued and 
production motivation.  All these factors affect oil palm productivity. 
 
4.  Land disputes and tenure insecurity undermining smallholder 
commitment to oil palm and the long-term viability of the 
industry 
• Land conflicts take many forms in the oil palm smallholder sector, from the 
large compensation claims demanded by customary landowners for land 
alienated for estate plantations and land settlement schemes to inter- and intra-
household disputes over block ownership. 
• Land conflicts are critical production issues.  Land disputes reduce 
smallholder productivity by removing disputed stands of oil palm from 
production and lowering smallholder incentives to invest in their long-term 
futures (e.g., replanting or fertiliser uptake).  Also, insecure tenure undermines 
smallholder confidence in and commitment to oil palm, and deters economic 
development.  
• Land conflicts on both VOP and LSS blocks are particularly serious in 
Popondetta and are a major constraint on and challenge to improving 
smallholder production. 
• The “sale” of customary land in some VOPs at Hoskins is leading to land 
disputes between settlers and some landowning clan members, especially 
younger clan members who perceive future land shortages for themselves.   
These disputes are undermining the future tenure security of settlers “owning” 
VOP blocks. 
• At Hoskins and Popondetta there is growing intolerance and resentment of 
settlers (“outsiders”) who landowners believe are reaping most of the rewards 
of economic development and are the cause of growing land shortages in the 
region.   
 
Industry and OPIC Interventions 
• To increase smallholder production and productivity, the industry has 
introduced several smallholder initiatives.  They include new payment systems, 
 xxiii
credit schemes, fertiliser incentive schemes, infill plantings of oil palm on LSS 
blocks, replanting programmes and developing new areas of smallholder oil 
palm.  The latter is restricted to VOP expansion and the development of mini-
estates on customary land. 
• Replanting programmes at Hoskins and Popondetta are being hindered by a 
reluctance amongst smallholders to replant.  At Popondetta, smallholders are 
reluctant to replant for several reasons including high debt levels, potential loss 
of income, low oil palm prices, tenure insecurity, rental arrears, poor road 
conditions and a view by some smallholders that replanting is unnecessary. 
• Despite problems of debt avoidance, interest-free, in-kind credit to 
smallholders at Hoskins and Popondetta remains very important for 
maintaining and enhancing smallholder productivity, social harmony, and for 
ensuring the future growth of the smallholder sector. 
• In all project areas VOP plantings are increasing.  Popondetta’s VOP 
expansion programme under the Oro Expansion Project funded by the World 
Bank has increased by over 7,840 hectares since the project commenced in 
1993, far exceeding the initial project target of 3,500 hectares.  
• Oil palm mini-estates (oil palm estates managed by private companies on land 
leased from customary landowners) are a recent phenomenon and are 
undergoing rapid expansion, yet the long-term socio-economic impacts are 
little understood and difficult to predict.  A particular concern is how to ensure 
that the benefits from mini-estate development flow to women and groups 
holding secondary rights in the resource. 
• The most successful smallholder intervention has been a new payment system 
for women known as the Mama Lus Frut Scheme.  It has provided substantial 
financial benefits for the company and women.  In 2000, participating women 
earned K1,443 on average.  Women spend a high proportion of their oil palm 
income on food and family needs and this partly explains why smallholders 
view the scheme as significantly improving the social environment and general 
quality of life on the blocks.   
• The Mama Lus Frut Scheme has helped households to better meet their needs 
by strengthening livelihoods through improving income distribution and labour 
arrangements within households, reducing reliance on garden/market income, 
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enabling households to meet short-term cash demands and social obligations, 
and opening up new avenues for men to contribute to the household economy. 
• The success of the scheme can be explained partly by the scheme’s 
guaranteed payment for women’s labour, the way it was introduced, the 
employment of female extension officers in OPIC, and the high level of 
support for the scheme by OPIC and NBPOL.  Also, there were few 
structural/cost barriers to participation in the scheme, and loose fruit collection 
was easily incorporated into existing gendered work roles and patterns.  Most 
importantly, it strengthened household livelihood security through increased 
financial and social benefits for women. 
• In the process of weighing up an industry or OPIC intervention, smallholders 
often focus on how a proposed intervention fits into, strengthens or adds to 
their existing livelihood strategies.  OPIC or company initiatives for 
smallholders are more likely to be successful if they are compatible with 
household livelihood strategies which smallholders see as important in 
maintaining economic and social well-being. 
 
Recommendations 
• Smallholder initiatives by the companies or OPIC to increase smallholder 
production or productivity should aim to promote sustainable livelihoods 
through increasing household choices, incomes, land security and social 
harmony. 
• Develop more flexible payment systems to encourage greater labour mobility 
between blocks and more equitable distribution of income between co-resident 
households. 
• Encourage the development of supplementary income sources that do not 
draw labour away from oil palm production.  This will help relieve some of the 
economic pressures on smallholder LSS blocks at Hoskins. 
• Maintain and enhance food security by encouraging strategies of sustainable 
food garden production, like improving garden soil fertility through the 
composting of empty fruit bunches and the application of inorganic fertilisers.  




• Address land disputes to ensure future land security and social stability, and 
conduct further research into the long-term socio-economic impacts of mini-
estate development.  
• Provide incentives for replanting by smallholders.  Replanting “packages” 
could include interest free credit and flexible loan repayment rates that take 
account of prevailing oil palm prices.  Promote high value market crops to 
compensate for short-term losses in oil palm income during replanting. 
• Continue the interest free credit schemes currently available to smallholders 
from the oil palm companies.  The value of these schemes to smallholders 
could be enhanced significantly by making repayment rates more flexible to 
take account of fluctuations in oil palm prices.  
• Promote family planning and budgeting among smallholders.  This should be 
supported by all stakeholders in the industry and the Department of Health.  As 
all smallholders will soon be required to have bank accounts for the direct 
payment of oil palm income, bank staff should regularly participate in industry 
field days to provide advice on banking and budgeting.  Finally, as the long-
term social and economic sustainability of the schemes is being eroded by 
population growth, it is imperative that family planning advice be made 
available to smallholders.  As a matter of course, Department of Health staff 




BACKGROUND TO OIL PALM IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
 
 
1.0  Introduction 
Oil Palm is grown in five project areas in Papua New Guinea: Hoskins and 
Bialla in West New Britain (WNB), Popondetta, Milne Bay and New Ireland 
(Figure 1.1).  All project areas operate on a nucleus estate-smallholder model 
whereby smallholders supply oil palm fruit to mills operated by the nucleus 
estate company.  In WNB and Popondetta smallholder production is located on 
Land Settlement Schemes (LSS) (State leased land) and on Village Oil Palm 
schemes (VOPs), (village-based production on customary land).  VOPs were 
introduced after the LSS schemes and were established to encourage more 
involvement in the industry by local villagers.  Milne Bay and New Ireland do 
not have LSSs, only VOPs.  Presently, there are over 100,000 hectares of oil 
palm, of which 43,000 ha are smallholder plantings (ADS (PNG) 2001). 
 
1.1  Brief History Of Oil Palm Development In Papua New Guinea 
Germans were the first to plant oil palm in 1894-95 on the Rai Coast of Papua 
New Guinea (Sack and Clark 1979, quoted in Grieve 1986).  The Germans also 
established additional experimental plantings in the early 1920s near Popondetta 
in Northern (Oro) Province (Landell Mills 1991).  Commercial plantings were 
established in 1967 following a World Bank recommendation that oil palm on a 
nucleus estate-smallholder system be introduced to New Britain or Bougainville 
to diversify the agricultural economy and increase the export income of Papua 








The World Bank recommendation accorded at the time with the colonial 
administration’s land settlement programme to open up alienated land for the 
voluntary resettlement of rural people from over-populated areas to “under-
populated” regions of Papua New Guinea.  Alienated land was subdivided into 
smallholdings for the primary purpose of cash crop production.  The settlement 
schemes were viewed as a major vehicle to increase agricultural export 
production, improve rural incomes, integrate Papua New Guineans into cash 
crop production, relieve population pressure in some rural areas and to bring 
into production “unused” or under-exploited land (Hulme 1984, 81).  The 
Australian colonial administration also considered that by establishing 
individualised holdings on land settlement schemes, Papua New Guineans 
would experience the benefits of an individualised land tenure system which, it 
hoped, would eventually replace customary land tenure (Hulme 1984, 86).  
Customary land tenure was considered inimical to the development of large-
scale cash crop production. 
 
The colonially administered land settlement schemes in the late 1950s and mid 
1960s (based on crops other than oil palm) were small schemes and suffered 
from ad hoc planning, few services and minimal government supervision and 
guidance.  Hence, the World Bank recommendation that oil palm be developed 
using a nucleus estate-smallholder model was enthusiastically accepted because 
it had the advantage of the smallholder settlement located around and supported 
by a central nucleus estate jointly owned by the government and a private 
company.  The company would be responsible for managing the estate, 
establishing its own processing mill, marketing, and providing smallholders 
with planting material, technical advice and processing facilities (Christensen 
1986).   
 
As part of the settlement scheme policies of the 1950s and 1960s the Australian 
administration had obtained large tracts of land along the north coast of New 
Britain, and later viewed these as suitable for the development of an oil palm 
nucleus estate-smallholder scheme (Hulme 1984, 237).  In 1966 the British 
plantation company, Harrisons and Crosfield applied to the administration to 
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develop an oil palm nucleus estate-smallholder project and the following year 
the first nucleus estate-smallholder scheme based on oil palm was established at 
Hoskins, a joint venture between the government and Harrisons and Crosfield 
(Longayroux 1972).  The two parties registered New Britain Palm Oil 
Development Pty Ltd (NBPOD) as a joint venture company and in 1967 work 
began at Nahavio to develop oil palm production in the province.  
 
Under the agreement NBPOD developed an oil palm estate and a processing 
mill and the Administration opened government land adjacent to the estate for 
500 smallholders to settle and plant oil palm for processing by the company.  
Oil palm planting on customary land by the local indigenous population was 
also encouraged.  The Hoskins scheme was considered by both parties as a pilot 
project (Longayroux 1972, 5), and it later became a model for other oil palm 
nucleus estate-smallholder schemes in Papua New Guinea (Hulme 1984).   
 
1.2  Smallholder Schemes 
1.2.1  Hoskins, LSS 
The smallholder land settlement scheme developed by the administration at 
Hoskins was based on land holdings of approximately 6-6.5 hectares.  It was 
expected that 4 hectares would be planted to oil palm, and the remaining area 
reserved for food gardens.  Groupings of approximately 130-320 blocks became 
subdivisions, each with a central community centre containing a primary school, 
health centre, agricultural extension office, designated market area, stores and 
recreational facilities.  Blockholders acquired 99 year agricultural leases over 
their blocks and were provided with loans from the Papua New Guinea 
Development Bank (PNGDB) for house building, oil palm seedlings, tools, land 
rent and to cover living expenses while waiting for the first harvest (Jonas 1972; 
Hulme 1984).   
 
People from other provinces of Papua New Guinea acquired smallholder leases 
and the first settlers moved onto their blocks in July 1968.  Whilst the 
agricultural leases were publicly advertised and open to all Papua New Guinea 
residents, preference was given to applicants from land-short areas, such as the 
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Chimbu, Maprik and Wabag areas, and the Gazelle peninsula of East New 
Britain.  Hulme reports (1984, 242) that special government publicity 
committees were set up in these land-short areas to encourage people to resettle 
on the oil palm blocks.  Many labourers involved with pre-settlement 
development were also allocated blocks and later Morobe Province was targeted 
as a recruitment area for settlers (Ploeg 1972; Hulme 1984).  By independence 
in 1975, 1,536 LSS blocks had been planted to oil palm and the project’s target 
of 1,560 blocks was achieved in 1975/76 (Hulme 1984, 241).  The majority of 
settlers at that time were from East and West Sepik (42%), followed by Chimbu 
(22%), East New Britain (15%), Morobe (11%) and West New Britain (4%) 
(Hulme 1984, 242 – based on 1976 figures).  Additional leasehold blocks were 
released in the 1970s and currently the Hoskins scheme has 1,634  LSS blocks 
(Table 1.1). 
 
1.2.2  Hoskins, VOP 
Following the initial development and establishment of the LSS scheme, 
attention was turned to indigenous landowners in the Hoskins area.  The VOP 
project initially encouraged local villagers to plant 2 or 4 hectare blocks of oil 
palm on customary land, but most have planted only 2 hectares.  Villagers were 
provided with PNGDB loans to develop their blocks and between 1970 and 
1975, 182 VOP blocks were established (Leach and Benjamin 1984, 17).  By 
the end of 1980 there were 418 blocks.  VOP blocks were slow to develop at 
Hoskins, although further expansion was stimulated in 1986 following 
assistance from the Asian Development Bank (Christensen 1986).  Presently, 
there are 3,021 VOP blocks in the Hoskins Scheme (Table 1.1).  A feature of 
the VOP blocks is their lower productivity compared with LSS blocks. 
 
1.2.3  Bialla 
The government and company viewed the Hoskins scheme as a success because 
it surpassed many of its early production and earning goals (Hulme 1984, 253) 
and provided an impetus to regional growth and development in the province.  
Its perceived success led the government to set up similar oil palm nucleus 
estate-smallholder schemes at Bialla and Popondetta.   
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The Bialla scheme was established in 1972 following a joint agreement between 
the government and a Japanese company.  However, a dispute between the 
government and the company delayed the commencement of the project and in 
1977 a new agreement was signed with SIPEF (Belgium) and Warrens (United 
Kingdom) (Christensen 1986).  A joint government and SIPEF-Warrens venture 
company, Hargy Oil Palms was formed.  The basic operation and structure of  
 












































Total estate area 
(ha) 








23.2 14.7 18.9 28.3 17.3 
LSS blocks 3,021 2,161 1,045 nil nil 
VOP blocks 1,634 1,067 4,448 536 648 
Total smallholder 
area (ha) 




277,642.7 119,730.01*** 113,665.12 9,609.0 10,616.8 
Smallholder yields 
(t/ha)** 
17.2 10.6 8.7 7.2 8.3 
% smallholder 
production to total 
production (2000) 
33.3% 59.2%  43.5%  4.6% 9.3% 
Total mini-estate 
area (ha) 
7,128  nil 2,051  1,975  309  
2000 production* 
(tonnes FFB) 
833,323.6 202,104.59 260,806.64 207,494 114,355.9 
Source: PNGOPRA data, ADS (PNG) 2001 
*      2000 production figures derived from PNGOPRA data. 
**    yields calculated on 2000 production figures and total area (hectares). 
***  production total also includes some smallholder crop in the Hoskins scheme. 
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the Bialla scheme mirrored that of the Hoskins scheme whereby the company 
partners agreed to develop a nucleus estate of oil palm and a processing mill and 
the government opened alienated land adjacent to the estate for smallholder 
leasehold settlement.   
 
Settler selection for the Bialla land settlement scheme followed that of the 
Hoskins scheme with blocks publicly advertised and priority given to applicants 
from land-short areas of Papua New Guinea.  A VOP programme was also 
established.  By the mid 1980s, 900 LSS blocks and 110 VOP blocks had been 
established at Bialla (Christensen 1986, 139).  The number of smallholder 
blocks has increased substantially over the last two decades and there are now 
1,067 VOP and 2,161 LSS blocks (Table 1.1). 
 
1.2.4  Popondetta 
The Popondetta Oil Palm scheme was initiated in 1976 following a 
recommendation that the failed Popondetta cocoa scheme1 be redeveloped as a 
nucleus estate-smallholder oil palm project (Harrison Fleming Advisory 
Services 1973 quoted in Hulme 1984, 216).  
 
In 1976 the government entered into a joint venture agreement with the British 
Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) to redevelop the 16,000 
hectare cocoa scheme into an oil palm nucleus estate-smallholder project 
(Grieve 1986).  The two parties formed Higaturu Oil Palm Plantation Ltd 
(HOPPL2).  In 1976 work began on developing a 4,500 hectare estate and 
processing facilities.  The government, with World Bank funding, agreed to 
establish smallholder oil palm plantings which included a land settlement 
scheme for leasehold blocks similar to that operating in Hoskins and Bialla.   
 
The resulting LSS scheme was a mix of the existing cocoa settlers (251 blocks), 
who were assisted to replant oil palm, and new settlers (544 blocks) from other 
provinces in Papua New Guinea (Hulme 1986, 298).  By 2000, 1,045 LSS 
blocks had been established (Table 1.1). 
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VOP development at Popondetta was on customary land and on Land Tenure 
Conversion (LTC) blocks.  Most of the latter were previously planted with 
cocoa and were incorporated into the oil palm project with the help of a 
‘comprehensive package of resources’ for the planting and maintenance of oil 
palm (Fingleton 1972, 166).  Like the growers at Hoskins and Bialla, VOP/LTC 
growers and LSS settlers were provided with Rural Development Bank credit to 
cover living costs, planting materials and housing loans. 
 
Although the initial smallholder planting targets were not achieved in the early 
stages of the Popondetta project (Hulme 1984, 297), smallholder oil palm 
development grew steadily throughout the 1980s from 3,395 hectares in 1980 to 
6,285 hectares by the close of the decade (OPIC file, n.d.).  VOP smallholder 
holdings then expanded significantly from 1993 under the present World Bank 
funded “Oro Smallholder Oil Palm Expansion Project”.  The project’s original 
objective was to plant an additional 6,000 hectares of smallholder oil palm by 
1999.  The enthusiastic planting of oil palm on VOPs has seen this target 
exceeded.  By 2000 an additional 7,840 hectares had been planted, bringing the 
total area of smallholder plantings to approximately 13,000 hectares (ADS 
(PNG) 2001, 17). 
 
1.2.5  Milne Bay 
Milne Bay started in 1985 following government approval for the development 
of a K60 million oil palm and cocoa scheme (Grieve 1986).  The government in 
a joint venture with Commonwealth Development Corporation planned to 
establish 4,000 hectares of oil palm and 750 hectares of cocoa (Christensen 
1986, 139), and Milne Bay Estates Ltd was formed (now a subsidiary of Pacific 
Rim Plantations Ltd).  The project, with World Bank funding, was seen as a 
major vehicle for bringing sustainable economic development to the province.  
One thousand hectares of smallholder village oil palm on customary land was 
also planned, but unlike previous oil palm nucleus estate-smallholder projects, 
no State land settlement scheme with leasehold blocks was established.  By the 
mid 1980s, policies of land settlement had fallen out of favour with government 
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and were no longer viewed as a major strategy in rural development (see Jones 
& McGavin 2001).   
 
Milne Bay Estates began planting in 1986, and over the next five years 4,661 
hectares of estate plantations and 383 hectares of VOP blocks were under 
cultivation (Konimor 1991).  World Bank funds provided credit to growers to 
establish oil palm blocks.  Although cocoa was planted on one of the company 
estates (Sagarai) in 1993 it was converted to oil palm due to disease problems.  
Now, estate planting has increased to 6,990 hectares with plans for further 
expansion (ADS (PNG) 2001, 20).  The development of estate plantations is 
being hampered by land disputes with customary landowners (OPIC 1998, 23). 
 
Village oil palm has been established on customary land under Clan Land 
Usage Agreements (CLUA) to facilitate loan requirements (OPIC 1998, 20).  
Presently, 1,338 hectares of village oil palm are planted, numbering 356 
smallholder farmers (ADS (PNG), 2001), with expectations that numbers will 
continue to grow over the short term.  Unlike other oil palm schemes in Papua 
New Guinea, smallholders’ contribution to total production is only around 5%, 
considerably lower than that of other schemes (Table 1.1). 
 
1.2.6  New Ireland 
New Ireland is the most recent and smallest oil palm scheme in Papua New 
Guinea.  The company, Poliamba Pty Limited (subsidiary of Pacific Rim 
Plantations Ltd), operates the estate and mill process and was formed in 1998 
following the restructuring of a group of cocoa and copra plantations in that 
province (Papua New Guinea Oil Palm Association 1998).  The company 
completed most of its planting in 1992 and plantings total around 5,200 hectares 
(ADS (PNG) 2001).   
 
Village oil palm plantings were established in 1991 with financial support from 
the Rural Development Bank of Papua New Guinea.  The area planted to oil 
palm remains limited with less than 1,300 hectares planted on customary land 
(Table 1.1).    
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Details of company ownership, estate and smallholder hectarage and production 
for each oil palm scheme is provided in Table 1.1.  The Oil Palm Industry 
Corporation’s (OPIC) strategic priorities (1999-2003) for each scheme are listed 
in Appendix 1.1.  
 
1.3  Government and Private Support in the Establishment of the 
Oil Palm Industry in Papua New Guinea 
The establishment of the industry based on the nucleus estate-smallholder 
model facilitated private investment in Papua New Guinea.  Substantial private 
investment was required to establish the estates and associated processing and 
marketing facilities.  Large-scale private investment continues as the industry 
expands in the five project areas.  For example, New Britain Palm Oil Limited 
had estimated capital expenditure of K47.4 million for 1999 and K59.2 million 
for 2000.  Much of this is for developing estate lands and processing facilities at 
Numondo and Kulu-Dagi and Inland Kove (NBPOL 1999).  Hargy Oil Palm 
Ltd is also investing over K20 million in the construction of a new mill at Navo.  
Presently, private investors are examining the feasibility of expanding oil palm 
to other provinces, namely Gulf, East New Britain, Madang and East Sepik. 
 
The establishment of the oil palm industry in Papua New Guinea also received 
considerable financial support from government and international donors, 
though this varied between the different schemes.  The government was joint 
owner in the early nucleus estate schemes in West New Britain and Popondetta, 
and remains a major shareholder in Bialla, Popondetta and Milne Bay.  Also, 
the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have played a substantial 
funding role in establishing the industry in Papua New Guinea.  The World 
Bank provided funding support for much of the development of the smallholder 
sector at Hoskins, Popondetta and Milne Bay.  
 
The government and overseas donors continue to provide substantial support to 
the industry, although government support is in decline.  The government 
provides smallholder extension services (though increasingly funded by a levy 
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on growers), industry subsidies, credit for smallholders and is responsible for 
the provision of services and infrastructure.  Currently, the largest overseas 
funded project, the World Bank Oro Expansion Project which began in 1993 has 
received in excess of US$27 million in funds. 
 
1.4  Structure of the Oil Palm Industry in Papua New Guinea 
The estate companies own and operate the processing mills and their own 
plantation estates.  Some also take responsibility for transporting smallholder 
fruit to their processing mills and providing seedlings, technical services and 
advice to smallholders.  
 
In most of the project areas, smallholder oil palm fruit is harvested fortnightly 
and stacked at the roadside edge of the block for collection by the company for 
processing.  A harvest can take up to 3-4 days work depending on the area 
planted to oil palm, age of palms and the number of people assisting with 
harvesting.  The fruit is cut, transported to the road in wheelbarrows and stacked 
for weighing and collection.  When fruit is harvested, or over-ripe, oil palm 
fruitlets become dislodged from the main bunch.  This loose fruit is separately 
collected by women and weighed, and can account for up to 14% of the harvest.  
A long-term concern for the oil palm industry has been the high rate of loose 
fruit wastage.  The recent introduction in several schemes – Hoskins, 
Popondetta and Bialla - of a separate payment card for women to collect loose 
fruit has lead to large increases in loose fruit collection (Chapter 8).  
 
Smallholders sell their fruit to the company, and depending on the project area, 
are paid either fortnightly or monthly.  The price paid for the fruit is determined 
by the world price of palm oil and is based on an agreed formula developed by 
the Papua New Guinea Government, the companies and the growers’ 
associations.  There is some variation in the price paid to smallholders by the 




Despite the rise in land disputes (Chapter 6), the nucleus estate-smallholder 
model has worked well.  Not only do smallholders generally have good access 
to transport and processing facilities, technical support and a regular income, 
but the presence of a large plantation estate also provides additional 
employment opportunities for smallholders.  This is especially beneficial for the 
growing population on the LSS.  Also, for the milling company the nucleus 
estate-smallholder model provides the company with access to a larger area of 
land planted to oil palm.  
 
With the restrictions and difficulties of alienating land for project developments, 
the industry, since the late 1990s, has been developing mini-estate schemes.  
Presently, approximately 11,500 hectares are under mini-estate production, with 
planned expansion of over 30,000 hectares in the near future.  Bialla is the only 
scheme that has not established mini-estates.  Mini-estates allow companies 
access to customary land for oil palm through a lease, lease-back arrangement 
with an Incorporated Landowning Group (ILG) – a legally-constituted 
landowning corporate body.  The customary land is leased to the National 
government which then sub-leases it back to the ILG.  The ILG in turn leases 
the land to the company for development.  Leases are usually for a 20 or 40 year 
period during which time the company takes responsibility for the management 
of the mini-estate, and the landowning group receives an annual rental fee as 
well as annual royalty payments on the production.  In the case of NBPOL, 
landowners are also issued company shares – the number depending on the 
hectares leased and the lease period.  The lease, lease-back system is not new to 
Papua New Guinea and is operating in several resource development projects.   
 
1.5  Structure of Governance in the Oil Palm Industry 
The industry consists of several institutions namely, the Oil Palm Industry 
Corporation, Papua New Guinea Oil Palm Research Association, Oil Palm 
Growers Associations, and the Papua New Guinea Palm Oil Producers 
Association.  Each is discussed below. 
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1.5.1  Oil Palm Industry Corporation (OPIC) 
Agricultural extension services to smallholders were initially under the 
management of the Department of Agriculture and Livestock (DAL).  In 1992, 
as part of the government’s corporatisation and agricultural reform policies, the 
Oil Palm Industry Corporation (OPIC) was established as a quasi government 
agency.  OPIC is financed by a smallholder crop levy of K3.50/tonne which is 
matched by the oil palm companies.  International aid funding also provides 
significant financial support for the organisation.   
 
The central role of OPIC is to provide extension services to smallholders and to: 
• increase smallholder productivity; 
• promote improved farm management techniques; 
• provide advice and education regarding oil palm production methods; 
• enhance the well-being of smallholders. 
 
OPIC is also responsible for liasing with the government, oil palm companies 
and other organisations involved in the industry.  To facilitate OPIC’s role, 
Local Planning Committees have been established in each of the five project 
areas.  These committees consist of the OPIC project manager and a 
representative from the local growers association, provincial government, 
plantation company and the Oil Palm Research Association.  The Committee 
meets regularly to discuss, plan and monitor the work of OPIC and to act as a 
forum for various stakeholders to raise various issues of interest or concern.  
OPIC’s mission statement and five year strategic plan for 1999-2003 are 
presented in Appendix 1.2. 
 
1.5.2  Papua New Guinea Oil Palm Research Association  
Oil palm research began in 1967 when the Dami Oil Palm Research Station in 
WNB was established by Harrisons and Crosfields.   As the industry expanded, 
a single research organisation that serviced all project areas was considered 
necessary for the industry.  In 1980 the Papua New Guinea Oil Palm Research 
Association (OPRA) was formed between the government, the plantation 
companies and the smallholder sector.  OPRA is financed by a smallholder and 
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plantation crop levy, some government funding and many of its research 
projects are funded by external (largely overseas) research grants. 
 
OPRA’s main areas of research include agronomy (in particular soil chemistry 
and plant nutrition), entomology, smallholder studies, and plant pathology.  The 
research underpins OPRA’s major role in developing new technologies and 
farm management techniques to improve oil palm production.  The association 
also provides technical support and training to smallholders, extension officers 
and plantation company officers. OPRA’s research output is in the form of 
academic and conference papers, technical reports and information bulletins for 
disseminating information throughout the industry. 
 
1.5.3  Papua New Guinea Palm Oil Producers Assocation (POPA) 
The Palm Oil Producers Association represents the interests of the milling 
companies.  It liases and negotiates with governments for positive support for 
the oil palm companies and the industry as a whole. 
 
1.5.4  Oil Palm Growers Associations 
Each project area has a smallholder Oil Palm Growers Association which 
represents the interests of smallholders to the industry bodies such as the 
companies, OPIC and OPRA and to National/provincial governments.  The 
Chair of each growers’ association sits on the board of OPIC and represents 
smallholders at Local Planning Committee meetings.  Smallholder membership 
is voluntary and an annual subscription fee helps fund the associations.   
 
The extent of smallholder involvement in the associations varies between 
project areas and over time.  At various times the associations have experienced 
problems with financial mismanagement resulting in members losing 
confidence in their organisations.  For example, in 2000 the membership of the 
Hoskins growers association numbered 89 growers, representing a substantial 
fall in membership from 500-600 members in the mid 1990s.  The massive loss 
of members resulted from misappropriation of the growers’ association funds.  
In Popondetta the Growers Association membership has been limited due in part 
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to the perception amongst settlers that the organisation is dominated by local 
landowner interests.  
 
1.6  Current State of Oil Palm Industry in Papua New Guinea 
Most of the development of the oil palm industry occurred in the decade 1975-
1985.  Since the first commercial plantings in 1968 at Nahavio, West New 
Britain over 50,000 hectares are now under estate cultivation and over 43,000 
hectares have been planted by smallholders.  Since 1997 approximately, 11,463 
hectares have been planted to mini-estates.  Growth of the industry has 
benefited enormously by the introduction in the early eighties of a pollinating 
weevil3 (Elaeidobius kamerunicus) and more recently by higher yielding and 
disease resistant strains of oil palm.  
 
In terms of total exports the oil palm industry is emerging as the most important 
agricultural export industry in Papua New Guinea.  Over the last few years oil 
palm has been one of the fastest growing agricultural exports in the country and 
has performed remarkably well, especially compared to other tree crop exports 
(Tables 1.2 and 1.3).  Last year the value of oil palm exports exceeded coffee 
for the first time (DAL data, 2001).  In 2000 oil palm exports accounted for 
32% of the total value of Papua New Guinea’s agricultural exports, and 5% of 
total Papua New Guinea exports (data held by DAL, 2001).  The total value of 
palm oil exports for 2000 was K302.5 million, a substantial increase from 
K142.2 million in 1995.  In the same period the volume of palm oil exports 
increased by 77.5% (Table 1.3). 
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Palm Oil -6.5 77.5 65.9 
Coffee 18.2 18.8 40.5 
Cocoa -14.5 22.5 4.7 
Copra 45.9 3.6 51.1 
Copra Oil -0.30 45.0 44.5 
Rubber 94.6 -17.8 59.8 
Tea -10.6 102.3 80.8 
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea and DAL statistics 
 
Currently, there are over 14,500 smallholder oil palm blocks.  In 2000, 
smallholders produced 531,264 tonnes of FFB and earned approximately K36.5 
million from oil palm (ADS (PNG) 2001, 1).  At Hoskins alone, approximately, 
K1-1.5 million enters the economy every month (ADS (PNG) 2001, ii).  In 
2000, smallholders accounted for 43% of the area under oil palm and 33% of 
total production.   
 
Whilst there have been large increases in production and the area planted by 
smallholders (Table 1.4), improving smallholder productivity (production per 
unit area) remains the industry’s major challenge.  Smallholder productivity 
continues to be much lower than the estate plantations (Table 1.1), and VOP 
productivity is consistently lower than the LSS (except for Popondetta).  A 
priority of the industry is to increase smallholder production as a proportion of 
total production to at least 50% by 2003 (OPIC 1998, ii).  This is to be achieved 
through expanding the area under cultivation and by increasing the productivity 
of existing blocks. 
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SMALLHOLDER OIL PALM 
(HECTARES) 
2000 
SMALLHOLDER OIL PALM 
(HECTARES) 
HOSKINS 11,180 16,148 
BIALLA 9,279 11,250  
POPONDETTA 9,931 13,000 
MILNE BAY 1,060 1,338  
NEW IRELAND 975 1,285 
TOTAL 32,425 43,021 
Source: OPRA data and ADS (PNG), 2001 
 
Oil palm appears to have several attributes that make it suitable for smallholder 
production: 
• It has few pest and disease problems.  
• It grows on a wide range of soils and requires little maintenance.   
• Oil palms can tolerate a lot of neglect and can be quickly brought back 
into production.  If oil palm prices collapse, harvesting can be abandoned 
until prices rise again.   
• Although yields vary seasonally, palms produce all year, providing 
smallholders with a regular income (unlike coffee which has a very short 
harvest season).   
• Because of the nucleus estate model smallholders generally have good 
access to processing and marketing facilities.   




1. The Popondetta cocoa scheme established in the 1950s allocated leasehold 
blocks to Australian ex-servicemen.  A smaller area of leasehold blocks was 
opened up for Papua New Guineans: most being from Popondetta and a 
small minority from other provinces in Papua New Guinea.  The average 
block size was approximately 10 hectares (Hulme 1984, 216). 
 
2. In 1995 HOPPL was renamed Higaturu Oil Palms – a member of the Pacific 
Rim Plantation Pty Ltd Group. In 1995 Pacific Rim Plantations Ltd was 
formed following a restructuring of CDC.  It was a joint venture between the 
PNG government and CDC. 
 
3. The pollinating weevil eliminated the need for hand pollination of the palms 
every few days, and this vastly improved pollination rates and lowered 







FORMULATION OF PROBLEM AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
2.0  Research Problem 
During 1999 funding was approved by ACIAR for a joint 
ANU/Curtin/PNGOPRA project to research the socio-economic constraints that 
affect productivity among smallholders.  The primary aim of the research was to 
help improve smallholder oil palm productivity. 
 
Smallholder production in Papua New Guinea has been increasing steadily over 
the last decade (Table 2.1).  In 2000 total smallholder output was 531,264 
tonnes, a doubling of production since 1994.  However, a characteristic of 
smallholder production is that yields for both LSS and VOP growers are much 
lower than those for the plantation sector (Table 2.2), and average yields per 
hectare for the VOPs are consistently lower than that of the LSS (except for 
Popondetta).  There is also considerable variation in productivity among 
individual smallholders.  Some LSS and VOP smallholders consistently 
maintain productivity levels at or near estate productivity levels, while other 
smallholders have consistently low productivity levels. 
 
Table 2.1.  Smallholder production by project 1994-2000 (FFB tonnes) 
 




1994 120,733 79,425 59,374 4,101     67 263,633 
1996 146,140 93,627 75,177 8,537 1,357 324,838 
1998 210,918 83,708 94,280 7,793 2,505 399,204 
2000 277,643  119,730    113,665 9,609    10,617 531,264 
 

















Smallholder 17.2 10.6 8.7 8.3 7.2 
Estate 23.2 14.7 18.9 17.3 28.3 
Source: OPRA data 
 
 
A primary goal of the industry is to increase smallholder production and 
productivity through a range of interventions such as increased fertiliser use, 
access to credit for tools and seedlings, harvesting cards for women and 
promoting better farm management techniques amongst smallholders (Chapter 
7).  These interventions have mostly been geared to increasing yields through 
intensification of inputs by improving block maintenance, switching to higher 
yielding palms and encouraging the participation of women in oil palm 
production. 
 
Although it is widely acknowledged by the industry that diverse socio-economic 
factors interact with agronomic practices to explain variations in productivity 
between growers, few studies have examined the socio-economic constraints 
among smallholders.  One key work is the Landell Mills (1991) study at 
Hoskins.  That study identified the socio-economic factors associated with four 
smallholder production categories (0-25, 25-50, 50-75 and 75-100 percentiles of 
mean block productivity), and concluded that variations in productivity were 
attributable to incomplete harvesting, post-harvest loss and poor agronomic 
practices.  It was suggested that labour shortages, conflicts over land, disputed 
inheritance, off-block residence and employment, time management between 
customary obligations, community commitments and oil palm production, 
together with illness and aging among the original owners were explanatory 
factors.  By using high, medium and low production categories the study 
identified the main constraints operating in each category (Table 2.3). 
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Harvesting Abandoned block 
Incomplete harvesting 
Irregular harvesting 
Less than 12 pick ups 
p.a. 
Incomplete harvesting 
Irregular harvesting  
12-20 pick ups p.a. 
Complete harvest 
Regular harvest every 14 
days 
20 + pick ups p.a. 
Lus Frut collection None Sometimes Always 
 
Fertiliser None Unevenly administered 
Not enough  
Correct amounts 
Correctly administered 
Weeding None Inappropriate weeding 




Herbicide None Inappropriate use Adequate use 
 
Replanting None Not at right time 
Not enough 
Well planned 
Poisoning None Not at right time 
Poisoned trees burnt or 
left to stand 
Well planned 
Poisoned trees knocked 
over 
Source: adapted from Landell Mills 1991 
 
 
2.1  Formulation of Research Questions 
Workshops with OPIC extension officers were conducted at the beginning of 
fieldwork at Hoskins and Popondetta to draw on their knowledge and 
experience to refine the research questions and to ascertain their understanding 
of the primary factors explaining variations in productivity.  A similar 
framework of smallholder production categories to that used in the Landell 
Mills study was adopted in the workshops.  At the workshops a comprehensive 
list was made of what extension officers identified as the primary factors 
influencing smallholder production.  The results from each workshop are 
presented in Tables 2.4 and 2.5.   
 
Several important findings and research questions emerged from the OPIC 
workshops.  First, extension officers at both project schemes stressed how 
individual smallholders frequently shift between the “high” and “low” producer 
categories through time.  Several of the factors identified to explain low 
production, such as illness, death, or disputes over tenure and/or conflicts 
between family members on a block were raised in relation to how the 
occurrence of these types of events can suddenly shift a smallholder from high 
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Table 2.4.  Factors identified by OPIC officers to explain high and low production among Hoskins smallholders 
 HIGH PRODUCTION LOW PRODUCTION 
PHYSICAL FEATURES Good soils. 
Good terrain conditions and drainage. 
Poor soils. 
Poor terrain conditions and poor drainage. 
AGRONOMIC AND FARM 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
Regular harvesting 
More likely to harvest rear section of block. 
Regular and correct use of fertiliser. 
Well maintained tools regularly available for harvesting. 
Well maintained block. 
Introduction of the Badang to overcome labour shortages, irregular harvesting 
and terrain problems. 
 
Irregular harvesting. 
Low harvesting rate at rear of block. Harvesting rate decreases away from the 
road (i.e., strong edge-effect). 
Fertiliser use poor or irregular. 
Harvesting tools often unavailable for harvesting or broken and not repaired 
promptly. 
Poorly managed block. 
LABOUR CHARACTERISTICS Co-operation of all family members (wok bung) in production. 
Organised, hard-working family unit. 
Limited labour availability overcome by use of contract work (e.g., contract 
workers used to apply fertiliser and for block maintenance). 
Visitors provide additional labour for harvesting and block maintenance work. 
 
Elderly blockowner with limited labour supply. 
Limited labour availability unable to be overcome.  Usually the result of family 
conflict. 
Labour disorganised. 
Illness and poor health, but no support with block maintenance or harvesting. 
INTRA-HOUSEHOLD 
RELATIONS 
AND DECISION MAKING 
Family unity and cohesiveness.   Family conflict.
INCOME DISTRIBUTION All the family benefits from income earned on block.  All co-operate to harvest 
and maintain block. 
Reluctance to share income.  One person controls the money and thus little 
incentive for other family members to harvest. 
Too many visitors on the block wanting to share in the income. Can act as a 
disincentive to harvest regularly. 
 
TIME AND CASH 
MANAGEMENT SKILLS 
Good cash management. 
Community type distractions limited. 
Good time management.  Limited demands on their time from customary 
obligations. 
 
Community distractions which remove labour from oil palm production (e.g., 
funerals, local and community politics and customary obligations). 
Poor cash management. 
Spending money on beer often results in low block maintenance and less 
commitment to production 
 
TENURE SECURITY  Inheritance problems on the LSS acts as a disincentive as ownership uncertain. 
Land disputes, either with customary owners or within the family. 
ECONOMIC MOTIVATION Economic pressure to earn a high income (e.g., some households motivated by 
school fees, debt repayments, etc.  Once economic pressure is removed (e.g., 
payment of school fees) then the household can shift to lower production levels. 
Limited or no economic pressure to earn a high income (e.g., VOPs blocks).  
Less economic pressure to harvest as they have greater access to subsistence and 
alternative sources of income (e.g., cocoa). 
LEVEL OF INTEREST  Young people lack commitment to the industry, or pride in the block.  They are 
interested in money, but not interested in maintaining the block. 
Multiple block owners.  Several low producers are multiple block owners, 
especially on VOP. 
Lazy grower. 




Table 2.5.  Factors identified by OPIC officers to explain high and low production among Popondetta smallholders 
 
 HIGH PRODUCTION LOW PRODUCTION 
PHYSICAL FEATURES Favourable topography Poor topography. 
AGRONOMIC AND FARM 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
Regular harvesting. 
Owner harvests and maintains all the block. 
Adequate supply of tools. 
 
Irregular and partial harvesting. 
Only harvests and maintains front section of the block. 
Lack of tools. 
Old palms on block.  Grower tends to harvest only the younger and 
shorter palms. 
 
LABOUR CHARACTERISTICS Most family members involved with harvesting. Family members unwilling to provide labour due to family conflicts. 
Off-block employment – less labour for oil palm. 
 
INTRA-HOUSEHOLD RELATIONS 
AND DECISION MAKING 
Co-operation between family members.  Disputes rare. Disputes within family.  Mainly between brothers, between fathers 
and sons and sometimes between sons and step-fathers. 
 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION Fair distribution of income within family.  Unequal distribution of income acts as disincentive to family 
members to harvest. 
 
TIME AND CASH MANAGEMENT 
SKILLS 
Good cash management. 
Balanced social and community obligations. 
Poor cash management. 
Customary obligations takes time away from oil palm production. 
 
TENURE SECURITY  Land ownership disputes on VOP blocks.  Some blocks being 
reclaimed or compensation demands made. 
Insecurity of tenure of LSS blockowners acts as disincentive to 
production and improving living standards. 
 
ECONOMIC MOTIVATION Rely heavily on oil palm income and block to provide family 
sustenance.  No alternatives. 
Fall in oil palm prices has only limited impact on production. 
VOP smallholders have good access to garden land and other 
subsistence resources.  Do not need to rely heavily on oil palm. 
Fall in oil palm prices acts as disincentive.  Some stop harvesting and 
maintaining the block. 
 
LEVEL OF INTEREST Personal character.  Competitive and plans ahead. 
Readily listens to extension advice. 
 
Personal character.  Grower ‘lacks vision and initiative’.  Some 
growers resist change. 
Unwilling to listen to extension advice. 
Source:  data collected from workshop with OPIC officers at Popondetta, 26th September, 2000 
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to low production.  Conversely, a low producer can over time move from low 
production to high production when problems are resolved on a block.  Hence, 
at both Hoskins and Popondetta, extension officers maintained that individual 
smallholder productivity is highly variable and often fluctuates in response to 
social factors affecting the well-being of smallholders and the level of social 
harmony on the block.   The discussion raised several research questions: 
 
What explains the high variability in production among 
smallholders? 
 
Why is there so much movement between production 
categories? 
 
What influences the level of social harmony on a block? 
 
How useful is the high-low production dichotomy in 
capturing the complexity of inter- and intra-household 
processes operating on a block? 
 
Second, extension officers stressed poor cash and time management as an 
ongoing constraint on smallholder production.  The discussion revealed how 
men and women are involved in a diverse range of activities that draw on their 
labour and time (e.g., customary obligations, off-block employment, visitors 
and gardening), and oil palm is only one of these activities.  However, extension 
officers emphasised that some of the negative factors identified as affecting 
production, such as customary obligations and hosting visitors from home 
(Hoskins only) are also important dimensions of life quality.  Fulfilling 
customary obligations and hosting visitors from home strengthens social bonds 
and is a valued part of social life.  Also, it must be kept in mind that high 
producers continue to participate in customary exchange and host visitors.  In 
the Landell Mills study (1991, 42), for example, a quarter of the top producer 
households had family members who had visited their home villages during the 




How are non-oil palm activities and responsibilities (e.g., 
customary exchange, off-block employment, gardening) 
managed or integrated into household economies and 
production practices? 
 
What is the relationship between non-oil palm activities and 
oil palm production?  Do non-oil palm labour and time 
demands compete with oil palm production or do they have 
a positive influence whereby they contribute to household 
livelihood security?  
 
What is the relationship between non-oil palm activities and 
social stability on blocks? 
 
Following the workshops at Hoskins and Popondetta we compiled the factors 
extension officers identified as affecting smallholder oil palm production (Table 
2.6).  
 








Favourable topography Poor topography 
Regular and complete harvesting Irregular and partial harvesting 
Well maintained block Poorly maintained block 
Family cohesion Family disputes common 
Co-operation of most family members 
in harvesting 
Few family members participate in harvesting 
Secure land tenure Land tenure is insecure or under dispute 
Fair/undisputed distribution of oil 
palm income 
Income distribution unfair/contested 
Economic pressure to harvest Less economic pressure to harvest (mostly on 
VOP blocks) 
Good time management of customary 
and community obligations 
Customary and community obligations take time 
away from oil palm production 
Good cash management Poor cash management 
High commitment/interest in oil  
palm industry 
Low commitment/interest in oil palm industry 
Well maintained and adequate  
supply of tools 
 
Lack of available tools for harvesting 
 
Table 2.6 highlights the key variables that required further investigation of their 
influence on smallholder production.  These were:  
• Physical factors. 
• Agronomic and farm management practices. 
• Intra-household relations and decision-making. 
• Income distribution. 
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• Time and cash management skills. 
• Tenure security.  
• Economic necessity to harvest. 
• Level of interest in oil palm harvesting. 
• Personal characteristics of growers. 
 
These variables were incorporated into the research design of the project.  The 
study aimed to investigate the links and interactions between these variables to 
reach a fuller understanding of the constraints on and variations in smallholder 
productivity. 
 
Most of the factors identified in Tables 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 are largely internal to a 
block.  Extension officers also identified a range of external factors affecting 
smallholder production and commitment to the industry.  The study therefore 
also explored, where relevant, the impact of the following on smallholder 
production:  
 
• Company transport systems (for the collection of smallholder fruit). 
• Road conditions. 
• Extension and company-smallholder services and initiatives. 
• Effectiveness of the Lands Department to resolve land disputes. 
• Law and order problems. 
 
2.2  Objectives of the Study 
After consultation with the main stakeholders in the project area (smallholders, 
OPIC, oil palm companies), several modifications were made to the initial aims 
and objectives outlined in the original project document.  The final objectives of 
the project were to: 
 
• gain an understanding of the socio-economic constraints on smallholder 
production, especially the socio-economic factors operating within 
households that help explain household productivity and the range of 
agronomic practices.  
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• Evaluate the Mama Lus Fruit Scheme.  The aims were to learn how the 
scheme has changed production practices within the household and to 
assess its impact on women, household income and labour flows.   
 
• Develop strategies for more effective extension interventions through 
working with smallholders, OPIC staff and the companies. 
 
• Make recommendations for change that might result in further increases 
in smallholder productivity. 
 
• Produce a “toolkit” for extension officers.  The toolkit is designed to be 
a learning manual to improve extension skills and strategies for 
increasing smallholder productivity.  
 
In summary, the expected benefits of the project were: 
• improved understanding of the circumstances and decision-making of 
smallholders; 
• interventions to raise productivity better tailored to the needs and 
circumstances of smallholders; 
• the enhanced economic viability and social stability of the smallholder 
sector in the longer term.   
 
2.3  Description of Research Design 
2.3.1  Research sites 
Fieldwork was limited to the Hoskins and Popondetta oil palm projects because 
of logistical constraints and the requirements of the study to have LSS 
smallholders included in the study.  New Ireland and Milne Bay do not have oil 
palm LSSs and were therefore unsuitable for investigation in this study.  The 
Bialla project was omitted because at the commencement of the project, Hargy 
Oil Palm had withdrawn financial support for key industry organisations such as 
OPIC and OPRA, so their support of the project was not guaranteed.  
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The Hoskins and Popondetta sites provided an interesting contrast as 
smallholder and plantation development at each site occurred under different 
historical, economic, social, and political contexts.  Also, both companies and 
OPIC offices have recently introduced several smallholder programmes and are 
actively promoting expansion of the smallholder sector. 
 
2.3.2  Research Design 
The research design was based on a combination of methodologies involving 
semi-structured interviews, case-studies, questionnaire surveys, workshops, 
focus groups, analysis of industry smallholder data bases and review of relevant 
reports and published literature.  The research relied on in-depth qualitative 
interviews with smallholder families.  The multi-method approach enabled a 
comprehensive understanding of the factors influencing smallholder production, 
especially from the perspective of smallholders.  This approach also provided a 
means of cross-checking and validating information across smallholder families 
as well as providing leads into important areas of inquiry.   
 
Key stakeholder groups that participated in the research included: 
1. Smallholders (men and women). 
2. Oil palm companies. 
3. OPIC. 
4. Industry associations, such as the Oil Palm Growers Associations, and 
5. Customary landowners. 
 
Most data were collected from August 2000 to the end of January 2001 (four 
months at Hoskins and two months at Popondetta) by two research scientists 
(funded by the project) and an OPRA-employed research assistant at each 
project site.  Additional data were collected by OPRA’s agronomist, GIS 
researcher and research assistants during February to April 2001.   
 
Initially at each site, OPIC and company smallholder production data bases 
were analysed, discussions were held with OPIC field and project managers, 
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and field visits undertaken with OPIC extension officers to all LSS and some 
VOP subdivisions.  
 
2.4  Data Collection 
Data collection in Hoskins and Popondetta was divided into four parts: 
1. Weekly interviews and surveys with selected smallholder households 
(six weeks at Hoskins and four weeks at Popondetta).  
2. Interviews with key industry personnel, workshops with OPIC 
extension officers and focus groups with smallholders.   
3. Bio-physical and socio-economic smallholder survey.  
4. Review of company and OPIC data bases, reports and other published 
material. 
 
2.4.1  Weekly interviews and surveys with smallholder households 
The main purpose of the weekly surveys/interviews was to develop household 
case studies to reveal the socio-economic dynamics within and between 
households resident on a block.  This was to contribute to an understanding of 
the range of agronomic practices within the smallholder sector, including how 
households respond to and accommodate new industry initiatives to increase 
smallholder productivity.  
 
At Hoskins and Popondetta a total of 12 households at each site were initially 
selected from one LSS and one VOP for the weekly survey/interviews.  The 
sample was restricted in size and confined to one LSS and one VOP for several 
reasons: 
• Small sample size is more suitable for household case study analysis 
using repeat interviews based largely on qualitative research methods. 
Using qualitative interview techniques, each interview generally takes 
between one and two hours.  This allows for three smallholder 
interviews per day. 
• Logistically, it was more appropriate to confine the study to a small 
geographical area as distances between blocks and subdivisions are too 
great to allow more than two sites of data collection in each project 
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area.  Also, if the family is absent it is easier to return later in the day 
after completing an interview with another family in the same 
subdivision.  This would not be possible if the interviews were spread 
across several subdivisions. 
• Time constraints.   
 
Smallholder households were selected on a range of characteristics, including 
demographic profile of block, access to labour and production performance 
(high, medium and low producers).  The study also included a mix of ethnic 
groups on the LSS schemes.  Smallholder production data from company and 
OPIC data bases for the previous 18 months, and information gained from OPIC 
officers were used in the final selection of households.   
 
At Hoskins, the LSS and VOP subdivisions chosen for weekly surveys were 
Kavui LSS subdivision and Gaungo VOP.  Kavui was established in 1972 and 
currently has 319 registered blocks.  It is typical of most LSS subdivisions and 
was chosen after several subdivisions were deemed unsuitable for data 
collection (e.g., security risks, recent inter-ethnic conflicts, or only recently 
established, such as Siki).  Also, according to OPIC, Kavui was fairly “stable” 
socially and in terms to production.   
 
The first oil palm plantings at Gaungo were in 1974/75 when 12 blocks were 
planted.  Initially the establishment of oil palm blocks at Gaungo was slow, but 
in the last fifteen years oil palm has expanded considerably, partly because of 
better road infrastructure and land being “sold” to “outsiders”.  Gaungo 
currently has 320 registered oil palm blocks, and a further large area is presently 
being subdivided into blocks for planting oil palm.  
 
Gaungo was selected for several reasons: recent and rapid expansion of oil 
palm; the movement of villagers to reside on their blocks rather than in the 
village; the trend to “sell” village land to “outsiders” (migrants); and access to 
alternative sources of income such as fishing and other cash crops.  The latter is 
a feature of many coastal VOPs, and the “sale” of customary land is also 
occurring at several other VOPs in the Hoskins scheme.   
 31
 
At Popondetta, Sorovi LSS and Igora VOP were selected for the study.  Sorovi 
LSS was chosen largely because the Mama Lus Frut Scheme had been 
introduced earlier that year and the research team were interested to learn of any 
changes to production since its introduction.  Igora VOP was chosen because it 
had a mix of producers with recent and lengthy engagement with the oil palm 
industry.  However, due to access problems (e.g., Plate 2.1), Igora VOP was 
dropped from the study after two weeks and Igora LSS was chosen for its easier 
access.  Much of the data collection at Popondetta took place in the wet season.  
The very poor road conditions restricted site selection and hence, accessibility 
and road conditions heavily influenced the final selection of survey sites.   
 
 
Plate 2.1.  Collapsed culvert at Igora VOP, Popondetta 
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After completing the sample selection and gaining the acceptance and approval 
of the twelve families to be included in the study, families were visited weekly 
over a six-week period.  In Popondetta, due to heavy rains, flooding and 
impassable roads, the number of visits was reduced to four and in some cases, 
three visits for some households.  Regular visits were considered the most 
appropriate means to develop family case studies that explored household 
dynamics, labour strategies and income distribution.  Gaining an understanding 
of the situations of particular households requires a level of trust and rapport to 
develop between interviewees and interviewers and this takes time and 
commitment.  Once familiarity and trust are established people are more open in 
discussing their situations and concerns, and are generally very co-operative.  
For the interviewer, it is also a gradual process of getting to know the 
individuals in each family and learning what characterises and shapes their 
everyday life. 
 
The weekly visits to smallholder blocks combined semi-structured interviews 
with a short standardised quantitative survey (Appendix 2.1).  The weekly 
survey recorded: household and inter-block labour activity and allocation (oil 
palm, gardening and other economic and social/leisure activities); household 
income (e.g., from oil palm, marketing, customary exchange) and expenditure 
and food consumption (the latter to assess the relative importance of garden and 
store-bought foods).  An additional survey was conducted following a harvest 
pick up (Appendix 2.2) which recorded household and non-household labour 
contributions to the oil palm harvest.  Survey questions usually were 
interspersed in general conversation.  In responding to questions, informants 
were not discouraged from digressing to related issues or other important 
matters that had arisen in the week since the previous interview.  This often 
uncovered new information that would not be revealed through the standardised 
survey and provided insights into what people themselves felt were important 
issues. 
 
These conversations led into more semi-structured interviews.  The main 
emphasis of the interviews was to gain an understanding of everyday life issues 
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through people’s own stories and from the perspective of smallholders 
themselves.  This helped build a picture of what influences people’s decision- 
making processes and behaviours.  Also, as the visits progressed, people came 
to view our visits as an opportunity to express their concerns and ideas.  
Although relatively free-flowing, the interviews explored the following topics: 
 
• household labour and income decision-making; 
• factors influencing household and family members’, participation in oil 
palm production; 
• additional and/or competing labour and income demands; 
• levels of household cohesion and cooperation; 
• constraints on oil palm production; 
• impacts and perceptions of agricultural extension initiatives, especially 
the Mama Lus Fruit Scheme.  
 
On a typical fieldwork day we would visit three smallholder blocks together 
(four days each week for 12 households).  Often smallholders who were not part 
of our sample would turn up at an informant’s block or stop us on the road and 
request to be interviewed at a later date as they too wished their views be 
included in the study.  In these additional interviews, themes identified amongst 
the sample group were often elaborated in more detail.  Because these people 
were “self-selecting” it is probable that the issues they wished to discuss were of 
more concern to them than for the general population – issues such as 
population pressure and lack of access to gardening land.  In this way, interview 
numbers snowballed to include many smallholders that were not part of the 
formal sample1.  In total, 172 separate interviews with smallholders were 
undertaken.  
 
Towards the end of the fieldwork at each site we discussed the general findings 
and recommendations with the families in our weekly surveys and sought their 
feedback on our recommendations.  This process helped ensure the data 
collected were an accurate reflection of the situations and concerns of 
smallholders, and that the recommendations were more likely to be valued and 
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supported by smallholders.  At Hoskins, the preliminary findings and 
recommendations were then presented in a seminar to the Scientific Advisory 
Committee of the Oil Palm Research Association (Koczberski and Curry 2000).   
 
Data collection methods in the weekly surveys and one-off interviews could be 
described as participatory action research in that the emphasis was on close 
collaboration and discussion with smallholders to identify constraints on 
production, and develop workable solutions to overcome these constraints.  The 
approach also sought to gain an understanding of the lived experiences of 
smallholders from the perspective of husbands, wives, sons, daughters and other 
relatives residing on the blocks (Reason 1998, 269).  These discussions inform 
the main findings and recommendations of this report.  As researchers our 
primary aim was to produce research results and outcomes that would enhance 
the well-being of smallholders, which at the same time would gain the support 
of industry. 
 
2.4.2  Industry interviews, OPIC workshops and smallholder focus 
groups 
Interviews were conducted with key stakeholders in the industry such as the oil 
palm companies, OPIC, growers associations, and customary landowning 
groups.  Semi-structured and structured interviews were conducted with key 
personnel in the oil palm companies at both Popondetta and Hoskins.  
Interviews with the General Managers, smallholder officers and mini-estate 
officers were conducted to: 
• learn about corporate strategies and new or planned smallholder 
initiatives;  
• gauge what the company, especially smallholder staff, identified as the 
major smallholder production issues; and  
• gain a more rounded understanding of the oil palm industry in Papua 
New Guinea.   
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Group interviews with several members of the growers’ association in Hoskins 
and representatives from the landowning company in Popondetta provided 
further information on the smallholder sector and the main socio-economic and 
political factors affecting smallholder production at both sites. 
 
A close working relationship with OPIC allowed for numerous interviews and 
discussions with OPIC staff throughout the fieldwork period.  On several 
occasions, particularly in the early stages of the project, we accompanied 
extension officers to the field to gain a better understanding of the various 
subdivisions, the nature of extension work and to draw on extension officers’ 
knowledge of the subdivisions and the smallholder sector.  These fieldtrips also 
provided an opportunity to observe the interactions between smallholders and 
extension officers.  Interviews and discussions with extension officers also 
explored their ideas on effective extension strategies, possible ways to increase 
productivity among smallholders, problems in the smallholder sector and 
difficulties in their work as extension officers.  The support, knowledge and 
experience of OPIC staff were extremely helpful in validating information 
gathered from smallholders and in developing a sense of the main issues 
affecting smallholder-extension officer relationships.   
 
As mentioned in Section 2.1 a workshop with OPIC staff in each project site 
was conducted at the beginning of the project.  The workshops were well 
attended with 25 and 19 officers participating at Hoskins and Popondetta 
respectively.  At the conclusion of fieldwork at each site a further workshop was 
held with extension officers to present the preliminary research findings and 
recommendations, and to seek their input and feedback for the final report2. 
 
Smallholder group interviews (focus groups), usually made up of four to eight 
people, were conducted occasionally to explore specific topics.  Two focus 
group meetings with women were held in Hoskins (Kavui and Gaungo) to 
discuss issues pertaining to the Mama Lus Fruit Scheme (MLFS).  The purpose 
of the interviews was to gauge women’s views on the 
attractiveness/unattractiveness of the MLFS and to obtain a more detailed 
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understanding of how the scheme had been incorporated into household labour 
and income strategies.   
 
Two other focus group meetings were held at Hoskins: one with Kavui 
smallholders to discuss some of the preliminary findings and recommendations 
of the research and another at Gaungo with “outsiders” “buying” land in the 
VOP to gather information on land disputes at Gaungo (both focus groups were 
held at blocks participating in the weekly survey to which other people were 
invited to participate).  Although these formal group interviews generated 
valuable data, they tended to lack the more free-flowing discussion of many of 
the opportunistic group discussions which sometimes occurred when we visited 
smallholder blocks.  In these latter instances the smallholders had taken it upon 
themselves to invite other people (mainly extended kin or shared ethnicity) to 
their blocks to talk to us, or we just happened to arrive on a block when a group 
of people were visiting for some other purpose.  In these discussions most 
people appeared to express their views easily, and their familiarity with each 
other meant that the conversation was more open as well as humorous.   
 
2.4.3  Bio-physical and socio-economic smallholder survey 
A quantitative bio-physical and socio-economic survey of 100 smallholders was 
undertaken by OPRA staff across several LSS and VOP subdivisions at Hoskins 
and Popondetta.  At Hoskins 50 blocks were surveyed in February-March 2001 
across five LSS and 50 blocks across 16 VOP subdivisions.  At the time of 
writing, the growers survey of 100 blocks at Popondetta was under way.  The 
purpose of these surveys was to examine the bio-physical and socio-economic 
interactions within the smallholder sector. The survey was conducted following 
completion of the main data collection phase described above, and the content 
of the survey was informed by data collected in the first phase of the study.  In 
the socio-economic part of the survey, data were collected on: 
 
• Planting details (area and year planted). 
• Ownership status (original leaseholder, deceased estate, caretaker). 
• Population (number of individuals and families living on block). 
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• Food Gardens (location and type). 
• Additional income sources. 
• Labour supply and agronomic practices. 
 
The bio-physical data collection is currently underway by OPRA agronomists 
and will be completed in late 2001.  The bio-physical data incorporates soil 
chemical and plant tissue analyses and terrain classification of each block 
visited.  The 100 blocks at each study site were selected across the main soil 
types, and a cross-section of high, medium and low producers in the sample was 
attempted.   
 
Data entry and analysis of the socio-economic information is not complete: 
some of the Hoskins data are discussed in this report, but the Popondetta data, 
due to poor road conditions delaying data collection, are as yet unavailable.  
Thus while the report is presently unable to address bio-physical and socio-
economic interactions within the smallholder sector, some of the socio-
economic data have been used to inform the broader smallholder issues 
discussed in this report. 
 
2.4.4  Review of company and OPIC data bases, reports and other 
published material 
Smallholder data bases held by OPIC and the oil palm companies in Hoskins 
and Popondetta were used for sample selection based on smallholder oil palm 
income, production and planting history; loose fruit production; production 
trends; variations in productivity between smallholders within and between 
subdivisions; and levels of and patterns of debt repayment.  While production 
data were considered to be reasonably accurate at Hoskins, data on areas planted 
and years of planting were less so at Hoskins, because the relevant data bases 
were not always updated.  Block production data at Popondetta were 
problematic because of the large numbers of growers avoiding loan deductions 
by using contractors to cart their fruit to the mill (production was not being 
recorded against their blocks).  However, Popondetta OPIC’s data base on 
smallholdings of oil palm and replanting data appeared reasonably accurate. 
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Company and OPIC reports and other published material provided additional 
information on the oil palm industry and smallholder sector.  This additional 
material was especially useful for detailing the background of the industry and 
understanding the current state and future development of the industry and the 
smallholder sector.   
 
2.5  Conclusion 
In summary, the research relied on a multi-method approach that entailed 
spending a considerable amount of time with individual smallholders and their 
families to gain a better understanding of the socio-economic factors affecting 
household productivity.  The mix of qualitative and quantitative techniques 
provided detailed data which, in certain circumstances, is preferable to 
approaches relying solely on formal survey methods where larger numbers of 
people are interviewed using a standardised questionnaire.  The latter technique 
assumes that the researchers already have a detailed understanding of the 
economic and social situations in the sample population.  However, where little 
is known about the everyday situations of a population, more qualitative 
assessments are preferable as a prelude to a formal survey as they allow the 
researchers to develop a more accurate picture of the situation of the study 





1. The following example gives some idea of this process of “snowballing”.  
During a regular interview at Kavui a neighbouring smallholder requested 
we visit his block.  When we arrived at his block we found four other 
smallholders waiting to talk to us.  After a lengthy discussion one 
smallholder asked if we would visit his brother who also wanted us to 
collect his ‘stori’.  A week later we arrived at his brother’s block where 
three other growers were waiting for us. 
 








3.0  Introduction 
The chapter examines the diverse range of livelihood strategies pursued by 
smallholders and how they influence oil palm production.  A key finding of this 
study is that smallholders pursue a diverse range of livelihood strategies in 
addition to oil palm production.  Livelihood strategies are defined as those 
activities undertaken by smallholder households to provide a means of living.  A 
key goal of livelihood strategies is to ensure household economic and social 
security.  In our analysis of smallholder livelihood strategies emphasis is given 
to the range of income sources pursued by smallholders, and the important role 
subsistence agriculture and kin networks continue to play in maintaining 
household livelihood security1.   
 
The chapter draws attention to the range of economic activities in which 
smallholders are engaged, of which oil palm is but one.  This has implications 
for extension services and smallholder interventions.  Importantly, the chapter 
shows that studies of smallholder production could benefit from focusing more 
on livelihood strategies as these strategies indirectly influence oil palm 
production through their impact on economic and social well-being.  
Acknowledging smallholders’ participation in a range of livelihood strategies 
would assist in developing a more complete picture of oil palm smallholders 
and their social and economic circumstances. 
 
 
3.1  Smallholder Livelihood Strategies 
Men and women are involved in a diverse range of activities that draw on their 
labour and time (Figure 3.1).  Activities like food gardening, maintaining social 
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and kin networks and seeking medical care draw on people’s time; for women, 
food preparation, childcare and church activities take a considerable proportion 
of their time.  Socialising, especially for men, is an important activity in that 
much of this time is invested in maintaining social relationships with relatives 
and friends, thus strengthening social networks and maintaining social harmony 
through the ongoing day-to-day resolution of social conflicts2. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, a principal goal of livelihood 
strategies is to ensure household economic and social security.  This section 
outlines the range of livelihood strategies pursued by smallholders.  To think of 
oil palm production as being the only and/or dominant economic activity of 
smallholders is misleading because other important household strategies are 
obscured.  Indeed, in some instances, oil palm production is not the primary 
activity or income source at all.   
 
This section discusses how these various livelihood strategies interact with oil 
palm production and how they contribute to household well-being.  This is 
important information for understanding what is occurring at the block level, 
and for developing appropriate interventions aimed at increasing smallholder 
production and productivity.  The main livelihood strategies outlined below 
include cash crop production, wage employment, small business enterprises, 
garden production for home consumption and local markets, and customary 
exchange.  Each is discussed below. 
 
3.1.1  Cash crop production 
Oil palm is generally the only export cash crop planted on smallholder oil palm 
blocks.  Some LSS smallholders have holdings of other export cash crops in 
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Figure 3.2.  Non-oil palm income sources for Hoskins smallholders (Source: Growers Survey, Hoskins) 
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subdivisions such as Siki, Sarakalok, Kapore and Dagi still have remnant 
plantings of copra and some cocoa (Figure 3.2).  At Siki, for example, in 1995, 
16 smallholders owned copra dryers and eight owned fermentaries (Kean 2000, 
165).  More recently at Hoskins, planting of vanilla bean has been increasing 
and is now providing a supplementary income for some smallholders. 
 
For most VOP smallholders in both Hoskins and Popondetta, entry into oil palm 
production is relatively recent and many retain holdings of other export cash 
crops,  notably cocoa, copra, and coffee. These older export cash crops are 
increasingly being replaced by oil palm.  In a survey of 50 VOP and 50 LSS 
leaseholders at Hoskins, 72% and 26% respectively had access to other export 
cash crops (Table 3.1).  Of the Hoskins VOP blocks with cash crops, 83.5% had 
two or more types of cash crops in addition to oil palm.   
 
Table 3.1.  Percentage of Hoskins LSS and VOP leaseholders with 









LSS nil 24%* 10% 2% 
VOP 2% 62% 66% 10% 
*The majority of these blocks are in Kapore LSS 
 
Export cash crops provide an alternative income source when oil palm prices 
are low.  Many smallholders view cash crop diversification as a form of income 
security to hedge against falling cash crop prices.  As one Galilo VOP grower 
stated:  
taim prais bilong wel palm igo daun, mipela no wori – moni 
ikam long kopra na koko  
when the price of oil palm falls, we do not worry – copra and 
cocoa provide us with money.   
 
As the relative prices of cash crops change, many VOP smallholders adjust their 
production strategies accordingly.  For example, the renewed interest in oil palm 
production on the Hoskins VOP subdivisions may have much to do with the 
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current depressed price of copra.  Interest in oil palm may wane if copra prices 
were to rise.  In New Ireland, a near doubling of oil palm production in 2000 
among VOP smallholders has been attributed in part to the collapse of copra 
prices3 (ADS (PNG) 2001, 23).  The stability in VOP oil palm production at 
Hoskins, despite the fall in oil palm prices, may be partly attributable to the very 
low price of copra over the past few years.  Thus, for smallholders, especially 
VOP smallholders, a range of cash crop alternatives allows them some 
flexibility and greater income security in the face of fluctuating commodity 
prices4. 
 
3.1.2  Wage employment 
Access to off-block wage employment often adds significantly to material 
standards of living on the blocks.  Permanent houses, water tanks and other 
substantial assets erected on the blocks in the last decade or so have mostly been 
financed by savings from off-block employment.  Also off-block employment 
of a household member can provide an ongoing income subsidy to block 
residents which is especially useful on highly populated blocks (Chapter 4.2.1).  
The oil palm plantation estates provide opportunities for short-term casual 
employment and long-term employment of smallholders.  The former often 
provides temporary financial relief for block residents during peak cash 
demands such as payment of school fees, brideprices or other customary 
obligations.  
 
Non-agricultural wage labour is more limited and provides employment to a 
minority of smallholders that hold specific trade or professional skills or have 
obtained upper secondary or tertiary education.  Some are employed in 
workshop, clerical or management positions in NBPOL and others work in 
government or the private sector.  For families with a wage earner, material 
standards of living are usually significantly higher than blocks without a wage 
earner. 
 
In the Landell Mills (1991, 32) study there was a higher level of self-
employment amongst high producers on LSS blocks by the sons or relatives of 
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household heads.  The same study also presented evidence to suggest that off-
block employment was associated with lower oil palm productivity on VOP 
blocks.  The study reported for Hoskins VOPs that there was a high level of off-
block employment in the low production category and those seeking off-block 
employment were young household heads.  Further, of the low producers, 
31.6% had off-block employment incomes higher than their income from oil 
palm.  This would suggest that on blocks where there are a small number of 
dependants on the wage earner, off-block employment can become a substitute 
for oil palm income.  That is, it more than compensates for foregone income 
from oil palm.  Also, as indicated by the OPIC extension officers at Popondetta, 
off-block employment is only a problem when it limits the labour availability at 
harvest times. 
 
The situation on heavily populated blocks is likely to be different, especially on 
LSS blocks where alternative incomes are more constrained.  Here, off-block 
employment provides important supplementary income, and because of higher 
population numbers is unlikely to lead to other block residents withdrawing 
their labour from oil palm production (Box 4.1).  In summary, we found no 
evidence to suggest that off-block employment adversely affects oil palm 
productivity, but it certainly added to the material standards of living of other 
block residents and widened the choices open to smallholder households. 
3.1.3  Small businesses 
Small commercial enterprises provide many smallholders with another source of 
income, but for the majority of small business proprietors, it remains a minor 
activity that supplements oil palm income.  Business enterprises vary in size and 
turn-over, and include public motor vehicles (PMVs), tradestores, kerosene 
sales and the raising and marketing of poultry and pigs.  Tradestores are 
typically small and sell a limited range of stock such as tinned fish and meat, 
rice, vegetable oil, tea, coffee, sugar, biscuits, cigarettes, matches, drinks and 
snacks.  Profit margins are narrow and many stores can become insolvent, 
particularly if customers are slow to repay credit.  Approximately 10% of LSS 
blocks and 8% VOP blocks have tradestores (Figure 3.2).  
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The most common small business activity at Hoskins is live poultry sales.  
Survey results indicate that 30% of LSS and 16% of VOP smallholder blocks 
had poultry businesses.  These enterprises are popular due to the relative ease of 
entry into the business, good consumer market and the profitable returns they 
generate (Box 3.1).  However, recent increases in the price of chicks and feed 
have created new entry barriers to this business.   
 
At Hoskins, most small business enterprises are operated by LSS smallholders 
(Figure 3.2).  This is to be expected where limited access to land for other cash 
crops restricts LSS smallholders to small commercial business ventures on their 
blocks.  Also, as LSS smallholders point out, access to alternative income 
sources is often necessary to meet household needs, particularly during times of 
depressed oil palm prices.  On the Popondetta LSS schemes, small commercial 
enterprises are largely absent due to the conflicts between landowners and 
settlers (Chapter 6.1.2).   
 
A burgeoning and profitable business in the VOP areas in Popondetta, and to a 
lesser extent in Hoskins, is the wholesaling of betel nut (Areca catechu).  This 
may be sold locally or exported to other provinces where returns are higher.  In 
Popondetta a substantial trade has developed between Popondetta and the 
Highland provinces and Port Moresby.  Buyers from these regions frequently 
visit Popondetta to purchase large quantities of betel nut and their presence in 
town is heralded by the large numbers of betel nut sellers congregating outside 
the town market waiting for the buyers to arrive.   
 
3.1.4  Subsistence production 
Food garden production remains extremely important for LSS and VOP 
smallholders in terms of labour demands and household consumption.  
Households grow sufficient food to meet most of their requirements, and 
women often sell surplus garden produce at local markets.  The range of foods 
cultivated is broad, but is dominated by roots crops, notably sweet potato 
(Ipomoea batatas), Chinese taro (Xanthosoma sagittifolium), taro (Colocasia 
esculenta), cassava (Manihot esculenta), and yams (Dioscorea spp).  These are 
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often interplanted with bananas (Musa spp).  Gardens may be planted to one or 
more of these root crops, and often contain tobacco and a range of other 
vegetables such as maize, tomatoes (Lycopersicum spp), sugar cane, pitpit 
(Saccharum edule), a variety of green vegetables including aibica (Hibiscus 
manihot), aupa (Amaranthus tricolor), pumpkin (Curcurbita maxima), and 
spring onions.   
 
Gardens cultivated primarily as cash crops for local markets are often planted as 
monocultures of peanuts or sweet potato.  Fruits such as pineapples, pawpaw, 
watermelon and sweet banana are also planted for sale at local markets.  
Because of their relatively better access to land than LSS settlers, VOP 
smallholders are likely to have more extensive gardens and more access to 
secondary forest for foraging, hunting and the collection of house building 
materials. 
 
The above general description of garden food crops does not take into account 
variations in food crop types by ethnicity (see Benjamin 1977 for a detailed 
discussion).  From our own observations, Sepik households tend to plant 
cassava as a substitute for sago, a major component of “traditional” Sepik diets, 
while Tolai settlers favour larger plantings of bananas.  Also, among the 
Orokaivan VOP smallholders in Popondetta, taro (Colocasia esculenta) is the 
dominant crop.  However, ethnic differences in garden food preferences appear 
less marked than described by Benjamin (1997), and observations suggest that 
sweet potato and cassava are becoming more acceptable across all cultural 
groups.  Whether this is a reflection of changing tastes or declining soil fertility 
on the blocks cannot be resolved at present (both sweet potato and cassava are 
more tolerant of poorer soils than other root crops).  
 
The weekly surveys reveal that garden production is very important in terms of 
labour allocations and is a central part of everyday life for Hoskins and 
Popondetta smallholders (Figures 3.1 and 3.3).  Gardening labour surpasses oil 
palm labour as the dominant activity carried out by Hoskins smallholders.  
Overall, smallholders spend considerably more time in gardening than they do 
in oil palm related work.  This is most notable among women who allocate 
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almost 2.5 times as much of their labour to gardening than to oil palm; for 
Hoskins men, gardening and oil palm are of about equal importance in terms of 
amounts of time allocated to each activity (Figure 3.1).  There is also an 
indication that both oil palm work and gardening are more important for LSS 
settlers than VOP producers (Figure 3.3).  This may partly reflect population 
pressure/land constraints on the Hoskins LSS scheme where economic necessity 
is driving oil palm production, and where, as a corollary, gardening systems are 
becoming more labour intensive. 
 
Further evidence of the importance of gardens for household food security is 
provided by data from dietary surveys undertaken at Hoskins and Popondetta 
(Figures 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6).  Again, these results indicate that LSS settlers are 
much more dependent on gardens than VOP producers.  Root crops, green 
vegetables and bananas dominate meal ingredients for LSS settlers, whereas 
Gaungo VOP smallholders have much more variety in their diets as well as 
better quality diets characterised by higher protein intakes (Figure 3.4).  
Nineteen per cent of all meals at Gaungo VOP contained either fresh meat/fish 
or tinned fish; whereas only 6% of meals at Kavui and 5% at Popondetta did so. 
 
If sources of meal ingredients are categorised by “garden” and “non-garden”, 
the reliance of LSS settlers on subsistence garden production becomes more 
apparent (Figure 3.5).  Approximately 80% of meal ingredients at Kavui LSS 
and Popondetta (mostly LSS settlers in the sample) were from gardens 
compared with about 50% of meal ingredients from food gardens at Gaungo 
VOP.  Further, if the source of ingredients of each meal is considered, it is clear 
that Gaungo VOP producers have more nutritious diets as two-thirds of all the 
meals they consume contain at least one non-garden ingredient compared with 
23% and 32% for Kavui and Popondetta respectively (Figure 3.6).  Further, 
store food consumption among Kavui smallholders tends to be concentrated 
within the first few days to a week of receiving the monthly oil palm cheque.  
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These data on garden production and meal consumption are perhaps surprising 
to some in the industry given the common perception that relative to LSS 
settlers, VOP smallholders are positioned more peripherally in economic 
development and generally less committed to and involved in oil palm 
production.  The differences in diet quality between LSS and VOP smallholders 
are partly a reflection of the wider range of income choices available to VOP 
smallholders.  They are also partly attributable to the population pressure on 
Hoskins LSS blocks, where declining per capita incomes from oil palm are 
increasing settlers’ dependence on subsistence food production. 
 
Exchanges of garden labour and food occur regularly between households co-
resident on a block or between friends and relatives residing on nearby blocks.  
Daily exchanges of food between households are common and reflect the 
importance of food sharing in Papua New Guinean societies; and garden 
produce, especially on the VOPs, continues to play a central role in customary 
exchange (see below).  In the Hoskins LSS subdivisions, some older Sepik 
settlers from the Maprik district, East Sepik Province, continue to cultivate 
ceremonial long yams (Dioscorea alata) which are sometimes exchanged 
between males from this area.   
 
Most gardens are located on the block, although some smallholders have 
gardens on other blocks belonging to relatives or friends, or on village land in 
the case of VOP smallholders.  At Hoskins, many growers near the boundaries 
of LSS subdivisions have also established gardens on adjoining private and 
government land.  On the LSS schemes the rear two hectares are usually 
reserved for gardening land, though in recent years OPIC has been encouraging 
growers to plant these to oil palm (Chapter 7.4).  Where old oil palms have been 
poisoned for replanting, the area is generally planted to food crops and remains 
in production until the new oil palm canopy closes.  In these areas food gardens 
appear to be very productive, probably as a result of the application of fertiliser 
for juvenile oil palms and the richness of organic matter from the decaying 
poisoned palms5.  
 
 55
In-shore fishing is also an important part of the subsistence and cash economy 
for many coastal VOPs in West New Britain and can provide a significant 
income source during the fishing season.  Fish is sold at local markets (fresh or 
smoked), to town supermarkets in Kimbe and, increasingly, to commercial fish 
buying operations.  At Gaungo VOP, for example, fishing provides a good and 
regular income.  People often move between oil palm and fishing depending on 
fish catches and the price of oil palm.  During the survey period at Gaungo 
when oil palm prices were relatively low (K56/tonne), some households 
temporarily abandoned oil palm production to concentrate on fishing6.  
 
3.1.5  Informal markets 
The marketing of food crops, coconuts, betel nut, tobacco, processed foods and 
manufactured items at local markets provides a regular additional income, 
especially for women from the LSS schemes.  Each LSS subdivision has its own 
community market, as well as several other smaller informal markets.  In 
addition, the town markets of Kimbe, Bialla and Popondetta are also important 
for LSS women.  Many oil palm company compounds have market places too, 
and LSS women frequent these markets to sell garden produce to plantation 
workers on company pay days. 
 
Marketing is a popular activity among women as it provides a source of cash 
income between the fortnightly (Popondetta) or monthly (Hoskins) oil palm 
payments.  Average earnings per person, per market visit were K10.91 at 
Hoskins and K4.64 at Popondetta.  Although the amount of money earned is not 
substantial, the additional cash plays an important role in family welfare as the 
cash is used to purchase small everyday household items such as soap, kerosene 
and store and market foods.  For some households on heavily populated LSS 
blocks at Kavui, local markets can be the primary source of income. 
 
Before women were issued an oil palm harvesting card (“mama card” – Chapter 
8), market income was, for many LSS women, their primary source of cash 
income.  In a survey of 100 blocks at Hoskins in February-March 2001, 100% 
of LSS blocks and 52% of VOP blocks reported female residents regularly 
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selling food at local markets (Figure 3.2).  Further, 88% of LSS blocks and 42% 
of VOP blocks reported at least one female resident marketing produce within 
the preceding seven days of the survey.  This not only reflects the importance of 
markets (and gardening) for smallholders, especially for LSS women, but it also 
points to the fact that the rapid uptake and entrenchment of the Mama Lus Frut 
scheme at Hoskins appears not to have impacted significantly on marketing.  In 
terms of total time allocated to marketing, it is a minor activity overall and 
considerably less than other tasks such as food gardening and oil palm work 
(Figure 3.1).  Also, on blocks with multiple households, sometimes one woman 
may market produce on behalf of co-resident women.  Therefore, in terms of the 
demands on total labour availability marketing is small. 
 
A survey undertaken with OPIC of women selling at several markets around 
Kimbe and Hoskins in October 2000, revealed that 54% of sellers were from 
LSS schemes and 8% were settlers residing on village land (Table 3.2).  Given 
that many of the other sellers at the markets were from urban centres or 
company or government compounds, then women from local landowner groups 
have very limited involvement in marketing.  These figures again reflect the 
importance of local markets for women from the LSS subdivisions. 
 
The same survey revealed that LSS women are disproportionately over-
represented in local markets in terms of the values of items for sale (Figure 3.7).  
While “manufactured goods” and “secondhand clothes” dominate markets in 
terms of total value and tend to be marketed by non-LSS women, these figures 
are a little misleading.  The survey recorded the value of goods on display, and 
because only a small proportion of these items are sold per market visit, their 
inclusion in Figure 3.7, tends to devalue the contribution of food items where a 




Table 3.2.  Numbers and percentages of settler women marketing in October 2000 from LSS subdivisions or residing on 


































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.9. Breakdown of categories of items on sale at markets by women from LSS (total = 100%) & Village/VOP (total = 100%) (Source: OPIC & 
OPRA survey of markets in Hoskins & Kimbe in October 2000). 
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Women from the LSS subdivisions tend to dominate sales of “garden” foods, 
both in terms of the kina value of foods on display (Figure 3.8) and in their 
proportional share of the quantities of these items on sale (Figure 3.9).  In terms 
of kina value, the most important items on sale by LSS women in descending 
order of importance are “root crops”, “green leaf vegetables”, “other 
vegetables”, “tobacco” and “bananas” (Figure 3.8).  Perhaps surprisingly, given 
that the villages have more access to garden land, village and VOP women are 
not as heavily involved in marketing garden produce at local markets (Figure 
3.9).  They tend to sell more “tree fruit”, “poultry/meat/eggs” and “seafood”, 
which may reflect their better access to these resources.  Also, given that they 
are living in the village context it is possible that a higher proportion of their 
surplus garden produce is channelled into customary exchange rather than 
markets.  Overall, village/VOP women have very limited involvement in 
marketing relative to LSS women and other women (from urban settlements and 
company compounds) selling at local markets.  
 
Apart from the economic benefits a market income provides, it is also a highly 
valued social environment for women to catch up on gossip, meet friends, 
relatives and recently arrived visitors from their home provinces, and to 
exchange stories and news.  At the town market especially, women gather from 
all over the region and the market is a centre for the dissemination of news and 
information.  We met many women who identified more closely with marketing 
than with oil palm production, and whilst this is partly a historical legacy of 
women’s marginal status in the oil palm industry, it also reflects the immense 
social significance women attach to marketing and the marketplace. 
 
3.1.6  Customary economy 
The indigenous economy consists of the exchange of goods, services, labour, 
traditional wealth items and cash between kin.  The effect of exchange is to bind 
individuals and groups into networks of social relationships and obligations.  
Customary exchange can be in the form of daily gifts of cooked and uncooked 
food, garden and oil palm labour, various services and cash contributions to 
major events to mark initiations, marriage, birth, death, adoptions, dispute 
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settlements, or land transfers.  Exchange is also increasingly being used to raise 
capital for business ventures and land purchases and to help with the education 
costs of children. 
 
Customary exchange remains very important on both the LSS and VOP 
subdivisions.  On the LSS subdivisions, exchange occurs between kin living 
nearby and many continue to participate in exchange with relatives in their 
home villages through either hosting short-term visitors or by making cash 
contributions to village exchange transactions or other requests.  For LSS 
smallholders, it is in their interest to maintain customary exchange relationships 
with home so that their claim to village resources remains intact (Chapter 4.2.2).  
Some LSS smallholders have formed exchange relationships with unrelated 
settlers and contribute wealth and food to large ceremonies such as those 
surrounding marriage and death.  These non-kin exchanges are a very important 
aspect of creating and strengthening a sense of community on the LSS schemes. 
 
While customary obligations remain important on the LSS, it is more so on the 
VOPs.  This is hardly surprising given that most VOP smallholders are still 
operating in the village context with all its networks of obligations and cultural 
practices still extant, whereas for settlers these networks have been altered, and 
partly eroded by their absence from their home villages.  In Popondetta, for 
example, pondo, the Orokaivan term for customary exchange or feast, is central 
to social life and pondo events remain common where large quantities of food, 
pigs, cash and other items are exchanged.  Such pondo exchange now extends to 
events such as Easter, Christmas, the opening of a new church, school or other 
community facility and to mark special days such as the anniversary of the Mt. 
Lamington eruption.  A large pondo draws on extensive networks of kin who 
contribute pigs, garden food, cash and/or store bought foods.  In this way, 
customary exchange is continually occurring between and within lineages which 
locks people into webs of social and material obligations.  The intermittence of 
oil palm production on VOPs is sometimes attributable to the variable demands 
of customary obligatins for labour, cash and time. 
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It is often assumed that cultural practices and customary obligations are an 
impediment to cash crop production (said to draw people away from 
production).  However, the reverse can be true.  Cash and store bought items are 
now important exchange items and one reason people engage in the market 
economy is to earn cash to fulfil customary obligations.  In essence, the 
requirements of customary exchange can drive people’s involvement in the 
market economy/oil palm production.  For example, in Popondetta and at 
Gaungo, fluctuations in individual oil palm production among village 
smallholders can be explained partly by their activities in customary exchange.  
Some smallholders with intermittent involvement in oil palm production may 
not harvest for several months but will do so to contribute to a feast or 
exchange.  For more regular producers, oil palm production may increase 
significantly when customary obligations are unusually high, such as when 
brideprices or death compensation must be paid.  At other times, the harvest 
may be weighed on another card belonging to a relative, for example, to support 
a brideprice payment.  It seems for village smallholders that cultural practices, 
obligations and rituals are timed to the oil palm cycle of payment, rather than 
with the garden cycle as practised in earlier times.  The motivation to harvest is 
not so much concerned with accumulating savings for capital investments or 
consumption in the market economy, but with building and maintaining social 
relationships by redistributing wealth through exchange.  Thus, for many VOP 
smallholders, oil palm production is very much embedded in kinship relations 
and customary obligations and does not conform to the model of the rational 
economic producer. 
 
3.1.7  Other sources of income 
VOP smallholders may also receive additional income as royalties from mini-
estates or timber leases.  Also, some VOPs at Hoskins such as Gaungo, 
Morokea and Mosa “sell” land to non-clan members.  Money earned from land 
sales can be substantial.  During the survey period at Gaungo, one household 
received K3,000 and another K1,000 as part payment for sale of clan land.  
Whilst much of this income is distributed to other clan members, it remains an 
important income source for some households and allows them to make 
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significant capital investments in such businesses as tradestores, PMVs and 
fishing equipment.   
 
Another source of income available to some smallholders at Hoskins are share 
dividends received biannually from NBPOL.  In 1999 shares in NBPOL were 
offered at a discount to smallholders and approximately 2,300 growers took up 
the offer of shares in the company.  The smallholder section at NBPOL 
estimates that between K300,000 and K400,000 was paid to growers as 
dividends in 2000.  If we take K350,000 as an estimate for dividends paid to 
growers in 2000, smallholder shareholders earned an average dividend of K152. 
 
3.2  Conclusion 
Smallholders draw income and sustenance from a diverse range of sources, and 
oil palm is not always the principal activity or focus of people’s lives.  Indeed, 
where block populations are high and contain several household units, the block 
is often dependent upon several income sources for its livelihood and relies 
heavily on gardens for household consumption (see Chapter 4).    
 
The diverse strategies pursued by smallholders are undertaken for several 
reasons.  An important reason for income diversification widely raised by 
smallholders was that it lowered income risks by reducing their vulnerability to 
the fluctuating price of oil palm.  During the latter stages of data collection 
when the price of oil palm dropped to K52/tonne, smallholders often referred to 
their dependence on other income sources to meet family needs.  In one 
discussion with a grower at Kapore LSS on the range of income sources on his 
block, he remarked:  
… banis kakaruk, em olsem liklik bisnis bilong mipela.  Nau prais 
bilong wel pam igo daun, mipela lukluk long kakaruk na moni 
bilong maket. 
… the chicken project is like our small business.  Now the price of 
oil palm has dropped, we rely on the chicken business and local 
markets.   
 
Similar sentiments were expressed on the VOP blocks.  Such comments when 
combined with the data presented above illustrate that smallholder livelihood 
strategies promote household economic and social security by: 
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• increasing income and diversifying income sources; 
• strengthening people’s capacity to meet their needs; 
• expanding the options and choices available to households;  
• increasing food security; 
• lowering risks; and, 
• maintaining a sense of community. 
 
Acknowledging the range of livelihood strategies operating on smallholder 
blocks and understanding why smallholder households undertake diverse 
economic and social activities may assist the industry in formulating appropriate 
smallholder interventions.  For example, industry initiatives are probably more 
likely to succeed if they are compatible with (or do not undermine) household 
livelihood strategies.  As outlined above, it may be that economic necessity 
(especially on the heavily populated blocks) leads a smallholder block to 
embrace a range of livelihood strategies to supplement oil palm income.  
Moreover, additional sources of income are even more critical to the household 
economy during periods of depressed oil palm prices.  A fuller picture of 
smallholders that recognises their diverse situations and livelihood strategies 
and how these relate to variations in smallholder productivity would better 
inform smallholder interventions. 
 
The range of livelihood opportunities also partly explains why some growers are 
more committed to oil palm production than others.  It is probably correct to say 
that many VOP growers are part-time/intermittent producers who view oil palm 
as just one of several activities and choices open to them.  On the VOP 
smallholder blocks managed by local landowners, harvesting is much more 
irregular than on the LSS schemes.  VOP oil palm producers not only have an 
adequate subsistence base to provide for most of the daily food needs, but as in 
the case of Gaungo VOP, they often have a broader range of income sources 
than LSS smallholders.  Thus, the economic pressure to harvest oil palm is not 
as great on the VOPs.  They can, and do, shift in and out of production 
depending on the relative returns to labour of oil palm, other cash crops, fishing, 
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and garden production.  Although such producers are a constant source of 
frustration to the industry, it may be better to accept this situation and look at 
ways of encouraging more flexible labour practices through the use of hired 
labour for harvesting and identify the ways in which the social and economic 
priorities of smallholders can be accommodated to increase oil palm 
productivity. 
 
In brief, the ability of smallholders to pursue livelihood opportunities is 
important for the overall social and economic sustainability of the smallholder 
sector.  The policy importance of such findings include: 
 
1. Smallholders pursue diverse livelihood strategies as a way of reducing 
risk. 
2. Non-oil palm incomes are important for maintaining the social and 
economic viability of smallholder blocks. 
3. As population and land pressures continue to grow there will be 
increasing numbers of block residents engaged in non-oil palm 
activities. 
4. Promotion of non-oil palm income earning opportunities is important 
for the long-term economic and social viability and development of the 
oil palm schemes. 
5. Subsistence gardening is of critical importance to smallholders and 
ways of supporting the sustainability of food production, especially on 
the LSS schemes should be explored by the industry (e.g., composting 
trials, kitchen gardens, improving access to garden land, etc.). 
6. While smallholders are competent in actively finding solutions to meet 
their needs, long-term planning is sometimes subverted to short-term 
needs when perceived levels of economic and social security are low. 
 67
 
Box 3.1:  Chicken business, Gaungo VOP, Hoskins 
 
William has two hectares of oil palm.  We arrived at his block to complete the weekly 
survey and found him and his brother building a poultry coop.  They were finishing 
the roofing when we arrived.  Part of the roof was sago thatch and the rest covered 
with plastic, which William had bought for K68.  William wanted to start his own 
poultry business after observing several successful poultry businesses in his village.  
Also, as he explained, poultry sales would provide him with supplementary income 
between the monthly oil palm cheques.  
 
The estimated costs to establish the business are as follows: 
Items       Cost (Kina) 
1 box 52 chicks      130.00 
1 bag starter        43.00 
3 bags grower K43 X 3     129.00 
1 bag finisher        43.00 
TOTAL COST                  K345.00 
 
Estimated total sales  
50 chickens at K20 each               K1,000.00 
 
Net profit                   K655.00 
 
If the business succeeds, William plans to buy a further 3 or 4 boxes of chicks next 
time.  A major factor determining the success of poultry businesses is credit 
repayments and saving the profits for reinvestment into the business.  Many poultry 






1. The study of livelihoods and rural diversification is appearing as a new 
approach in rural development among international development 
organisations and practitioners.  Our discussion of livelihood strategies is 
restricted to focusing on the economic and social activities households 
perform to secure livelihoods.  Some studies use broader definitions and 
have included such components as household assets, educational levels, 
access to services or financial capital (e.g, Chambers and Conway 1992; 
Carswell 1997; Ellis 2000). 
 
2. In Figure 3.1 the category “Rest at House” does not suggest that men 
spend a significant proportion of their time idle.  In wet weather there is a 
tendency for men to stay around the house whereas women still need to 
visit their gardens to harvest food for meals.  Also, on dry days when men 
said they were resting at the house, often a visitor was present, though this 
was under-reported.  They were more likely to report “Visiting/ 
Socialising” when this involved a visit to another block. 
 
3. Copra is the main alternative cash crop in New Ireland. 
 
4. The behaviour of VOP oil palm smallholders is similar to other 
commodity crop smallholders in PNG where commitment to production 
depends on prices.  In the Wosera subdistrict, East Sepik Province, for 
example, many smallholder coffee producers abandon their coffee blocks 
during depressed prices and concentrate their efforts on producing foods 
for sale at local markets. 
 
5. In Popondetta growers planted aibika around the base of standing poisoned 
palms.  Aibika flourished in these conditions which growers attributed to 
the abundance of organic material. 
 
6. A study in two villages in New Ireland which owned copra plantations 
showed that fish landings were negatively correlated with the mean annual 





MAINTAINING LIVELIHOODS IN THE CONTEXT OF 




4.0  Introduction 
Population growth on the LSS schemes is becoming a critical production issue.  
This chapter examines population growth on the Hoskins scheme and the 
economic and population pressures that are emerging on the Land Settlement 
Schemes.  Hoskins LSS was established in 1968 and average number of persons 
per block has more than doubled over this time as second generation settlers 
marry, have children and remain living on the block as opportunities to return 
“home” diminish.  As we argue, the recent increase in mean numbers of persons 
per block and the presently high numbers of households per block indicates in 
part how returning “home” is increasingly constrained for settlers as their 
village ties weaken through time.  On the Hoskins LSS blocks (and possibly 
Bialla) it is now common for several family units to be residing on and sharing 
the resources of a block.  Usually, these multiple household blocks consist of 
the elderly original owner, his married sons (and sometimes married daughters) 
and their families all residing on the block.   
 
These multiple household blocks are often under a great deal of economic 
pressure as oil palm income is divided among several households.  Further, 
because each family sharing a block has financial demands to pay for health, 
schooling, food and other basic household necessities, the conditions are present 
for social instability and conflict.  In response, smallholders are pursuing a 
range of livelihood strategies not only for economic security, but also to 
promote social stability. 
 
Chapter 3 described the range of livelihood strategies in which smallholders are 
engaged.  In this chapter, we continue the analysis at the household level and 
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explore in more detail the situation of multiple household blocks which are now 
experiencing population pressure and where oil palm income alone is 
insufficient to meet family needs.  The discussion draws attention to the ways 
households are dealing with falling per capita oil palm income as the number 
and size of households increase on the block.  To capture this complexity we 
discuss the range of livelihood strategies households are adopting to maintain 
income levels and social and economic security.   
 
The growing population on LSSs presents new challenges to the industry as the 
schemes become increasingly complex and internally diverse.  The growing 
number and complex nature of multiple household blocks warrants further 
investigation to better understand the social and economic context as well as the 
agronomic circumstances of these blocks.  Such information can assist future 
industry interventions and extension services.   
 
Before we describe the strategies of multiple household blocks, a brief overview 
of population growth is provided. 
 
4.1  Population and Demographic Issues: The Growth Of The 
Multiple Household Block 
Between 1980 and 2000, WNB’s annual population growth rate averaged 3.7%, 
making it one of the fastest growing provinces in the country (National Census 
of Population and Housing 2001).  The increase is due to both in-migration and 
a high rate of natural increase.  At the 1990 census, 29% of the WNB population 
were immigrants and the province’s Total Fertility Rate was over 6, amongst the 
highest in the country.  At 3.7% annual growth rate the population is doubling 
every 21 years.  Kimbe’s population has been growing rapidly (Keig 2001, 
265), and it is likely that Bialla too has been experiencing relatively rapid 
population growth.   
 
Table 4.1 shows various estimates of average numbers per LSS and VOP block 
for the Hoskins scheme.  They show an increase in population density from the 
early 1970s through to 2000.  The small increase in density from 7.2 persons per 
block in 1975 to 8.6 in 1990, suggests that out-migration may have been a factor 
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over this period.  It is probable that out-migration may have been more 
important in the earlier periods when ties with home were still strong and people 
were able to reintegrate successfully into their home villages. 
 













Mean number of 
persons per block 
LSS 5.9 7.2 8.6 13.3 
Mean number of 
persons per block 
 
VOP NA NA 7.0 11.1 
Source: Landell Mills 1991 and field survey data 
 
A period of substantial population growth from 1990 to 2000 and the currently 
high numbers of households per LSS block (Table 4.2) may reflect the difficulty 
settlers would now face if they attempted to return “home”.  Their long 
absences together with the fact that many of their children were raised in WNB 
and learned Melanesian pidgin rather than their home languages, would mean 
that their chances of returning home and re-establishing themselves are slim.  
Further, their home areas are likely to be also experiencing population pressure, 
especially because in the establishment of these schemes, settlers from land-
short areas were given priority.  So the recent growth represents a new situation 
in which settlers’ residence options are more constrained.   
 
Unable to move “home”, the alternatives include off-block, long-term 
employment or a precarious urban existence in the rapidly developing informal 
settlements associated with most Papua New Guinean urban centres.  Given that 
opportunities for formal sector employment are extremely limited (Levantis, 
2000), these settlers have few options but to pursue income strategies in 
addition to oil palm to sustain their families.   
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MEAN NUMBER OF 
HOUSEHOLDS PER 
BLOCK 
Kapore 1968 11.5 2.5 
Tamba 1968 17.4 3.9 
Sarakolok 1969 9.8 1.8 
Kavui 1972 17.2 4 
Siki  11.4 2.6 
Total  13.3 2.9 
Source: Survey data 
 
 
4.2  Livelihood Strategies Among Multiple Household Blocks 
With a mean of 2.9 households per LSS block, there is increasing evidence of 
income diversification and other livelihood strategies emerging on multiple 
household blocks to compensate for falling per capita oil palm incomes.  Much 
of the following discussion draws on data collected from Kavui subdivision 
where, in response to increasing numbers of households residing on blocks, 
families are adopting a range of livelihood strategies to sustain them. Our 
analysis of multiple household blocks concentrates on those blocks with at least 
three or more households co-residing on a block.  Although the data presented 
here are derived mostly from Kavui subdivision, related issues were identified 
across all Hoskins LSS subdivisons.  Smallholders on other LSS subdivisions 
often reported similar stories and emphasised economic and population 
pressures as the most critical issues affecting their lives.  These issues are also 
likely to be relevant to the older LSS subdivisions on the Bialla scheme.  
 
Population pressure is not yet an issue at Popondetta for two reasons.  First, the 
scheme has been operating for a much shorter period and population densities 
per block are still relatively low.  Second, many settlers and their children fled 
their blocks during the Oro-for-Oro campaign of the early 1990s (Chapter 
5.1.2), many of whom have not returned.  Those who did return often left family 
members in their home villages for their safety and/or to retain the option of a 
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return to their home village should the situation in Popondetta become 
untenable.  However, the following discussion is pertinent for thinking about 
future plans for the scheme at Popondetta. 
 
At Kavui the mean number of households per block is 4 (Table 4.2).  These 
blocks are often under a great deal of economic pressure which can lead to 
tensions between block residents.  Although grievances are frequently resolved 
amicably, occasional violence does erupt, especially between brothers, between 
father and sons and between families.  In some cases, violent disputes can lead 
to the eviction of a block resident and their family, or a family being placed 
under intense pressure to leave the block.  Disputes and violence often occur on 
payday and usually ignite over the distribution of oil palm income.  The 
underlying cause of these tensions is insufficient oil palm income to support the 
large numbers of people on the blocks.  Growing population density is thus 
leading to a process that could be described as a shared-down poverty.   
 
The economic pressures and resultant tensions and conflicts are distressing for 
block residents as they threaten the integrity of the extended family group and 
undermine reciprocal obligations between co-resident kin.  In response to these 
pressures, and in an attempt to maintain some level of economic and social 
harmony on the blocks, households and individuals employ a range of strategies 
aimed at preserving social cohesiveness.  These strategies may not be concerned 
primarily with oil palm production, but are directed first and foremost at 
maintaining or regaining social stability and kin group cohesiveness.  However, 
they do impact both positively and negatively on oil palm production and the oil 
palm industry as a whole.  Such strategies include: 
• Securing off-block employment and on-block economic diversification. 
• Return migration. 
• Land acquisition. 
• Increased reliance on food gardens and markets. 
• Adoption of new labour and payment arrangements. 
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4.2.1  Securing off-block income sources and on-block economic 
diversification 
When several households reside on a block and oil palm income is insufficient 
to support all block residents, some male residents will pursue off-block 
employment and accommodation.  If successful, they often provide financial 
support to relatives remaining on the block.  It is not unusual in Kimbe to meet 
people in full-time employment who are subsidising their families residing on 
the LSSs.  They meet large expenses such as school fees, customary payments 
like brideprices and relatively costly household items, and sometimes assist with 
“start-up” capital to establish small businesses on the block.  Frequently, a 
portion of their fortnightly pay is regularly given to their LSS families to spend 
on everyday personal or household needs.  
 
Yet, even without providing a significant external cash subsidy, off-block 
residence takes pressure off the remaining families on the block by givem spes 
(giving space) to other family members.  The term givem spes was cited by 
many smallholders as an explanation for a family member living or working 
elsewhere.  In this context it refers to less pressure on garden land and housing 
space, less crowding, and less pressure on the block’s resources including oil 
palm income.  In the case of oil palm resources, givem spes refers in the broad 
sense to sharing oil palm work and income amongst fewer families/individuals.  
It also refers to the opportunity created for another brother to take more control 
of the block so as to accumulate capital to acquire land elsewhere in WNB 
(Boxes 4.1 and 5.5). 
 
Some block residents find permanent or short-term off-block employment but 
remain living on the block, and like non-resident kin provide considerable 
income support to other block residents (possibly more so).  But, off-block 
employment opportunities are limited and usually only open to males and those 
with high educational grades or work experience.  Consequently, off-block 
employment is not an option for many living on populated blocks.  Although 
women’s access to formal employment is limited, most are involved with 
marketing, and this income plays a very important role on densely populated 
blocks (see below). 
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Off-block employment is especially important to populated blocks when oil 
palm prices fall as sometimes there is simply not enough income from oil palm 
to meet even basic needs.  During periods of depressed oil palm prices the 
numbers of young men from LSS blocks seeking plantation work increases 
dramatically, but when prices are high their numbers fall off (Waka Wayang, 
pers. comm.).  Where the whole 6 hectares has had been planted to oil palm, and 
where there is inadequate access to land for food gardens, the situation for 
multiple household blocks can be very precarious.  In these situations off-block 
employment or supplementary income sources are crucial for block residents.   
 
Many settlers have established small businesses (PMVs, tradestores and chicken 
businesses) on their blocks to supplement income from oil palm and local 
markets.  If these business ventures are relatively successful, one brother may 
opt out of oil palm entirely, or make fewer demands on oil palm income.  Such 
a strategy is also described as givem spes to co-resident brothers and their 
families. 
 
The economic pressure on densely populated blocks to develop supplementary 
income sources is reflected in the increasing numbers of non-oil palm income 
sources as average block population increases (Table 4.3).  An LSS block with 
one non-oil palm income source (100% local markets) has a mean block 
population of 11.16, while blocks with three or more non-oil palm income 
sources have a mean population of 15.88, which supports the hypothesis that 
densely populated blocks are compelled to develop supplementary income 
sources.  The relationship between numbers of non-oil palm income sources to 
population density is less clear on the VOPs, though, mean population per block 
does increase from one or two non-oil palm income sources to three or more 
supplementary income sources.  This relationship on the VOPs is likely to be 
more complex because of the greater availability of land for subsistence 
production and because of the more extensive and developed kinship 




Table 4.3.  Mean block population and numbers of non-oil palm income sources, 
Hoskins. 
 











LSS and VOP 
Mean population 
per block 
One 11.16 9.69 10.56 
Two 13.07 9.2 10.79 
Three or more 15.88 14.17 15 
Source: Growers Survey data (n=100) 
 
The trend to increased reliance on non-oil palm income sources is likely to 
continue as population grows and as it becomes more difficult through time for 
second generation settlers to return home.  This is especially the case on heavily 
populated blocks where employment, marketing and small business ventures 
provide essential additional income.  This trend to income diversification has 
been observed in other smallholder cash crop areas of South America and 
Africa (e.g., Reardon 1997; de Janvry and Sadouilet 2001).   
 
The income diversification strategies adopted by populated LSS blocks are very 
different to VOP blocks (Figure 3.2).  On the VOP subdivisions income 
diversification is facilitated by more than adequate access to land (e.g., land for 
other cash crops such as cocoa and copra), whereas on the populated LSS 
blocks diversification is driven by inadequate access to land.  In other words, 
land shortages in the context of rising population pressure compels LSS settlers 
to diversify income sources, whereas VOP landowners’ greater access to land 
offers opportunities for income diversification that may or may not be taken up.   
 
4.2.2  Return migration 
One strategy some heavily populated blocks are relying on is return migration 
of one or more households to the home villages.  This may be on a permanent or 
temporary basis. The decision to return permanently to the village can be 
explained by a combination of factors (e.g., a perception of an insecure future in 
WNB, a desire to return to clan lands, or a perceived lack of access to additional 
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land in WNB), although relieving pressure and givem spes on the block were 
commonly cited reasons for settlers returning home.  Informants told us that 
those returning “home” permanently tend to be elderly blockowners who are 
now handing over block ownership to their son/s, and/or second or later born 
sons who are unlikely to inherit rights in the block.  According to the provincial 
census co-ordinator, there is some evidence from the 2000 census interviews 
that some young men on the LSS schemes are beginning to return to their home 
provinces.  These young men see their future in WNB constrained by limited 
land access and the potential for future land conflicts with indigenous 
landowners (B. Leo, WNB Provincial Census Coordinator, pers. comm.) (Box 
4.2). 
 
Apart from these permanent moves, short-term visits to the home village for up 
to twelve months are viewed, like off-block employment/accommodation, as 
providing some temporary relief to remaining family members on the block.  
More importantly, these trips home serve to maintain a person’s social identity 
in the village and reinforce their claim to village resources (see Curry and 
Koczberski 1999).  Such visits are necessary if migrants plan to eventually 
return “home” to be re-integrated into village society with access rights to 
village resources.  Hence, the occasional return trip provides an opportunity to 
reinforce claims to clan resources, and also deters other village lineages from 
appropriating these resources. 
 
The return option is becoming increasingly constrained for settler families as 
their ties with “home” weaken through time, and population pressure at home 
makes village kin less likely to accept the return of long-term absentees.  On 
many occasions second generation settlers told us they had no access to village 
land and many spoke of failed attempts at re-integration into their home villages 
(Box 4.3).  Returning home is only open to select families who have maintained 
strong social and economic ties with home throughout their time away, and 
where sufficient clan land is available in the village1.  
 
For second generation settlers where the father is deceased and where ties with 
home were not maintained, return to the village is highly improbable.  Second 
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generation settlers in this position are acutely aware of their predicament, 
especially those who were born in WNB and have never been to their father’s 
natal village.  Many would also be confronted with language barriers as they 
never learned their father’s language having grown up with Melanesian Pidgin, 
the lingua franca of Papua New Guinea.  The following quote expresses 
sentiments we heard on several occasions in discussions of the return migration 
option with second generation settlers on densely populated blocks: 
 
… Papa graun ifoul long mipela brata….. Ol ino bin lukim pes bilong 
mipela…ol ino save long mipela, olsem wanem ol bai givem graun long 
mipela?  
…the landowners [in the home village] do not know us [himself and his 
brothers] .  They have never seen our faces…they do not know us.   Why 
would they give us land?  (Smallholder, Kavui). 
 
Some smallholders unable to return home have attempted to acquire land in 
West New Britain. 
 
4.2.3  Land acquisition 
Acquiring additional land is the primary desire of most smallholders 
experiencing population pressure on their blocks.  Land acquisition strategies 
can take several forms: 
• Purchasing an LSS block. 
• Purchasing a VOP block (usually 2 or 4 hectares). 
• Squatting on government or private land. 
• Seeking land in another province or moving into an informal (squatter) 
settlement in an urban centre. 
 
Purchasing an LSS block 
Several smallholders told us how they had acquired an additional block with the 
financial assistance of their father (using long-term savings from oil palm 
income) or from the savings of a close relative in waged employment.  
However, opportunities for smallholders to purchase LSS blocks are becoming 
increasingly constrained for three related reasons.  First, as many smallholders 
highlighted, without substantial off-block income there is little opportunity to 
accumulate savings, especially when oil palm income is shared amongst several 
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households.  Those families that purchased blocks with money saved from oil 
palm earnings started saving very early when their children were young.  
Second, the expansion of LSS schemes has ceased and apart from the recent 
release of new LSS blocks at Bialla (e.g., at Soi and Kabaya subdivisions), there 
are few opportunities to buy land on existing LSSs. 
 
The final, and most significant constraint is the rapid inflation of LSS block 
prices.  Whilst there are no comprehensive data on LSS block prices, several 
sales in 1999/2000 provide an estimate of between K15,000 and K20,000 per 
block (Table 4.4).  
 
Table 4.4.  LSS block sale prices for 1999-2000, Hoskins 
Year of sale Subdivision Block Details Sale price 
1999 Kapore 6 ha block.  4 ha planted to oil 
palm. 
K15,000 
2000 Sarakolok 6 ha planted to oil palm, good 
house and tradestore on block. 
K35,000 
2000 Sarakolok 6 ha block.  4 ha planted to oil 
palm. 
K19,000 
2000 Sarakolok 6 ha block.  4 ha planted to oil 
palm. 
K30,000 
2000 Kavui 6 ha block.  4 ha planted to oil 
palm.  
K20,000 






Kavui 8 ha block.  4 ha planted to oil 
palm.  Back portion of block hilly 
and unsuitable for oil palm. 
 
K27,000 
2000 Kapore 6 ha block.  4 ha planted to oil 
palm. 
K20,000 
Source:  OPIC files and smallholder interviews 
 
Average block prices have risen sharply since Hulme’s estimate of K3,109 for 
the period 1976-79 (Hulme 1984, 248).  There is anecdotal evidence to suggest 
that most of the inflation in block prices occurred within the past five years. 
Smallholders and company sources maintained that LSS blocks could be 
 80
purchased for between K4,000 and K5,000 about five years ago.  A group of 
men at Kavui explained that because of the current high prices of LSS blocks, it 
is only company workers or people in good-paying jobs that can now afford to 
buy blocks.  The current high prices of established blocks they argued, places 
LSS blocks beyond the means of settlers.  Many times informants made 
references to ‘fotnait man’ when describing those now buying blocks on the 
LSS subdivisions.  There were suggestions that many of those now buying LSS 
blocks are oil palm industry workers acquiring blocks for their retirement/early 
retirement.  While they are in full-time employment, they have relatives or 
friends caretaking their blocks.  Without block transfer details it is difficult to 
verify the validity of these claims2.  It may well be the case that the recent rapid 
inflation in block prices is being driven not by settlers, but by those in formal 
employment.  If this proves to be the case, then an avenue for settlers to adjust 
people-land ratios is now largely closed to them.   
 
Purchasing VOP land 
One result of the highly inflated prices of LSS blocks is that those original LSS 
settlers seeking to acquire additional land for their sons are now purchasing less 
expensive land from customary landowners.  Customary land is significantly 
cheaper than LSS land, with prices ranging from K3,000 to K4,000 for a 2 
hectare block of undeveloped land.  But tenure of these blocks is insecure and 
these commercial transactions are fraught with risk (Chapter 6.2).  Because of a 
paucity of data on VOP land purchases it is not possible to state conclusively 
who are buying customary land.  Some of the senior clan leaders at Gaungo 
identified LSS settlers as those buying customary land.  They said that land 
purchasers were mostly settlers’ sons or settlers buying land on behalf of their 
sons.  Some settlers’ sons have gained access to VOP land through their long 
associations with local landowners through school, work or friendships 
developed by their father.  However, we also came across instances of non-LSS 
people buying VOP land.  These were men from over-populated parts of the 
country who had ties with settlers or were long-term plantation labourers 
seeking relatively inexpensive land on which to settle.   
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Squatting on government or private land 
Another strategy LSS blockholders are adopting is the illegal occupation of 
government or private land.  Unable to accumulate savings on highly populated 
blocks, some second generation settlers are now clearing government or 
company land adjoining the LSS subdivisions and planting oil palm.  Oil palm 
seedlings are purchased by using their father’s harvesting payment card.  We 
came across several cases where access roads had been cleared to these blocks. 
 
There is also illegal movement onto government reserve land at the community 
centres at Buvussi and Sarakalok LSS, and parts of the Dagi River floodplain 
have been planted to oil palm by settlers’ sons.  Uncontrolled movement onto 
government and company land has meant that the company and OPIC are now 
occasionally “discovering” new oil palm blocks.  For example, in January 2001, 
30 new blocks were “found” at Siki LSS subdivision (F. Lewis pers. comm.), 
and in an incident at Galai LSS subdivision in 2000, a NBPOL truck was forced 
to leave company land by smallholders who had planted oil palm in the area.  It 
is estimated that between 10 to 15 growers have planted oil palm in this area of 
NBPOL land. 
 
Last year, the Department of Lands at Kimbe received several requests from 
smallholders (via OPIC) to grant them government reserve land, usually 
adjoining their block, to plant oil palm.  In one request received in October 
2000, a group of twenty-five growers from Galai LSS submitted a joint 
application for government reserve land for the development of about 20 new 
blocks (Box 4.4). 
 
OPIC staff have observed that the smallholders moving onto government 
reserve land are often young men from the more populated LSS blocks and are 
those who are likely to have lost access to resources in their “home” villages.  
The movement onto government reserve land and company land is a reflection 
of the intense pressures on highly populated blocks. As Boxes 4.4 and 4.5 
reveal, the acquisition of additional land is viewed as a means of reducing social 
tensions and conflicts on the blocks, and for some, illegal occupation of land is 
their only recourse in these very difficult situations.  
 82
 
Seeking land in another province 
Another way in which people seek land is through their ethnic organisations.  
Some groups, such as Sepiks and Morobeans, have, since the early 1980s, 
formed pressure groups to lobby the National and/or their home provincial 
governments to resettle their sons in their home provinces.  That such groups 
have been in existence for almost two decades is indicative of the level of 
insecurity settlers have about their long-term futures in West New Britain, 
especially their children’s future.  For example, at the time of the Landell Mills 
study (1991, Volume III, 8) at Hoskins four ethnic associations existed (West 
Sepik Pressure Group, East Sepik Welfare Association, Morobe People’s 
Association and Simbu Association) whose primary concern was for the 
‘resettlement of sons back to their original areas’.  The activity levels of these 
groups fluctuate depending on current levels of ethnic tensions, group 
leadership and management, and perceived resettlement opportunities.  For 
instance, at the time of fieldwork, the Sepik Association was actively pursuing 
opportunities for resettlement or employment in their home province associated 
with a proposed oil palm development planned in that province   
 
4.2.4  Increased reliance on gardens for food and cash income 
As discussed in Chapter 3, smallholders, particularly LSS settlers, have a heavy 
reliance on gardens for food and as a source of income.  For example, as noted 
in that chapter, 80% of categories of meal ingredients at Kavui were from food 
gardens, reflecting settlers’ dependence on their gardens. 
 
While it was not possible to collect data on the areal extent of household food 
gardens, anecdotal evidence suggests dependence on food gardens (and market 
income) increases with block population.  Highly populated blocks are possibly 
more likely to have disproportionately larger garden areas than blocks 
supporting fewer people.  Many of these additional gardens are also likely to be 
located on other blocks and on government reserve or private company land 
adjoining LSS subdivisions, as the reserve two hectare sections at the rear of 
blocks are likely to be overused with consequent lower yields. 
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Multiple household blocks without off-block employment or supplementary 
income sources such as tradestores are likely to be highly dependent on garden 
production.  For these blocks, especially the more populated blocks (see below), 
oil palm is likely to provide a supplementary income to the primary one of 
garden production.  Women through earning income from local markets are, in 
many cases, providing the main source of family income (Box 5.7).   
 
4.2.5  Adoption of new labour and payment arrangements 
In an attempt to reduce social conflicts many multiple household blocks have 
changed the way that labour is managed and income distributed.  An 
increasingly common way is to adopt a rotation harvesting system (markim 
mun).  A rotation (markim mun) system is characterised by the allocation of a 
month’s harvest and the monthly oil palm cheque to one of the multiple 
households residing on a block on a rotating basis.  The following month a 
different household will perform most of the harvesting and collect the cheque.  
Thus, for example, if there are four households sharing the oil palm income, 
each household receives three cheques per year with four months between each 
payment.  The household that has been allocated the harvest may or may not 
receive assistance with harvesting from other households on the block.  Both the 
FFB harvest and the loose fruit collection are rotated on a monthly basis.  
Typically, one household is allocated FFB and another household is allocated 
loose fruit collection in any one month.  
 
Many smallholders from heavily populated blocks related how they moved from 
co-operative family harvesting (wok bung) to a rotation (markim mun) system 
following continual disputes over the distribution of oil palm income.  It appears 
that when the number of household units becomes too great for the sharing of 
oil palm income or when disputes over the disbursement of income threaten 
social harmony on the block, a rotation system is adopted.  During the lengthy 
period without oil palm income, households rely on alternative income sources 
or the generosity of the brother whose turn it is to receive the cheque.  Although 
the prolonged gap between oil palm cheques places enormous financial strain on 
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families, periodic access to a full month’s income from oil palm allows families 
to make relatively expensive purchases such as mattresses, clothes, sheets, 
school fees, etc.  This would not be possible if the cheque were distributed 
amongst families every month. 
 
4.3  Conclusion and Recommendations 
This chapter has highlighted the population and economic pressures emerging 
on the LSS blocks at Hoskins and the associated changes occurring as 
households respond to these pressures.  New livelihood, oil palm harvesting and 
payment strategies are emerging as households search for ways to maintain 
economic security and social harmony among block residents suffering rising 
population pressure and falling per capita oil palm incomes.  These production 
and livelihood strategies are not simply a direct response to population and 
economic pressures, nor even concerned primarily with increasing oil palm 
production, but are part of smallholders’ immediate efforts to maintain social 
stability on the block.  
 
Emerging economic and population pressures and the increasingly diverse 
economic and social situations operating on blocks presents a challenge to the 
industry to rethink existing ideas about smallholders, smallholder production 
and smallholder interventions.  The following are just a few issues the industry 
faces with the increase in the number of persons and households residing on 
blocks: 
• Changes in smallholder oil palm labour and income arrangements. 
• Falling per capita oil palm incomes as the number and size of 
households increase on the block. 
• Increasing economic pressure on blocks is leading to the development 
of a range of supplementary income sources.  Where oil palm income 
alone is insufficient to maintain income levels, oil palm harvesting is 
becoming just one of many economic activities carried out by 
smallholders. 
• A range of livelihood strategies may be necessary to allow heavily 
populated blocks to meet their basic household needs. 
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• The heavy and increasing reliance on gardens questions policies on 
expanding oil palm plantings to all 6 hectares. 
• The growing number of people seeking illegal or insecure access to 
land presents risks for the stability of the schemes. 
• Increasing numbers of under-employed people on blocks, especially 
youth, are being left out of oil palm production. 
• Increasing social instability and conflict on populated blocks is 
negatively affecting smallholder production. 
 
The above points suggest that interventions that foster economic and social 
security and community cohesion are vital for the long-term viability of the oil 
palm schemes.  We suggest that there are several potential interventions that 
will promote the long-term viability of these schemes.  These include: 
1. Encourage the development of supplementary income sources that do 
not compete for labour with oil palm.  This can be achieved through 
promoting small business development and other successful business 
initiatives that already exist on smallholder blocks.  As the numbers of block 
residents increases, smallholders are attempting to diversify income sources 
to maintain per capita incomes. The fact that this process of income 
diversification is associated with population density suggests that the 
development of supplementary income sources is not competing for labour 
with oil palm production.  Therefore, it would be useful to view these 
developments not as a threat to the industry because of their potential to 
draw labour away from oil palm production, but as a stage in the evolution 
of these schemes.   
 
As the schemes begin to pass through a generational change and smallholder 
blocks become more complex social and economic units, there are 
opportunities for the industry to capitalise on these changes so that the social 
environment becomes more conducive (stable) for oil palm production.  The 
aim here is to foster stronger local economies and job growth from the 
economic base that oil palm already provides.  For example, the 
encouragement of small-scale businesses requiring little start-up capital such 
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as for the repair of tools, nets and wheelbarrows would help initiate this 
process of income diversification.   
 
2. Maintain and enhance food security.  Because of the priority of subsistence 
food production in the livelihood strategies of smallholders, particularly on 
the heavily populated LSS schemes, ways of supporting the sustainability of 
food production should be explored by the industry.  We make several 
recommendations in this regard. 
 
First, retain 2 hectares of garden land on LSS blocks for food garden 
production.  The reliance of settlers on food gardens questions OPIC’s 
current objective of expanding oil palm plantings to all 6 hectares of LSS 
blocks – a policy endorsed by a recent World Bank report (ADS (PNG) 
2001, 83) (Chapter 7.4).  Because food gardens enhance food security and 
lessen risks associated with fluctuating oil palm prices, we disagree strongly 
with this policy and urge the industry to reconsider this policy.  
 
Second, develop new initiatives to improve the soil fertility of garden land.  
After more than 20 years of intensive garden cultivation on the rear 2 
hectares of LSS blocks, many smallholders complained of declining yields.  
In some instances, because of extremely low yields, smallholders had 
abandoned food production on their blocks and were cultivating food gardens 
elsewhere (e.g., in oil palm stands poisoned for replanting, on land belonging 
to other smallholders, private companies and land bordering the LSSs).  
Falling yields are therefore driving some smallholders to cultivate food 
gardens on land to which they have no legal right.   
 
One approach to improve soil fertility on smallholder blocks is to encourage 
the use of fertiliser on gardens, which a small number of smallholders are 
already doing with impressive results.  Extension efforts to promote the use 
of fertiliser on oil palm are more likely to be effective by using 
demonstration food gardens where the impacts on yields are immediately 
apparent to smallholders.  We anticipate that the use of food gardens as 
demonstration plots for fertiliser would translate into increased fertiliser use 
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on oil palm as smallholders come to appreciate the relationship between 
fertiliser application and increased yields. 
 
Other potential initiatives to improve soil fertility include extending current 
NBPOL research on the composting of Empty Fruit Bunches (EFBs) to 
settlers’ food gardens.  Composted EFBs, perhaps supplemented with 
inorganic fertiliser, could lead to the development of permanent food gardens 
on settlers’ blocks thereby easing the demand for garden land by reducing or 
eliminating the need for a fallow period.  The use of compost to establish 
permanent “kitchen” gardens has proved successful in urban settings in PNG 
and other South Pacific countries, and may be similarly successful on LSSs 
where access to garden land is becoming more constrained by population 
growth.  Such an initiative on the LSSs would also require trial 
demonstration plots to reveal to smallholders the value of EFB compost for 
increased yields and shorter fallow periods.  If such trials were to prove 
successful and receive the support of smallholders, a series of LSS drop-off 
points for compost could be identified for the delivery of composted EFBs by 
fruit collection trucks on outward trips from the mill.   
 
3. Promote family planning and household budgeting.  These two areas are 
important in any integrated strategy to improve the social sustainability of 
the schemes.  Family planning is a particularly pressing issue on the older 
LSSs.  Field days or community meetings where nurses or family planning 
officers from the Health department give advice on family planning issues 
are necessary and require the support of both the companies and OPIC.   
 
Equally important is encouraging greater awareness of household budgeting 
among smallholders.  Hoskins OPIC is encouraging smallholders to open 
bank accounts into which their oil palm income is paid.  As many 
smallholders have little or no experience with banking and have limited 
budgeting skills, it would be worthwhile to provide smallholders with 
opportunities to learn about saving and general budgeting.  Bank staff should 
be encouraged to participate in field days as a matter of course given that a 
large and growing number of their customers are now smallholders.   
 88
 
4. Introduce a scheme that would encourage greater participation of young 
men in oil palm production.  Despite population pressures on the blocks, 
there is a high level of under-utilised labour (especially young men on the 
LSSs at Hoskins and probably Bialla), and much under-production.  For the 
industry young men represent an under-utilised resource who, if given 
appropriate financial incentives, could significantly raise smallholder 
productivity and output.  In Chapter 8 we discuss in detail a potential 
payment system targeted at young men to increase their participation in the 













Box 4.1.  Off-block employment, Kavui LSS, Hoskins 
 
The original blockowner and his wife are deceased. The title of the block was 
officially transferred to the first born son, Joe (tertiary educated), who is a supervisor 
for NBPOL and has lived off the block for several years.   Prior to the death of the 
father in the mid 1990s the parents lived for several years on another smallholder 
cocoa block in Rabaul.  The father had bought the block in Rabaul to relieve the 
pressure on the Kavui block. 
 
Joe’s five brothers live on the block.  Two are married, with five children between 
them and the other three brothers range in age from 11 to 18 years.  One of the 
married brothers (David) gained employment with NBPOL and his family moved to a 
company compound at the beginning of the survey period.   When the parents left 
their home village in the early 1970s they were accompanied by the wife’s brother, 
Daniel, who lives on the block, with his wife and five children.  Another relative, 
Dennis, lives semi-permanently on the block and has erected a house on the 
boundary of the adjoining block purchased by Joe several years ago.  
 
During the survey period, two relatives were visiting and living temporarily on the 
block.  Currently there are three households and a total of 17 people residing on the 
block. 
 
All 6 hectares have been planted to oil palm and the families rely on their brother’s 
neighbouring block for garden land.  Some small gardens are maintained on the 
block. 
 
The family has taken several steps to relieve economic and social pressure on the 
block.  Joe purchased the adjoining oil palm block and obtained off-block 
employment.  David has recently moved off the block into full-time employment.  Both 
these moves were initiated to ‘givem spes long ol’ – “provide space” - on the block.  
Also, the two brothers in employment provide financial support to those remaining on 
the block and help out on the block if any problems, like illness, arise.  Joe also pays 
the school fees for his youngest brother.  The brothers’ off-block residences are 
appreciated for the short breaks away they provide for those remaining on the block.   
 
The third born son returned to their home village a few years ago to see if he would 
like to resettle there, but returned to West New Britain believing there was too much 





Box 4.2.  Return migration, Sarakolok LSS, Hoskins 
 
This caretaker block is maintained by the original leaseholder’s in-laws.  The 
caretakers (Chris and Sylvia) own a block at the Bialla scheme and were invited 
recently to look after this block at Sarakolok.  They moved to Sarakolok to relieve 
some of the pressure on their Bialla block and allow the two married sons and their 
families more ‘spes’ on the block.  Their two teenage sons, Joseph and Michael, 
moved with their parents to Sarakolok.  Joseph works full-time as a shop assistant at 
Kimbe.   
 
Chris and Sylvia said they gave a lot of thought to their sons’ futures in WNB and are 
concerned about their unmarried son’s access to land for oil palm production.  
Joseph is also well aware of the difficulties that confront him.  He has been saving 
money from his fortnightly pay and would like to “buy” some customary land at 
Gaungo.  However, last year his father refused to give him the additional money 
required for a deposit on some land and tried to dissuade his son from buying 
customary land.  He told his son that the tenure is too insecure on purchased 
customary land.   
 
Joseph is now placing pressure on his father to return to his village to plant coffee 
and vanilla in preparation for the family’s return.  However, there have been land 
disputes over Chris’ access to village land for cash crops in the past.  Joseph, a 
qualified mechanic, would also like to set up a small vehicle workshop on the 






Box 4.3.  Failed attempts at re-integration into“home” village, 
Kavui, LSS Hoskins 
 
Seven brothers live on this block.  Four are married with children and three are 
single.  A total of 20 people reside on the block.  The parents who moved to Kavui 
from the Highlands are deceased.  All the sons were born at Kavui.  
 
The eldest brother, Gabriel, explained that with so many brothers living on the block, 
the various households experience a great deal of economic pressure.  They have a 
rotation system operating on the block, but disputes often occur on paydays.  The 
brothers are currently looking at ways of resolving the problems on their block and 
recently some attempted resettling back in their father’s village.  
 
At the beginning of this year Gabriel and his three unmarried brothers went back to 
the village where they had been told by their father that their land boundaries were 
clearly marked.  However, when they returned to the village, clan members denied 
them access to land as the land had long been taken over and used by other clan 
members.  Gabriel reminded clan members that his father, along with other clan 
members, fought hard to obtain the present village land and this should be 
recognised by the clan members.  After an unwelcomed short stay in his father’s 
village, Gabriel left the highlands and returned to the block.  The three unmarried 
brothers remain in the highlands where they are waiting for Gabriel to fund their trip 
back to WNB.   
 
Gabriel is worried about his brothers’ return as he will have to revert back to rotating 





Box 4.4.  Request for Land, Galai LSS, Hoskins 
 
The President,      13th October, 2000 
Mosa Local Level Government, 
Kimbe, WNBP 
 




INTERESTED IN DEVELOPING FOREST LEASES AND STATE RESERVE LAND 
FOR OIL PALM CULTIVATION – GALAI ONE SUBDIVISION 
 
Sir, we the leaders of Galai One community who have signatures appeared on this 
letter have this felt problem to express to you so you …. assist us press our enquiries 
to above authorities eg. Governor’s office etc for reconsideration and possibly 
approval. 
 
We are interested in developing the above subject land to oil palm cultivation (see 
map attached).  We would like to advocate such a move in light of increasing 
population pressure now experienced here on the oil palm project especially in land 
resettlement scheme blocks eg. Galai Subdivision in the Hoskins project. 
 
We leaders would like this to take place in order to relocate some of our family 
members at this subject land in order to avoid some hardships and related economic 
and social problems faced nowadays. 
 
Sir, if our request are taken to consideration and other further actions we definitely 
will be solving those problems expressed.  The area will be accommodating up to 20 
blocks plus. 
 
Sir, this will very much depend upon availability of funds and resources but it’s a 
matter of expressing what problems we have so we find ways to solve this problem 
together. 
 
Finally, if our request is given full consideration your office will be supported 
thoroughly by us leaders and our people here at Galai subdivision. 
 
LEWIO WINIAS            JOHN MUI            
C.A.C. Representative      Community Leader 
Galai One   Galai One 
 
NELSON KUMUN   MICHAEL CHAN 
Representative   Community Reps. 
Galai Community 
 







cc: District Officer – Lands, 
Kimbe, WNBP 
 




PS:  The attachment: 
(i) Sketch of Area in Galai One, Block Map.  
(ii) (ii) A copy of letter to Divisional Manager, Buvussi/Galai by OIC Galai Sub 
division.   



















Box 4.5.  Movement onto company land at Galai LSS, Hoskins 
 
Boma’s parents settled at Galai when it was first established and most of the children 
were born on the block.  There are seven brothers and two unmarried sisters living 
on the block.  Three brothers are married and between them have 10 children.  A 
total of 22 people live on the block.  The households rotate the papa and mama card, 
and a tradestore/bottle shop provides additional income.  Their six hectare block 
adjoins company land.  The full six hectares are planted to oil palm, and the adjoining 
land is used for garden cultivation.  The gardens are very important for women to 
earn additional cash at the local markets.   
 
Last year, Boma planted an additional “4th hectare” on what he refers to as the 
“reserve” land adjoining his block.  Nine of his neighbours whose blocks back onto 
the company “reserve” land have also extended their oil palm plantings to a “4th 
hectare”.  Each have planted 240 seedlings, and hope to eventually get approval 
from the Lands Department to register the land so that a separate block number and 
payment card can be issued.  Some of the growers have organised and paid for a 
grader to put access roads through to their 4th hectare and Boma recently paid K760 
for the grading of a short but very rough road to his new plantings.  Boma and those 
of his neighbours who have lost access to land in their “home” villages see the 
additional 2 hectares as providing a brother or son with a separate income which 








1. Several studies in PNG now show that maintaining long-term relationships 
with home does not always guarantee successful re-activation of resource 
rights due to rising resource pressure in migrant source areas (e.g., Carrier 
and Carrier 1989; Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1997; Curry and Koczberski 1999). 
 
2. In one conversation with an OPIC officer he described how his approach 
to work and dealing with smallholders is changing as he is dealing with 
more growers who have either high educational grades or long work 











Chapter 4 drew attention to the changing demographic situation of Hoskins LSS 
where the increasing numbers of multiple household blocks mean that oil palm 
income is insufficient to meet income needs.  The discussion revealed that 
multiple household blocks are complex economic and social units and far more 
heterogenous than the nuclear single families that first settled the scheme in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s.  These multiple household blocks have adopted new 
oil palm labour and production strategies and pursue diverse livelihood 
strategies to maintain household economic and social security. 
 
The population and demographic changes occurring on the older schemes and 
the increasing complexity of household structures questions existing 
frameworks for understanding and analysing smallholders and smallholder 
production.  While the smallholder high-low production framework used in the 
Landell Mills study and in the OPIC workshops (Chapter 2), produced valuable 
information for understanding variations in smallholder productivity, it does not 
capture the complexity of production strategies now present in the smallholder 
sector.   
 
Further, a high-low producer framework does not lead to thinking through the 
everyday processes within households and how individual family members and 
households on a block interact with each other.  Moreover, a high-low producer 
dichotomy can conjure a static image of a high producer as an individual farmer 
or single household working together and making rational economic decisions 
about oil palm production; low producers, on the other hand, may be perceived 
as economically irrational decision-makers, poorly skilled, uneducated, or lazy 
(lacking commitment), and thus incapable of shifting to higher levels of 
productivity without some external intervention.  This leaves little room to think 
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about the socio-agronomic and economic arrangements of growers as they 
attempt to balance family food security, income needs and loan repayments in 
the context of fluctuating commodity prices and increasing population pressure. 
 
To overcome some of the limitations of the high-low smallholder framework, 
this chapter presents an alternative framework for analysis that aims to capture 
the diverse household types now present on smallholder blocks and the varied 
ways in which smallholder oil palm labour is organised and remunerated.  The 
framework is based on a simple household typology which is used to identify 
inter- and intra-household processes to better understand constraints on and 
variations in smallholder productivity.  The chapter begins with a discussion of 
smallholder household production units (single household, caretaker household, 
and multiple households) to examine the dominant forms of labour allocation 
and payment arrangements in oil palm production to understand variations in 
smallholder productivity.  The discussion also draws attention to one of the 
main findings of the study, which is the transition now occurring in land 
settlement schemes at Hoskins (and probably Bialla) where single household 
blocks are giving way to multiple household blocks.  This transition is being 
accompanied by significant shifts in oil palm labour and income strategies 
which have important implications for how the industry interacts with the 
smallholder sector. 
 
5.1  Smallholder Household Production Units 
As the smallholder sector develops over time diverse household types are 
emerging to include:  
• Single household blocks – usually consist of one household made up of 
household head, spouse, children and relatives attached to the household 
such as an elderly parent of the husband or wife, and/or short-term 
visitors. 
• Caretaker household blocks - many caretaker households are single 
households consisting of the household head, spouse, children and 
relatives attached to the household, such as a brother or temporary visitor.  
The type of relationship between the blockowner and caretaker varies.  
Caretakers can be close kin (e.g., brother, brother-in-law), distant 
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relatives, friends or merely someone from the same ethnic group as the 
blockowner.  
• Multiple household blocks - often consist of the elderly original owner, 
his wife, their married sons (and sometimes married daughters) and their 
families.  On some of the older LSS schemes the original owner is 
deceased and the married sons/daughters now share the block. 
 
Alongside this diversification of household types new ways of organising and 
remunerating labour are emerging.  Two main types of oil palm production 
strategies found on blocks are the traditional wok bung pattern where all 
household members harvest together and share the income, and a rotation 
harvesting system where the harvesting and oil palm cheque are rotated among 
the co-resident households on a block.  The rotation system is referred to by 
smallholders as markim mun, and is a recent shift in labour organisation in oil 
palm production (see Chapter 4.2.5 for more details on the rotation system). 
 
Payment arrangements differ between the two harvesting systems.  Blocks with 
a wok bung system share the monthly/fortnightly cheque between family 
members, whereas on rotation (markim mun) blocks the cheque is allocated to 
an individual household on a rotating basis.  The latter tends to emerge when the 
sharing of income among several co-resident households is disputed.  The way 
in which labour is remunerated also appears to differ between the two 
harvesting systems.  Labour remuneration on a rotation (markim mun) system is 
usually expected to be commensurate with labour input and there is limited in-
kind payment for labour.  On a wok bung system labour remuneration is not 
necessarily commensurate with labour input, but rather payment is governed 
more by gender, age, or kinship status.  Thus, there is usually more in-kind 
payment for wok bung harvesting labour and/or reciprocal (unpaid) labour. 
 
Taking into account the varied household types and harvesting production and 
payment systems now found on smallholder blocks, we present smallholder 
household production units as a framework for analysis based on different 
household types (single, caretaker and multiple households) and the dominant 
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oil palm production strategy operating on a block.  We identify the following 
typology of smallholder household production units: 
 
1. Single household (wok bung).  All or most adult family members work 
together to harvest.  
2. Caretaker household.  Usually single household working together (wok 
bung). 
3. Multiple household (wok bung).  Most adult members from each 
household work together to harvest, and adult women rotate the 
collection of loose fruit between households. 
4. Multiple household (markim mun).  Harvesting and loose fruit 
collection are rotated monthly between the different households 
resident on the block.  
 
The type of smallholder household production unit on a block reveals much 
about other key household factors/processes affecting block productivity.  These 
other household factors are: 
 
• labour supply and organisation; 
• decision-making; 
• income distribution; 
• family/gender relations; 
• the range of livelihood strategies; 
• production motivation. 
 
These key household factors have been incorporated into our analysis of 
household production units to explain variations in block productivity.  For 
example, how labour is organised and mobilised, how income is distributed, and 
how decisions are made on a block can explain much about variations in 
productivity between smallholders and household production strategies.  Below, 
we provide a description of the four primary types of smallholder household 




5.2  Single Household – Wok Bung 
Single household blocks are predominantly found on the VOPs.  These 
households tend to have a wok bung production strategy whereby adult male 
members harvest the FFB and women and children collect the loose fruit (and 
sometimes wheelbarrow FFB to the road).  Usually, the oil palm cheque is 
shared among the adult members of the household, but not necessarily 
commensurate with labour input (see below).   
 
5.2.1  VOP blocks 
On VOP single household blocks oil palm harvesting often involves reciprocal 
exchanges of labour with relatives residing on other blocks or in the village.  
Much of this labour is unpaid and is considered to be in the realm of customary 
obligations, and is therefore subject to the rules and obligations associated with 
customary exchange.  Flows of labour in and out of the block also extend to 
other activities such as gardening, house building, fishing and block 
maintenance.  The sheer volume of labour flows on the VOPs, makes it difficult 
to think of these single households as bounded production units as they are 
characterised by interdependence with other VOP blocks and village 
households.   
 
On VOP single household blocks, income distribution often does not reflect the 
labour input of individual household members.  Instead, income distribution is 
shaped more by gender and kinship relations, customary obligations and age.  
Sometimes these culturally specific variables determining payment are disputed, 
sometimes not.  Also, social obligations to share are particularly pronounced on 
the VOP blocks and it is more difficult for an individual to retain most of the 
income.  Indeed, the social demands and obligations placed on oil palm income 
by kin can be very high and take a significant proportion of the oil palm cheque.   
 
Single household VOP blocks also tend to have a high level of variability in 
their commitment to oil palm production.  Some growers have limited 
involvement with oil palm production and harvest occasionally when 
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supplementary income is required for household/personal needs or to meet 
customary obligations.  In the village setting they often have adequate access to 
gardening land for subsistence as well as other sources of income.  Because of 
these factors (rather than labour shortages or household conflicts), irregular or 
incomplete harvesting often characterises these blocks.   
 
On many of the single household VOP blocks visited at Gaungo, when asked 
about decision-making, most respondents said that the male household head was 
the “boss” of the block and therefore made the major decisions regarding oil 
palm.   
 
5.2.2  LSS blocks 
Single households on the LSS subdivisions differ from those found on the VOPs 
and are more likely to be young families or elderly blockowners whose adult 
children are residing elsewhere.  In these instances labour shortages are more 
likely, leading to incomplete or irregular harvesting.  If they have relatives 
residing nearby they can sometimes call on them for assistance with harvesting, 
or they may rely on hired help.  In either situation, labour availability is likely to 
be more constrained so that production can vary markedly through time 
depending on labour availability and their willingness to pay for hired labour. 
 
Oil palm income is usually shared between household members and with off-
block relatives who have contributed labour to the harvest.  But, some 
household members’ labour contribution to harvesting gives them limited rights 
to the income (e.g., younger sons), so most of the income is retained by the male 
head of the block.  This provides scope for disputes and withdrawal of labour 
(see below).   
 
The dominant form of decision-making authority on LSS single household 
blocks is centralised (usually the male household head), although there are 
instances of co-operative decision-making.  Sometimes decisions are disputed. 
For example, on some blocks where the male head has control, his decisions 
may be challenged by a wife or son.  This appears more common on LSS blocks 
 100
where sons are seeking greater control of the block and therefore challenging 
the authority of their fathers (usually elderly).  Such tensions between 
household members can affect oil palm production through the withdrawal of 
some family labour.  
 
A summary of the main characteristics of single household (wok bung) block is 
provided in Table 5.1.  Two case studies of single household blocks are 
presented in Boxes 5.1 and 5.2.   
 
 










• Family works together • Family works together 
LABOUR 
CHARACTERISTICS 
• All family members 
contribute labour. 
• Labour exchange with 
extended kin. 
• Sufficient household labour. 
• All family members contribute 
labour. 
• Hired help. 
• Shortage of labour (usually 
elderly block owner or young 
family. 
DECISION-MAKING • Central authority. 
• Co-operative. 
• Disputed authority. 
• Central authority. 
• Co-operative. 
• Disputed authority. 
INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION 
• Shared within family. 
• Shared with extended off-
block kin 
• Shared within family. 





• Egalitarian/social cohesion. 
• Unequal/conflict. 









• Competitive producer. 
• Indigenous obligations. 
 
• Reasonable alternative 
sources of income. 
• Subsistence security. 
• Debt reduction. 
• Competitive producer. 
 
• Low debt. 
• Few dependants. 
 
 
5.3  Caretaker Household – Wok Bung 
Many caretaker households are single households consisting of the household 
head, spouse, children and relatives attached to the household, such as a brother 
or temporary visitor.  In most instances caretaker single households adopt a wok 




Household characteristics and oil palm labour and payment arrangements vary 
considerably on caretaker blocks.  Also, the type of relationship between the 
blockowner and caretaker varies greatly.  Caretakers can be close kin (e.g., 
brother, brother-in-law), distant relatives, friends or an unrelated person from 
the same ethnic group as the blockowner.  Some blockowners maintain close 
and regular contact with their caretakers, while others may allow many years to 
elapse between visits to the block or communications with their caretakers.   
 
The strength and nature of the relationship between caretaker and blockowner 
has a significant influence on block productivity.  A good working relationship 
between caretaker and owner is reflected in regular harvesting and high 
production.  Disputes and uncertainties can shift a block to the low production 
category for several months or years.  A key factor affecting the type of working 
relationship between caretaker and owner is how income is shared between the 
two.  Again there is considerable variation in the oil palm payment 
arrangements on caretaker blocks, with some caretakers controlling all or 
retaining most of the income while some caretakers rely on owners to distribute 
the proceeds of the oil palm cheque.  Whilst the former makes for the most 
harmonious situation, it can breakdown if, for example, the caretaker begins 
avoiding bank or company loan repayments on behalf of the owner.   
 
Where payment is made by the owner to the caretaker there is more likelihood 
of grievances emerging, particularly if payments vary and do not reflect the 
labour input of the caretaker’s family.  In some cases, where the kinship 
relationship between the owner and caretaker is unequal, lower payments to the 
caretaker may reflect their relative kinship status rather than the labour input of 
the caretaker.  In some situations reduced payments are tolerated, but for many 
there is an eventual fracturing of the relationship.  The unstable nature of many 
caretaker-owner relationships partly explains why production on caretaker 
blocks is often disrupted by protracted disputes.  
 
Control over decision-making can also influence production on caretaker 
blocks.  Caretakers sometimes have limited decision-making control over inputs 
such as purchasing fertiliser, replanting, hiring labour or investing in new tools.  
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Long delays may be experienced before decisions are made on replanting or the 
purchase of new tools.  On the other hand, where a caretaker has authority to 
decide block investments and maintenance, there can be a level of reluctance to 
invest in the block, especially regarding medium and long-term investments 
such as replanting when the ultimate beneficiary of the investment will be the 
blockowner.  This reluctance to invest increases the higher the level of tenure 
uncertainty and the longer the delay in investment returns.   
 
Little is known about the mean productivity of caretaker blocks because of the 
difficulties in identifying such blocks on production data bases.  It is likely that 
there is high variability in commitment to oil palm production and possibly 
lower productivity given the likelihood of disputes.  There is some evidence for 
this argument at Popondetta where caretaker blocks on LSS blocks are common 
and where productivity of LSS blocks is lower than VOP blocks – a situation 
not found at Hoskins or Bialla.  Whilst there are other factors explaining the 
lower productivity on LSS blocks at Popondetta (such as insecure land tenure 
and a large number of “abandoned” blocks), the high rate of caretaker blocks is 
likely to be an important contributing factor. 
 
A summary of the main characteristics of caretaker household (wok bung) 
blocks is provided in Table 5.2.  Two case studies of caretaker household blocks 
are presented in Boxes 5.3 and 5.4. 
 
5.4  Multiple Household – Wok Bung 
Multiple household wok bung blocks are often characterised by a high level of 
inter-household dependence and co-operation and adequate labour supply.  
Although each household may have its own gardens, separate supplementary 
income sources and allocate most of their non-oil palm labour to their own 
household activities, the different co-resident households may also maintain 
common gardens and regularly share food and subsistence work. 
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PRODUCTION STRATEGY • Work together. 
 
LABOUR CHARACTERISTICS 
• All family members. 
• Hired help. 
• Limited labour exchange with off-block kin. 
 
 
• Shortage of labour. 
 
DECISION-MAKING 
• Central authority. 
• Co-operative. 
• Disputed authority. 
• Limited decision-making control as caretaker. 
 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
• Controlled by caretaker and shared within family. 
• Controlled by caretaker and shared unequally. 
• Controlled by owner and shared “fairly” with caretaker 
family. 









• Tenure insecurity. 
• Indigenous obligations. 




With a multiple household wok bung strategy the FFB cheque is shared among 
the adult males of all the households, and the mama cheque is allocated to a 
female from one household on a monthly rotating basis.  On occasions, the FFB 
cheque may be allocated to a particular household for a month.  With all 
households working together on oil palm, labour shortages for FFB harvesting 
rarely occur.  An adequate labour supply and harmonious social and working 
relationships often translate into complete and regular FFB harvesting and loose 
fruit collection.  Usually, where households work together on FFB harvesting, 
individuals and households receive a share of the primary oil palm income 
which they consider fair.  Disputes over FFB income distribution are infrequent 
and harvest labour is rarely withdrawn due to conflicts on the block.  It is likely 
that women on these blocks were among those few who collected loose fruit 
prior to the introduction of the mama card.   
 
To a large extent, co-operative labour arrangements on multiple household wok 
bung blocks reflect either shared decision-making where most household 
members contribute to production and income decisions, or centralised 
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decision-making dominated usually by the male head of the block but which is 
rarely disputed.  The multiple household wok bung block can be characterised as 
an egalitarian and cohesive family production unit.  These blocks are likely to 
be the most productive and represent many of the high producing blocks, though 
further data are necessary to substantiate this claim. 
 




MULTIPLE HOUSEHOLDS (WOK BUNG) 
 
PRODUCTION STRATEGY 
• Households work together on FFB harvest and women 
rotate loose fruit collection. 
 
LABOUR CHARACTERISTICS 
• All members of households. 
• Inter-household cooperation. 
• Limited labour exchange with off-block kin (LSS). 




• Central authority (strong). 
• Disputed authority (weak). 
 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
• Shared between households. 
• Shared unequally but not disputed. 




• Egalitarian/social cohesion. 
 
PRODUCTION MOTIVATION 
• Debt reduction (LSS). 
• Competitive producer. 
• Indigenous obligations (VOP). 
• Limited alternative sources of income (LSS). 
• Economic pressure (LSS). 
 
 
Disputes do occur as conflicts of interest and power struggles play out in the 
family.  This may be the result of brothers disputing their respective shares of 
the oil palm cheque or a son challenging his elderly father’s control of the 
block.   The former may arise following the death of the father when the eldest 
son attempts to assert control of the block and his younger brothers begin 
disputing his authority.  Disputed inheritance or ongoing disagreements over 
inputs of harvesting labour between brothers leads to a breakdown in the social 
cohesion of the family.  These disputes can be traumatic for block residents and 
if they occur regularly the block may shift to lower productivity levels as some 
brothers withdraw their labour from oil palm production.   
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In some cases the solution to conflict on the block is a move away from high 
levels of inter-household dependence and co-operation in oil palm production 
and gardening to the more individualised system found on blocks with a rotation 
(markim mun) production system (Section 5.5).  In this way, the multiple 
household wok bung strategy can be tenuous in the context of population and 
economic pressure or disputes over block tenure.  Thus, in some instances, the 
multiple household wok bung production unit can be viewed as a transitory 
stage as households shift (mainly due to demographic and generational changes 
on the block) from co-operative production units to more individualised units of 
production by adopting a rotation (markim mun) system. 
 
A summary of the main characteristics of multiple household (wok bung) blocks 
is provided in Table 5.3.  Two case studies of multiple household (wok bung) 
blocks are presented in Boxes 5.5 and 5.6. 
 
 
5.5  Multiple Households – Rotation (Markim Mun) 
Multiple household rotation (markim mun) production units are predominantly 
on the LSS schemes at Hoskins where up to five or six households reside on one 
block.  These households may consist of the original blockowner, his married 
sons and sometimes married daughters.  In these situations population pressure 
is a serious issue and the total population living on a block may exceed 25 
individuals.  As mentioned in Chapter 4 these highly populated blocks are 
generally under a great deal of economic and social pressure.   
 
Most respondents reported that the rotation (markim mun) strategy emerged as a 
response to inter-household disputes over allocations of oil palm labour and/or 
the distribution of oil palm income.  It is therefore a response to the increasing 
number of co-resident households on blocks.  When the numbers of household 
units becomes too great for the sharing of oil palm income they begin to act as 
separate production units.  Co-resident households begin to operate as 
individual production units with limited inter-household labour co-operation 
and exchange in oil palm and garden production.  They cultivate their own 
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gardens, develop their own income sources and have their own allocated oil 
palm harvests.  
 
Further, as households move from a co-operative to a rotation (markim mun) 
production system there appear to be changes in labour remuneration 
arrangements.  On single and multiple household wok bung blocks, labour 
payments often do not reflect labour input, but rather payment is governed more 
by gender, age, or kinship status, and reciprocal labour co-operation is common.  
On blocks that have moved to a rotation production system, people expect to be 
paid for their labour input and there is less in-kind payment for labour.  This is 
exemplified by differences between VOP/LSS single households blocks and 
rotation (markim mun) multiple households on the LSS subdivisions.  The 
former are more likely to use in-kind payment for labour or some form of 
reciprocal labour arrangement for harvesting, whereas rotation production 
systems are more likely to remunerate labour with cash.  
 
The way in which harvest labour is allocated on blocks with a rotation (markim 
mun) strategy varies.  Generally, one brother/son and his family will be 
allocated the FFB harvest work and related income from that work for a 
particular month.  The following month another brother will harvest the fruit 
and collect the cheque and so on.  Similarly, the loose fruit cheque is rotated 
among female heads of households.  In this way oil palm labour and income are 
rotated among co-resident households.  On some blocks the household whose 
turn it is to harvest may seek some labour assistance from other households on 
the block.  With both family assistance and the labour provided by other block 
residents, this allows for more thorough harvesting.  Household members and 
close kin from co-resident households contributing to the FFB harvest typically 
receive a share of the oil palm cheque.  As mentioned above, there is an 
expectation that they will share in the proceeds of the cheque, and that the 
amount of money they receive will reflect their labour input to the harvest.  
 
Decision-making on rotation (markim mun) blocks varies and can have a 
significant impact on block production.  In some cases we observed, decisions 
regarding the allocation of harvests and harvesting payments were made by the 
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head of the block – either the original leaseholder or the eldest born son of a 
deceased leaseholder.  Their decisions were based on the views of other block 
residents or were made without consultation.  Often an elderly blockowner will 
try to maintain control and leadership over the block by making all decisions on 
harvesting and payments, although a married son may begin to challenge his 
father’s authority.  Where the father is deceased and “ownership” has passed to 
the first or second born son, disputes may arise.  Hence, decisions on allocating 
harvests may be challenged by younger brothers and the rotation system begins 
to break down.   
 
Where disputes over harvesting and income distribution are minimal, and where 
some labour is recruited from other households on the block, production can be 
consistently high.  Not only is there adequate labour to complete a full block 
harvest, but the economic pressure on these populated blocks means that it is 
unlikely that the block will forego a harvest round.  These smallholders could be 
described as “desperate producers” rather than high producers as production is 
driven by economic necessity resulting from population pressure.   
 
Sometimes, however, if disputes over income or harvesting emerge and remain 
unresolved, then a household may harvest alone as individuals from co-resident 
households withdraw labour.  With limited labour assistance, the household 
usually is unable to harvest the full 4 or 6 hectares.  Thus, conflicts can lead to 
the paradoxical situation where there is under-employed labour on a block while 
there is a labour shortage for harvesting.  For instance, as Box 5.7 reveals, 
although this block has over 15 adult residents, there were never more than 
three people harvesting, including loose fruit collection.   
 
In the distribution of oil palm income on these blocks, it is difficult to agree on 
payment arrangements that satisfy everyone.  With several households residing 
on a block, a household may wait three to four months before being allocated a 
harvest and the oil palm cheque.  Therefore, some access to a portion of the oil 
palm income, by assisting with someone’s harvest, helps through the period 
they are waiting for their allocated pay month.  Economic pressure and the need 
to access income causes many disputes which can negatively affect oil palm 
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production through disrupted production.  There is also a need for income 
diversification on these blocks.   
 
A summary of the main characteristics of multiple household rotation (markim 
mun) blocks is provided in Table 5.4.  Two case studies of multiple household 
rotation blocks are presented in Boxes 5.7 and 5.8. 
 









• Rotate FFB harvest and loose 
fruit collection between 
households. 
• Rotate FFB harvest and loose 





• Adequate labour for harvesting. 
• Some inter-household 
cooperation. 
• Limited labour exchange with 
off-block kin. 
• Limited number of labourers per 
harvest. 
• No inter-household cooperation. 
• Limited labour exchange with 
off-block kin. 
• Block labour under-utilised. 
 
DECISION-MAKING 
• Central authority with 
programmed harvests. 
• Disputed authority and disputed 
rotation. 




• Shared within household. 
• Small portion shared with 
members of other households. 











• Economic pressure. 
• Competitive producer. 
• Indigenous obligations. 
• Limited alternative sources of 
income. 
• Economic pressure. 
• Indigenous obligations. 




5.6  Smallholder Households in Transition 
The typology of smallholder production units outlined above permits an 
alternative way of examining smallholders and smallholder production 
strategies.  It raises questions regarding household dynamics, such as how 
labour is organised and mobilised, how decisions are made, what influences 
income distribution, how households and household members maintain social 
stability, and how all of these, separately and conjointly influence oil palm 
production and productivity.  If we begin to think in terms of households rather 
than individual producers, then we can begin to think about the dynamics 
operating within and between households to access income and thus influence 
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production.  The framework, therefore, enables further scrutiny of household 
dynamics and can be used in conjunction with the high-low producer framework 
(Landell Mills 1991) to provide another layer of analysis.  The household 
framework could also be of use to extension officers to better address problems 
on blocks through a greater understanding of the intra-household processes 
operating in each type of smallholder production unit.  
 
By considering the different smallholder household production units a better 
sense can be gained of the varied smallholder production strategies present on 
LSS and VOP blocks.  An outstanding feature of the LSS and VOP subdivisions 
is the diversity of household types and production strategies that have emerged 
as the smallholder schemes develop over time.  Block population, household 
size and organisation, gender relations, production strategies, labour 
availability, household co-operation and conflict, while diverse show some 
correspondence with our typology of smallholder household production units.  
Our framework, therefore, captures some of the diversity and complexity of 
smallholder production today.   
 
Finally, the various types of household production units reflect a recent 
transition on the older LSS schemes such as Hoskins where single household 
blocks are being replaced by multiple household blocks and as a consequence 
labour arrangements, harvesting practices and methods of payment are changing 
in a variety of ways.  Since the establishment of the oil palm smallholder sector 
over thirty years ago, the uncomplicated single household block has become the 
complex multiple household block of today.  
 
It appears that the rotation (markim mun) system is a recent change in 
production practices that has occurred over the last decade as population 
pressure has begun to exert an influence on LSS blocks at Hoskins.  Long-
serving OPIC extension officers and employees in the Smallholder Affairs 
section of NBPOL recalled that the rotation system emerged around the mid 
1980s when settlers’ sons began to marry and form their own households (Waka 
Wayang and Tapas Pokus pers. comm.).  It did not become widespread until 
more recently.  In the 1991 Landell Mills Hoskins smallholder study there was 
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no mention of the rotation system, although blocks with a population above 20 
persons were omitted from the study due to data collection difficulties.  The 
agro-sociologist involved in that project does not recall the rotation system 
being a significant feature of harvesting practices at the time of the study (C. 
Benjamin pers. comm.).  At Popondetta this study did not come across the 
rotation (markim mun) system among smallholders on the LSS, and OPIC 
officers identified only a small number of blocks that had adopted the system. 
 
The multiple household rotation (markim mun) blocks operate very differently 
to the less populated blocks and VOP blocks where communal harvesting and 
inter-household garden labour exchange remain common.  As mentioned earlier, 
when the number of household units becomes too great for the sharing of oil 
palm income they begin to act as separate production units.  Also, on these 
multiple household rotation blocks, reciprocal labour and in-kind labour are 
increasingly being replaced by cash payments that are likely to be 
commensurate with labour input.  This differs from the single household blocks, 
where money received for harvesting assistance often does not reflect the labour 
input of individual household members, and where reciprocal co-operation is 
the norm.   
 
The changes observed in harvesting arrangements and income distribution 
appear to be driven primarily by generational and demographic changes on the 
schemes.  However, it is likely too that socio-cultural change, increased 
demands for cash and economic pressure on blocks are also contributing to 
these changes.  For example, young men at Kavui LSS now want to be paid well 
for their work, whereas in the past food or some other small payment was 
considered adequate remuneration. 
 
The shift to a rotation (markim mun) rotation system on highly populated blocks 
where households are operating more like nuclear family units and where labour 
payment arrangements are changing is a major socio-agronomic transformation 
occurring on the land settlement schemes at Hoskins (probably Bialla too where 
population pressures are also a factor).  However, it should be remembered that 
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many multiple household blocks continue to work together and share income 
and food, but the rotation system appears common and is increasing.  
 
The transition that is occurring in smallholder household types and production 
strategies presents new challenges to the industry.  Although there are only 
limited data to support the following claims, we suspect that the move to the 
rotation (markim mun) system has four important implications for block 
productivity and smallholder interventions: 
 
1. Oil palm productivity is higher on highly populated blocks that have not 
moved to the rotation (markim mun) system.  Families that harvest together 
tend to have more people involved with the harvest and therefore can 
harvest more of the crop.  In a rotation system fewer block members may 
participate in a harvest round so harvesting is more likely to be incomplete. 
  
2. Under a rotation (markim mun) system, there is a higher probability that 
block maintenance (or replanting) is neglected or disputed (the tragedy of 
the commons argument).  For an individual household wishing to minimise 
its labour expenditure while maximising its income, it makes more 
economic sense not to engage in block maintenance as the benefits from 
such labour (higher yields) are dispersed amongst all resident households 
including those that did not contribute to block maintenance.  
 
3.  Under a rotation (markim mun) system, where economic pressure exists, it is 
more likely that there will be a reluctance to poison old palms and replant.  
The loss of income may be considered, in the short-term, too great.  
 
4.  Under a rotation (markim mun) system there is probably more incentive to 
abuse industry credit schemes or the mama card (Chapter 7.2 and 8.3) as 
individual households seek to maximise their oil palm income during their 
allocated payment month.  On blocks where each household is receiving 
only three or four oil palm cheques a year, then the temptation to avoid loan 
repayments or to place a significant quantity of fruit on the mama card 
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could be irresistible, especially since the costs of such a decision (e.g., loan 
repayments) are shared amongst all block households. 
 
Potential interventions for highly populated blocks are explored in Chapter 8. 
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Box 5.1.  Single household (wok bung), Gaungo VOP, Hoskins 
 
Bernadette and Bill reside on Bill’s sister’s block.  They have a 4 year old daughter.  
Currently two adult male in-laws, Mark and Steven are temporarily living on the block.  
Mark and Stephen are supported financially by their brother who works as a 
supervisor with NBPOL, and they also occasionally receive a share of the oil palm 
cheque on the block.  During the survey period, the visitors were building a chicken 
house to start their own poultry business.  Their brother provided the money to start 
the business and they will share the profits with him.    
 
Bill and Bernadette harvest oil palm only once a month, and decisions on harvesting 
are made jointly. Although only a 2 hectare block, they usually receive help from 
close kin at harvesting and the number of kin involved in the harvest is relatively 
large.  A harvest during the study period involved:   
Bill – cutting fruit;  
Bernadette – wheelbarrowing fruit and stacking bunches; 
Steven cutting fruit and collecting and wheelbarrowing loose fruit; 
Anna (Bill’s brother’s wife) collecting loose fruit; 
Peter (brother) cutting fruit;. 
Lucy (niece) wheelbarrow fruit  
 
Loose fruit was weighed on Anna’s mama card and the money will be shared with her 
family.  According to Bill and Bernadette the main reason for inviting relatives to 
harvest is to promote solidarity amongst the kin group, as sharing wealth is 
instrumental in maintaining kin and social relationships.  This social aspect of oil palm 
production is very important.   
 
The oil palm income is controlled by Bernadette.  She collects both the papa and 
mama cheques and distributes the household income.  Bernadette gained control of 
the household income after they moved to Madang where Bill worked previously.  Bill 
respects his wife’s claims on the household income and acknowledges that he would 
fritter the money away if he kept the papa cheque.  At times there are disputes over 
the income  but overall it seems to work. Bernadette manages the income well, and it 
was the only household in the survey (including Kavui) where each week at least K10 
was spent on store foods.  
 
Because Bernadette has control of the papa card, it means that she can often 
allocate the collection of loose fruit (and the mama cheque) to female relatives.  
Being able to distribute income was seen by Bernadette as one of the main benefits 
of the mama card. 
 
There is great variation in the amount of fruit harvested each month.  This is 
explained by several factors such as competing activities occurring in the village, the 
need for cash and the availability of labour. The block also has several sources of 
alternative income: 
 
• selling clan land to settlers (mainly the sons of LSS settlers);  
• timber royalties; 
• fishing; 
• currently establishing a chicken business on the block; 
• one small pig. 
 
As expected in a village context much energy is oriented towards kinship-based 





Box 5.2.  Single household (wok bung), Igora LSS, Popondetta 
 
Kathie and Luke migrated from the Sepik to Popondetta in 1979. Currently five 
children live on the block: two adult unmarried sons (Paul and Robert), a teenage 
daughter (Susan) a 10 year old son and 6 year old daughter.  Also living on the block 
is their first born daughter’s 5 year old son.  Kathie’s brother has been living on the 
block since June 2000.  Their two eldest sons work in other provinces and provide 
financial assistance to the family when necessary.   
 
Four hectares are planted to oil palm.  The family harvests for most pick-ups, with all 
family members working together to harvest the block, including the young children.  
Paul and Robert do most of the harvesting as their father is too old to do the 
physically demanding task of cutting fruit.  Luke usually helps wheelbarrow the fruit.  
Kathie and Susan and the two youngest children collect the loose fruit.   
 
Because of the number of male adults on the block, labour shortages are not a 
harvesting constraint.  Luke told us that before they finished re-paying their loan, the 
family harvested for every pickup.  Now he does not feel the pressure to harvest 
every round and claims he only harvests when he feels like it.  The sons will usually 
harvest if their parents are not interested. 
 
The oil palm cheque is deposited in Luke’s bank account and then shared with the 
sons.  This appears to work well as the sons continue to do most of the work on the 
block, including maintenance work.  The sons usually accompany their father to town 
on pay days.  Paul believes the amount of money he receives is reasonable.  He 
acknowledged that some young men are not pleased with the small amount they 
receive for their labour and relayed how on other blocks, some young men have 
disputed their father’s control of the block.  In some cases the sons have taken 
control of the income on the block and the parents are now dependent on the son for 
money.  
 
Kathie has control over the mama cheque and shares it with Susan and the younger 
children.  The remaining money is spent on food for the family and other household 
items.  Kathie sometimes sells food at the community market, but the main income 
source on the block is oil palm.  The customary landowners, through intimidation and 
threats, discourage settlers from other areas from establishing small businesses on 




Box 5.3.  Caretaker household, Sorovi LSS, Popondetta 
 
This block is owned by Raymond, an employee of Higarturu Oil Palm Ltd who lives 
on a company compound.  Patrick and Rita from Morobe Province have been 
caretakers for 5 months and live on the block with their six children – all under the 
age of 15 years.  Prior to being caretakers they lived on Rita’s brother’s block at 
Sorovi.  They heard that Raymond was looking for caretakers for his block and 
approached him.  Rita is from the same village as Raymond’s wife and they all 
belong to the same ethnic group.  Before Patrick and Rita moved onto the block, 
Raymond paid a youth group to harvest the block.  
 
Four hectares of oil palm are planted, but Patrick never manages to fully harvest the 
block as he is the only adult male on the block.  Without control of the block income 
(see below) he cannot afford to hire labour.  He works alone cutting fruit and is 
helped by his younger sons in transporting the fruit to the road.  Cutting the palms on 
this block is arduous work as the palms are very tall and ready for replanting.  Rita 
and the eldest daughter collect the loose fruit and the young sons help in transporting 
the loose fruit to the road.  There is no mama card on the block.  During the survey 
period, they missed two harvest pick-ups because their wheelbarrow broke and they 
were waiting for the caretaker to visit the block so that they could request a 
replacement.   
 
The oil palm cheque is deposited into the owner’s account and he then allocates 
some of the cheque to Rita and Patrick.  The amount of money they receive varies 
depending on the price of oil palm. According to the caretakers, if the price of oil palm 
is reasonable then they may receive K100 or more, but if the price falls they can 
receive as little as K50 and, on occasions, they have received only store bought food 
and no cash.  A few times the owner has given them a 5kg bag of rice rather than 
cash payment for their harvest labour.  Both are unhappy with the remuneration they 
receive.  Patrick said that his main concern is that he will not have enough money to 
pay his children’s school fees this year (around K290).  The payments they receive 
for their labour from the owner is used to buy food and other essential household 
items.  The family tries to save a little of each payment to put towards school fees.   
 
Patrick and Rita have gardens on the block which they rely heavily on for most of 
their food and for the sale of garden crops for some additional income.  Rita and the 
eldest daughter also supplement the diet by fishing regularly in a nearby creek.   
 
In the last week of the survey period the owner visited the block to ask Patrick to 





Box 5.4.  Caretaker household Gaungo VOP, Hoskins 
 
This 2 hectare block was bought by a “settler” who currently resides at the new 
subdivision of Soi at Bialla LSS.  The owner has his widowed brother, Simon, as 
caretaker of the block.  Simon has two young sons.  Also living on the block is Paul.  
Paul’s brother owns a block nearby, but following a dispute with the brother, Paul was 
evicted and Simon took him in.  Paul helps with harvesting and block maintenance.  
Paul has lived away from his village for over a decade and claims that it would be 
very difficult for him to return and access land as both his parents are deceased and 
he is the youngest brother.  For most of the survey period Simon had two young male 
relatives visiting him and his mother also arrived for a two week visit.   
 
Simon and his brother have agreed that the primary harvesting card be used to pay 
off the debt for the recently purchased block at Soi and the mama card became 
Simon’s income.  The primary cheque is deposited directly into Simon’s brother’s 
bank account.  To increase Simon’s share of the oil palm income, fruit bunches are 
also placed on the mama card, and for most of the survey period the tonnage was 
higher on the mama card.  Simon decides how much fruit is to be weighed on the 
primary card.  Whilst the amount of income he allocates himself varies depending on 
his family’s needs (e.g., hosting visitors from his home village) or the price of oil palm, 
he stressed it is important to give his brother a share which his brother views as fair 
and reasonable.  In this way, disputes over income will not emerge and there will be 
no reason why his brother should want to evict him (a common problem on caretaker 
blocks).  
 
Simon said that once the debt on the Soi block is reduced to a reasonable level, then 
he will increase the amount of fruit weighed on his mama card, giving him a higher 
income.  It is likely, according to Simon that his brother will remain living at Soi and 
Simon will take control of the block at Gaungo.  As there is no debt on the block, the 
mama card provides the brothers with a very convenient way to share income.    
 
Simon is a high producer and harvests every pick-up.  Because of the frequent 
harvesting and small area to be harvested, the harvest is usually completed in one 
day.  The general pattern is that Simon cuts the fruit and Paul collects loose fruit and 
transports the fruit to the road.  If additional labour is required, a visitor will help cut 
and transport fruit.  Sometimes if relatives in his home village need money, Simon will 
“mark” a month for a family member to visit and harvest the oil palm.    
 
Simon has two large gardens.  Most crops in his garden were planted by village 
relatives who have little access to garden land.  When the crops are ready they return 
to Gaungo to harvest them.  The food is used for household consumption and a large 
section of tobacco is often planted for sale at local markets. To maintain high garden 
yields Simon applies oil palm fertiliser.  His last purchase of fertiliser from the 





Box 5.5.  Multiple household (wok bung), Kavui LSS, Hoskins 
 
The original blockowners, Martin and Lina from Morobe Province, reside on the block 
with their six sons.  The eldest son Michael is married and lives on the block with his 
wife Patricia and six children.  Robert (18yrs), David (approx 16yrs), Julius (approx 
13 years) all live and work on the block.  Yoan lives on the block and attends school 
– grade 8.  Last born Api, 8 years lives on block.  A total of 15 people live 
permanently on the block.   
 
Two single sons are currently working for NBPOL and live elsewhere in West New 
Britain and another daughter is temporarily visiting a sister in their home village.  The 
third born son lives permanently in his wife’s village in Morobe province.  Links with 
children living off-block are maintained as are links back to Martin’s village. 
 
All family members sleep in the one house and work together in gardening and 
harvesting.  Unlike many young men at Kavui, the young males on this block spend 
little time away from the block, but rather are active in gardening, block maintenance 
and harvesting work.  The explanation for such “disciplined” behaviour is partly found 
in the strict behavioural codes associated with their religion which espouses a strong 
work ethic, family unity and self discipline.  Their religion also opposes the 
consumption of tobacco, alcohol and betel nut - which are very popular among young 
males.  
 
The family harvests together for every pick-up and all members of the family 
contribute to the harvest.  It is not unusual to have 7 or 8 family members working on 
a harvest.  If family members are sick, then relatives living on other blocks are called 
upon.  The father controls decisions regarding harvesting and has put a system in 
place whereby all members of the family will cut and transport fruit from one section 
of the block before moving onto the next section.  In this way no one individual is 
given an easier or more difficult section to work on.   
 
The large number of people working on a harvest means that all 6 hectares of oil 
palm are harvested each harvesting round which places the block in the top high 
producer category. In 2000, the average monthly income was K531.45 (papa card) 
and K241.05 for the mama card.  The family identified several reasons for their “high 
producing” status. One, they only cut ripe bunches - these are the heaviest (highest 
oil content).  The father learnt this while working for the plantation many years ago.  
Second, there is no conflict between the brothers and the family has not moved to a 
rotation system which they see as an inefficient production system because of the 
limitations it places on the number of labourers per harvest.  Finally, they cut fruit just 
before the truck pickup (fruit bunches begin to lose weight after they are harvested). 
 
The oil palm cheque is paid into the father’s bank account and part is distributed 
among the family.  Some income is used to buy food for the family and some of the 
proceeds remain in Martin’s bank account.  For example, during the survey period 
the block received an oil palm cheque (papa cheque) for K390.  K212 was disbursed 
among 9 male members on the block and one cousin who helped with the harvest. 
Individual shares of the cheque ranged from K10 to K40 depending on the level of 
work carried out on the harvest and the age of the son.  After spending some money 
on food for the family and putting aside K70 for the father and son to attend a 
religious retreat, the balance remained in Martin’s account as savings.   
 
The father appears to make all decisions over the disbursement of the papa cheque.  
Although there is some discontent with this system (see below), it obviously works 
well as the young sons continue to harvest.   Whilst the distribution of income by the 
father provides some income to all members of the family, a few family members 
complain that the small share they receive prevents them from saving any money.  
Michael and Patricia, for example, would prefer that the father occasionally allocate 
them a month for the papa card to allow them to save some money to visit relatives in 
other provinces.  Also Robert would like his father to open a bank account for him so 
he can save to buy an oil palm block as he is concerned about future pressures on oil 
palm income with so many brothers living on the block.   
Cont… 
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Box 5.5 cont. 
The mama cheque is rotated monthly between Lina and Patricia.  When it is Lina’s 
month, Patricia helps her mother-in-law with the collection and transporting of the fruit 
to the roadside– this is expected in her role as daughter-in-law. Occasionally, Lina 
will help Patricia collect loose fruit.  Lina and Patricia tend to use the mama cheque in 
the same way.  Both use the money to buy food and clothes for the family and will 
distribute some of the money to their children.  According to the women, they were 
collecting loose fruit regularly prior to the introduction of the mama card and they 
were receiving a share of the papa cheque.  ‘Martin em scalim [papa cheque] gut 
long ol pikinnini na meri’. 
 
A further characteristic of the block is that there is much garden labour cooperation 
between. Additional income is earned by the women at local markets.  There are 
three small peanut gardens on the block which provide block residents with a good 




Box 5.6.  Multiple household (wok bung), Igora LSS, Popondetta 
Rex and Grace are the “owners” of the block and are from the neighbouring village of 
Horihita.  They were given the block by Rex’s brother-in-law as part payment for a 
brideprice.  Rex and Grace reside on the block with their three children, and Rex’s 
widowed mother.  Their last born child, Giona is married and lives on the block with 
her husband, Francis, and two young children.   
 
The block has four hectares planted to oil palm and some reserve land for gardening.  
Rex and Francis share most of the harvesting and on occasions are helped by Rex’s 
sister’s husband who lives nearby.  If they are short of labour they receive help from 
relatives in Horihita village.  Rex makes all decisions on block harvesting and 
maintenance.  He also works on a casual basis as a carpenter and is regularly 
undertaking off-block work.  Sometimes when he is absent he will allocate the 
harvest to Francis.  If Rex has not allocated a harvest to someone in his absence, the 
block is usually left unharvested, so irregular harvesting can be partly explained by 
Rex’s frequent absences from the block. The block has very low production with very 
few harvests over a period of several years. 
 
Oil palm payment arrangements vary.  Francis claims that sometimes when he cuts 
the fruit with Rex he receives only a small portion of the cheque while Rex receives 
the rest.  Sometimes if he harvests alone in Rex’s absence he is given all the 
cheque.   At other times if Rex needs the money he will keep all the proceeds of the 
oil palm cheque, despite the help received from Francis. Towards the end of the 
survey period Grace was issued with a mama card.  The mama card will be shared 
with her daughter Giona.  It would be expected that as a daughter-in-law Grace 
would also share the proceeds of the mama card with Rex’s mother living on the 
block.   
 
Being close to their village, they remain involved in customary exchange 
transactions.  Sometimes they will either give cash from oil palm income or invite 
someone to work and harvest their block and let them keep the oil palm cheque. 
 
For the last two weeks of the survey period the family was preoccupied with 
preparing for a Pondo (feast) exchange.  The Pondo is for the adoption of their 
youngest child.  The biological parents were to be presented with a selection of store 
bought foods, a pig and a substantial quantity of garden food - mostly taro and 
banana, as well as coconuts, betel nut, pumpkin, sweet potato and  sugar cane.   
 
The store bought food and the pig were purchased by Rex.  On the last two visits to 
the block during the survey period many relatives had contributed garden food for the 
Pondo.  Most brought taro, betel nut, and tobacco – valuable contributions.   Most 
relatives were staying on the block until the Pondo exchange was completed.  Other 
relatives were expected to arrive closer to the day with food for the exchange.  
Nearby blockholders from other provinces (e.g., Morobe and Sepiks) have also 
contributed food to the Pondo.  Similar to other large Pondo events, this exchange 
was planned months ahead to allow gardens to be prepared.  Cont… 
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Box 5.6 cont. 
 
Grace told us that because of the prevalence of Pondo amongst the local population, 
oil palm production is intermittent.  Some people may not harvest their block for 
several months but then will do a complete harvest to help with a Pondo, or they may 
harvest and weigh the harvest on another card (when this occurs no production is 




Box 5.7.  Multiple household rotation (markim mun), Kavuii LSS, 
Hoskins 
 
Twenty six people reside on this block including the elderly owners Agus and Wutnia, 
some of their children and close kin.  Agus and Wutnia left their Sepik village in 1958 
and have 10 children.  Two sons live in their home village and 2 daughters have 
married and live on nearby blocks.    
 
Three sons (Aron, Wemen, Terrence) and one daughter Dominica are married and 
reside on the block with their spouses and children.  The youngest daughter is single 
and lives with her parents.  For the second half of the survey period, Terrence, his 
wife and three children were temporarily absent - visiting in-laws in Madang.  Two 
male relatives (David and Phillip), both with their wives and children also live on the 
block.  A total of 7 households reside on this 6 hectare block.  Each household acts 
as an individual production unit.  While there is the usual sharing of food among kin, 
each household has its own gardens and income sources.  There is limited exchange 
of garden labour and very little co-operation among households in oil palm harvesting 
(see below).   
 
The large number of households places great economic pressure on the block, which 
appears to be relieved by households moving off the block for short periods.  For 
example, for most of the survey weeks, at least one of the seven households was 
absent for more than five days.   
 
Agus holds authority on the block and maintains control over harvesting labour and 
the flow of oil palm income.  Because of the large number of households on the block 
a rotation (markim mun) system of harvesting is used.  Agus makes all decisions 
regarding harvest allocations to particular individuals/households on the block, for 
both the mama and papa card.  This is said to reduce conflict on the block.  His 
decisions relating to the harvest rotation are often based on the needs of individual 
families, and are an attempt to distribute equally the income between households on 
the block.   
 
Although there are no set rules on how income should be distributed on the block, 
there is an expectation that people should show generosity if there are not great 
demands on the income.  The rotation system, whilst acting to distribute the income 
to all families, is not a very efficient harvesting system because the allocation of a 
harvest to one household results in only two or three adults from a particular 
household working on a harvest at any one time.  The outcome is that the block is 
usually not fully harvested.  Another problem on this block is that a family whose turn 
it is to harvest tends to put more fruit on the mama card to avoid loan repayment 
deductions on the papa card. This explains why the tonnes recorded on the mama 
card are often equal to or about two-thirds of that placed on the papa card.   
 
Although Agus carries out all block maintenance, he and Wutnia do not harvest oil 
palm.  They do receive a small share of the oil palm income, but rely mostly on 
money Wutnia earns at local markets.  Wutnia often sells cassava “sago” which is 
undertaken by both Wutnia and Agus.  Money earned from selling cassava “sago” 
can be significant– sometimes earning as much as K20.  Agus and Wutnia spend a 
great deal of time gardening and working together and sharing domestic tasks such 
as collecting firewood.  Mutual co-operation and respect is a marked feature of their 




Box 5.7 cont. 
 
The mama card is in the name of the eldest daughter living on the block and like the 
papa card is rotated among households.  A month is allocated to a particular female 
head of household, and it is expected she will distribute part of the income to her 
husband, children and sister-in-laws.  Marketing and gardening are also important as 
they provide an area where women have complete autonomy and control over the 
income derived.  Wutnia and Katarine (Aron’s wife) described themselves as ‘meri 
long market’ – identify strongly as market women.  They market at least once or twice 
a week and the income is the household’s main source of cash while they wait for the 
papa cheque. 
 
A considerable amount of time is spent on gardening by women.  Twenty-six gardens 
in various stages of cultivation were recorded.  .  Many of the gardens surveyed were  
planted with produce to be sold at local markets.  Also, the block backs onto 
company (SBLC) land and this provides the households with additional land for 
gardening.  Some gardens are also cultivated on the adjoining block owned by Agus’ 
brother. 
 
The block residents have extensive social and kinship networks with other blocks.  
There are many closely related and more distantly related kin living on blocks at 
Kavui and on other land settlement schemes in the Hoskins project and in the town of 
Kimbe.  Also the family maintains ties back to the village.  Hence, customary 
exchange is important and occasionally places demands on people’s time and 
finances.  
 
Towards the end of the survey period, Phillip (visitor) opened a small tradestore on 
the block and planted over a dozen betel nut palms.  The tradestore and betel nut is 




Box 5.8.  Multiple household rotation (markim mun), Kavui LSS, 
Hoskins 
 
The original blockowner and his wife migrated from the Highlands to the land 
settlement scheme in the early 1970s where they raised five sons.  The parents are 
now deceased.  Three sons are married with children and two are single (of 
marriageable age).  Until March 2000, all sons and their respective families lived on 
the block.  Presently, one married son and his two younger single brothers are 
visiting the Highlands and intend to return early next year.  The brothers have no 
links to their home village; nor do they have rights to village resources.  They are 
visiting in-laws.  Two married brothers, Yopo and Nali remain living on the block with 
their respective wife and children.  The block population during the survey period was 
6.  When the brothers return, there will be four households totally 11 people residing 
on the block. 
 
When the father was alive he made most decisions on the block relating to oil palm 
harvesting and income distribution.  Oil palm was harvested with all sons working 
together (wok bung).  After the father died conflict over ownership and control of the 
block emerged between the brothers, when the first born son (Francis) was “officially” 
given title of the block.  As Francis attempted to take on the leadership of the block, 
the other brothers disputed and resisted his new role. Yopo took over the role of 
‘mausman’ (spokesman) for the block.  With all five brothers living on the block a 
rotation harvesting system was introduced.  At harvest times the brothers would work 
together to cut the fruit, but the heavy and time-consuming task of carting fruit to the 
road was carried out by the brother who was allocated the cheque for the month.  
Although a cheque was allocated to a particular individual, the holder of the cheque 
was obligated to reward the other brothers for their help at harvest time by giving 





Box 5.8 Cont. 
 
While this system aimed to distribute the income to all households on the block, there 
were problems. Often a brother would dispute the allocation of a “month” to a 
particular brother, or one of the brothers would collect the oil palm cheque when it 
was not his allocated month.  Also, the distribution of oil palm income regularly 
resulted in fights between the brothers, and no one brother would take responsibility 
for block maintenance.  Finally, the rotation system meant that each brother would 
only receive a cheque twice to three times a year, resulting in families relying on 
other sources of income and/or relying on the generosity of the cheque holder of a 
given month.  It was a fight over the oil palm cheque earlier this year that resulted in 
Yopo evicting his three brothers from the block.  Yopo now claims ownership of the 
block. 
 
Yopo and Nali sometimes work together to harvest the block, though Yopo does most 
of the harvesting as Nali has off-block income.  With Yopo doing most of the 
harvesting and block maintenance on his own, he rarely is able to harvest the full 6 
hectares of oil palm.  On his own, and sometimes with the help of his young son, he 
will harvest two hectares.  With his brother Nali, or with the help of friends, he may 
harvest the full 6 hectares. For block maintenance and fertiliser application Yopo 
often relies on the help of young single men.  They are sometimes paid with cash or 
provided with cooked food. 
 
Ruth (Yopo’s wife) has two sweet potato gardens on the block and a peanut garden 
on a nearby block belonging to an in-law.  The peanuts will be sold at local markets.  
Currently, Ruth does not sell food at local markets as she says she does not have 
adequate garden space on her block.  Most food in the garden is used for 
consumption and part of the sweet potato production is fed to her pig which will either 
be sold or used in exchange.  Ruth also has a chicken business which she shares 
with her son.  She collects loose fruit, and her husband (or others) transports the 
loose fruit to the road.  Yopo also collects loose fruit and shares in the mama cheque. 
There is no strict division of labour for loose fruit collection.  On one harvest during 
the survey period, Yopo collected most of the loose fruit, but the money was shared 
with Ruth.  Ruth does not exercise complete control over the loose fruit collection nor 
the distribution of oil palm income.  Instead, the mama card appears to be used as a 
convenient way to earn more cash when loan repayments are very high.  Ruth 
rotates the mama cheque with Dorothy (Wemen’s wife).   
 
Both the mama and papa cheques are deposited into Yopo’s bank account and Yopo 
appears to control the distribution of income from both cheques - although this is not 
always the case.  For most months during the survey period, the mama cheque 
provided the main source of income on the block because more fruit was placed on 
the mama card than the primary card.  Approximately 70% of the gross income on 
the papa cheque is deducted each month to repay a bank loan taken out in early 









6.0  Introduction 
This chapter focuses on land tenure issues and conflicts over land on the LSS 
and VOP subdivisions at Hoskins and Popondetta.  The study identified land 
issues as key factors currently affecting smallholder production.  These issues 
pose potential problems and major challenges for the future viability and 
sustainability of the smallholder sector.   
 
Land conflicts take many forms in the oil palm smallholder sector, from the 
large compensation claims demanded by customary landowners for land 
alienated for estate plantations and land settlement schemes to inter- and intra-
household disputes over block ownership.  Land conflicts are critical 
production issues as they have the capacity to cause short-term disruption of oil 
palm production to protracted disruption of oil palm production for individuals, 
groups and plantation companies.  The following discussion outlines some of 
the main forms of land conflict and associated issues identified in Hoskins and 
Popondetta. 
 
6.1  Customary Landowners and Land Settlement Schemes 
As discussed in Chapter 1.2, land for the LSSs in West New Britain and Oro 
Province was alienated from the customary landowners to resettle people from 
other parts of Papua New Guinea.  Grievances over the amounts of 
compensation originally paid for alienated land periodically surface in West 
New Britain and Oro Province in the form of demands for monetary 
compensation, the return of alienated lands and the forced repatriation of 
settlers.  These recurrent demands exist alongside ongoing simmering tensions 
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between indigenous landowners and settlers on the LSSs.  Such grievances and 
tensions take various forms in Hoskins and Popondetta. 
 
6.1.1  Hoskins land settlement scheme 
Whilst there are some hostilities between settlers and landowners, overall, for 
most settlers their everyday activities and oil palm production are not 
constrained by outward aggression and intimidation by landowners, and there 
are no obvious signs that such conflicts are currently affecting LSS production 
(c.f. Popondetta discussion below).  However, this is not to suggest that 
resentment among the local landowners towards settlers does not exist.  
Opposition to settlers can manifest itself in regular and ongoing intimidation of 
settlers, periodic calls for their repatriation and/or large-scale acts of group 
violence/protest against settlers.  Generally, intimidation of settlers is spatially 
restricted to blocks bordering local villages.  In these border areas, hostility to 
settlers is most often expressed through theft of garden food, tree crops, 
especially betel nut, tools and occasional damage to property.  These acts serve 
to undermine a sense of social well-being and long-term security amongst 
settlers. 
 
Since the early 1990s, there have been several confrontations between settlers 
and migrants, and calls for the repatriation of settlers.  The most prominent 
incident occurred in 1993 at Kavugara sub-division when settlers from the 173 
leased blocks abandoned their block following harassment by the customary 
landowners.  The eviction, which came after several years of animosity 
between settlers and landowners, resulted in settlers being repatriated to their 
home provinces, moving to live with relatives elsewhere in WNB or PNG, or 
settling in informal settlements at Kimbe.  Within a few weeks of the eviction, 
local landowners had removed houses, water tanks and other assets from the 
leaseholders’ blocks1.  The Kavugara subdivision has since been handed back 
to the two landowning groups in the area and one group has developed part of 
their land as a mini-estate.   
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The Kavugara incident is etched deeply in the minds of smallholders both in 
the Hoskins and Bialla schemes, and as a reminder of their vulnerable position 
as government leaseholders.  Whenever discussions relating to land security 
emerged in conversations with LSS smallholders, Kavugara was raised to 
illustrate the uncertainty of their future tenure.  The violent nature of the 
eviction, the loss of livelihoods, the lack of provincial and National 
government support for the Kavugara leaseholders and the failure to be 
properly compensated for their blocks have contributed to a sense of insecurity 
amongst many settlers.  
 
Landowner resentment of settlers varies, and the following grievances are not 
universally held by landowners.  A common grievance is the perceived 
inadequacy of compensation paid to landowners for land alienated for LSSs 
and company plantations.  There is a feeling among some landowners 
(especially younger landowners) that because their forefathers who negotiated 
the land deals were uneducated and unaware of the value of their lands, then 
they were exploited and cheated by government and company officials into 
handing over their land for token compensation.  In a meeting with landowners 
at Mosa VOP, they told how their educated children have made the older 
village people aware of the injustices that occurred with land alienation.  They 
would like to see the government and company reconsider the issue of 
compensation or consider paying a royalty to landowners.    
 
Existing alongside these compensation grievances appears to be a growing 
ethnic divide that has helped create an “us” and “them” division between 
settlers and landowners.  The single most important concern among 
landowners is the increasing law and order problem that they attribute to the 
large number of migrant youth on the settlement schemes.  The rape of local 
women, the drunken and intimidating behaviour of young male settlers on 
paydays and the perceived fear of attack by young settlers are fuelling 
resentment among the local population.  One landowner, discussing how the 
people in his village no longer feel safe, felt bitter that villagers could no 
longer feel safe ‘in their own place’.  This feeling of marginalisation was 
humiliating to landowners and felt to be unjust.   
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Of course, many settlers are equally concerned with crime issues and are often 
the victims of crime themselves.  Also, many settlers blame blockowners’ 
“undisciplined” sons for provoking anti-settler sentiments.  Many pointed out 
that most confrontations between settlers and the local population2 were 
sparked by crimes committed against the local population by settlers.  For 
example, a three week road block in 1998 on the Kimbe/Bialla road by 
landowners near Buvussi LSS and their demands for the repatriation of settlers, 
followed the killing of an elderly man from Laveke Village by suspected young 
male settlers from Buvussi/Galai LSS.  Although the provincial government 
was rumoured to have put together a package to repatriate the settlers, nothing 
eventuated. 
 
The growing intolerance and resentment towards settlers is also partly linked 
with wider feelings of unease held by indigenous landowners at the high rates 
of in-migration in WNB, and a new generation of young landowners who see 
“outsiders” as the cause of growing land shortages in the area.   
 
6.1.2  Popondetta land settlement scheme 
Disputes over land alienated for LSS and the plantation estates and opposition 
to settlers is currently more intense in Popondetta than Hoskins and is 
recognised as partly explaining why productivity is lower on the LSS than on 
the VOP blocks (ADS (PNG), 2001).  Landowners’ resistance to the land 
settlement schemes is evident in all the land settlement schemes and demands 
for compensation are ongoing.  Among landowners there is a feeling of 
marginalisation, disadvantage and loss, and intense, long standing distrust of 
the oil palm company.  There are several indications that suggest grievances 
over land threaten the viability of the industry and hinder the industry’s future 
development in the province.  For example, the reluctance to replant by some 
LSS smallholders (Chapter 7.5) and the large number of abandoned blocks has 
long-term implications for oil palm development in the province. 
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Unlike the situation at Hoskins, Popondetta landowners that lost land for oil 
palm development, have long been organised into united land pressure groups 
– although their level of activity is extremely variable.  In 1982, after numerous 
failed compensation bids by a range of landowning groups, a landowning 
pressure group (Sangara Pressure Group – representing several villages) was 
awarded K200,000 for land alienated for the land settlement schemes and 
company plantations.  Landowners continue to seek monetary compensation 
from the government as some see the 1982 settlement as “unfair” and further 
compensation necessary to overcome perceived problems of land shortages 
emerging as a result of being deprived access to customary land.   
 
Presently a landowning company Hammwek Holdings – representing eight 
villages is preparing a case for the National Court to seek compensation for 
land and environmental damage, and to force the government and company to 
comply with decisions and recommendations set out in the 1982 court 
settlement.  Amongst these recommendations is the return of some state land, 
and for landowners to receive preferential commercial opportunities from the 
oil palm company.  The land owning company is also currently negotiating 
with the National and provincial governments to receive some of the National 
government’s share dividends in the company. Representatives from the 
landowning company told us they would like to receive compensation 
packages similar to those that other landowning groups are gaining from large 
resource development projects elsewhere in Papua New Guinea (mining was 
highlighted).   
 
Representatives from the landowning company and other indigenous 
landowners feel that they have lost out in the development of the oil palm 
industry in the province as their interests and needs are not being met or 
considered by the company.  There is also widespread resentment that 
“outsiders” are benefiting from the oil palm industry more than the local 
population, especially in regard to employment in the company.  These 
perceived inequalities fuel jealousy and discontent.  Also, for some landowners 
there are certain expectations and obligations to local landowners that the 
company is not fulfilling.  For example, preferential employment and 
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commercial opportunities (such as transport contracting, store leases on 
company compounds) and the payment of land royalties were all raised in 
interviews with landowners.  While the company has responded to some 
landowner demands, the relationship between the company and landowners 
remains fragile.   
 
A bigger problem is the landowner-settler relationship.  All stakeholders in the 
oil palm industry in Popondetta identify the tense landowner-settler 
relationship as a major constraint on smallholder production.  In 1992 during 
the provincial election campaign, the current governor of Popondetta, 
Sylvenius Siembo, incited anti-settler sentiments by running on an “Oro-for-
Oro” campaign.  The campaign was based on the tenet that Oro Province 
should be developed and controlled by Orokavians and not outsiders (including 
expatriates).  Oil palm settlers from outside the province were targeted by local 
landowners and several hundred were forcefully and violently evicted from 
their blocks or fled their blocks in fear.  Some blockholders remained on their 
blocks but were intimidated during the campaign.  Many settlers, particularly 
women and children, left the province, some placing caretakers in charge of 
their blocks (often male relatives married to local women).  Whilst many 
settlers later returned to their blocks when the violence subsided, many others 
lost their blocks and now reside in their home villages, or in other provinces in 
PNG.  Some live with relatives in Popondetta and are seeking compensation 
from the local landowners now occupying their blocks.   
 
Unlike the large-scale eviction at Kavugara, Hoskins, the evictions at 
Popondetta were not restricted to one LSS subdivision nor one area, but 
occurred across all the LSS subdivisions and extended to “outsiders” living and 
employed in town.  Although the scale of destruction varied between 
subdivisions, the harassment of settlers was widespread and continues in 
various forms today.  As one settler remarked ‘Oro-for-Oro igo iet’ – Oro-for-
Oro continues.  Since the 1992 evictions there have been several small-scale 
localised evictions or attempts at evictions, involving short periods of intense 
intimidation of settlers and attempts by some landowners to extract land rentals 
from LSS blockowners in several sections of Iseveni and Igora LSS.  For many 
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settlers, these events sit alongside ongoing harassment and economic 
restrictions imposed on settlers by landowners (Box 6.1 and Box 6.2).   
 
Settlers are acutely aware that they can increase their risk of intimidation and 
violence by: 
 
• Establishing small businesses on their blocks.  Settlers who start 
businesses such as tradestores, transport or poultry enterprises are 
targeted with violence and forced to close the business.  For this 
reason very few settler blocks have supplementary income sources.   
• Appearing to earn high incomes from oil palm.  Settlers who are 
observed to regularly harvest several nets for collection and are seen 
to be successful growers are more likely to be harassed and their 
houses burgled than low producers. 
• Improving the block by replanting.  This can be interpreted as 
reasserting one’s claim on the block. 
• Buying a block from a settler, selling a block to a settler or placing a 
settler as a caretaker on a block can all result in attempts by some 
local landowners to reclaim the block. 
• Having no young men on a settler block increases the risk of 
intimidation and burglary as these blocks are perceived to be more 
vulnerable to attack. 
 
These restrictions and acts of intimidation appear to stem largely from the 
intense feelings of loss and disadvantage experienced by landowners, and are a 
visible expression and reminder to settlers that landowners consider themselves 
to have sovereign control over “their” land.  These types of problems faced by 
settlers place obstacles in the way of improving smallholder productivity.  
Many settlers feel insecure and uncertain about their future in Popondetta and 
many are also keen to see landowner grievances addressed by the government 
and company.  
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Hostility towards migrants in WNB and Popondetta is not out-of-step with 
what is happening elsewhere in Papua New Guinea, particularly at sites of high 
in-migration such as urban centres and mining sites.  Opposition to rural-to-
urban/rural migration and to “outside” migrants is growing in many provinces 
in Papua New Guinea and there have been several attempts over the last few 
years to reintroduce the Vagrancy Act3 (Curry and Koczberski 1999; Goddard 
2001; Koczberski et al 2001).  Thus, anti-settler sentiments on the oil palm 
schemes are part of a wider trend in Papua New Guinea (and other Pacific 
Island nations such as Solomon Islands and Fiji) where sharpening ethnic 
identities and rising land and resource pressure are contributing to new tensions 
surfacing between landowners and migrant groups.  It would be worthwhile 
therefore for those oil palm schemes that have an LSS component to develop 
long-term strategies that work to ameliorate these tensions. 
 
6.2  Customary Land and Village Oil Palm 
6.2.1  Hoskins VOP 
At Hoskins, significant changes are occurring to land tenure practices in 
several VOPs.  That rules of land tenure are changing is neither new nor 
different from what is happening in many areas of PNG (see Crocombe 1972; 
Ward and Kingdon 1995).  However, in the case of villages planting oil palm, 
it is the rapidity of change and the trend to “selling” two to six hectare blocks 
to “outsiders” for oil palm production which is of concern.  “Purchasers” are 
most often migrants to the province.  Land sales are occurring in several VOPs 
(e.g., Morokea, Dagi, Mosa, Siki) and although all land remains under 
customary tenure, landowners are allowing customary land transactions to take 
place under Section 73 of Chapter 185 of the Land Act (1984) which allows for 
the transfer or lease of customary land. 
 
At Hoskins, there is enormous demand for land for oil palm production.  LSS 
settlers see the purchase of land as a means of relieving population pressure on 
their existing LSS blocks and securing futures for themselves and their sons.  
For many settlers the purchase of VOP blocks is their only means of acquiring 
additional land for oil palm production as the price of LSS blocks (between 
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K15,000 and K20,000) is far beyond their reach.  Also, the acquisition of land 
on the VOPs is even more critical for second generation settlers who have 
either lost access to village land or have no village “home” to which to return.  
Similarly, company employees who have spent much of their working lives 
away from “home” and identify more closely with WNB (their children may 
have been raised in WNB), see an opportunity to secure a livelihood for 
retirement in WNB through the purchase of VOP land.  Intermingled with 
some of these land transactions is an element of land speculation. 
 
The following discussion is confined to Gaungo where most of our data were 
collected.  The extent of land sales to non-clan members can be gauged by 
examining the year of planting of blocks by ethnicity.  From the available data 
the first record of planting by an “outsider” was in 1985.  The last five years 
has witnessed significant activity in land sales at Gaungo and settler oil palm 
blocks now outnumber those of local landowners.  At least 60% of 
blockholders are “outsiders” and this is a conservative estimate as the WNB 
ethnic category includes settlers from other regions of the province, most 
notably, Bali Island.  Nearly 20% of “outsiders” are from the ESP, and one of 
the roads in this VOP is known locally as Sepik Road.   
 
Two major consequences are emerging from this “sale” of land to outsiders. 
1. A realisation by some clan members that land shortages are emerging in 
their village and that many young clansmen will no longer have access to 
land for oil palm production.  Access to land for oil palm is highly 
unequal in Gaungo as out of the seven clans, only two clans have primary 
land rights to plant oil palm.  The members of the other five clans have 
secondary rights and must seek access to oil palm land through the land-
owning clans.  However, much of the land has been sold to “outsiders”.  
 
Without a detailed land survey, this study is unable to determine the area 
left under customary use for food production.  However, when an 
application was submitted to NBPOL in 2000 by some Gaungo 
landowners for a 100 hectare mini-estate, the Company Mini-Estate 
Officer advised against the development.  He cited possible future 
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shortages of gardening land if such an area of land were to be alienated 
for oil palm production (A. Barnes pers. comm.).  Anecdotal evidence of 
brothers sharing blocks and others recognising that their sons will be 
denied access to land due to emerging restrictions on and shortages of 
land for oil palm are further evidence of real or perceived shortages of 
land and growing disparities in land ownership at Gaungo.  These 
perceptions of land shortages, common amongst the younger generation, 
are fuelling suspicion of and dissatisfaction with senior men in the village 
for what people perceive as being “cheated” of their “birth right” to land 
(see below).  Such grievances open the way for some landowners to feel 
justified in reclaiming their “birth right” to alienated land. 
 
2. A further consequence of the “sale” of land to outsiders is the emergence 
of increasing land disputes and insecure tenure of “outsiders”.  Land 
purchases at Gaungo are not governed by strict rules or protocols, but 
rather tend to be loose and informal, often based on verbal rather than 
written agreements between the vendor and purchaser.  Generally, no 
detailed land survey is undertaken to mark or record the boundaries of 
the purchased land, and instead land marks, like coconut palms are used 
to delineate the boundaries.  
 
Once an area of land and purchase price has been agreed upon, several 
different steps may follow.  The purchase may be recorded on an official 
Transfer or Lease of Customary Land Form, a Customary Land 
Transaction Form and/or Notice of Change of Ownership Form, and then 
executed and registered at the Provincial Lands Office (prior to January 
1999, OPIC was also executing customary Land Transfers on VOPs).  
These officially executed forms lack land survey or payment details.  
However, many land transactions remain verbal agreements thus open to 
interpretation, and some do not have written records of payment 
instalments. Landowners say that in these cases the land will be 
registered when the full purchase price has been paid. 
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Although the sale price is said to depend on the size and quality of the 
block (e.g., bush, cleared, planted to oil palm), there is great variation in 
land prices.  This is partly explained by the different types of 
relationships between the vendor and purchasers (see below).  Also, with 
the rapid inflation of block prices over recent years, attempting to 
estimate average block prices is extremely difficult. 
 
Over time, transfers of land can often end in dispute, and increasingly 
this appears to be the case at Gaungo where there is conflict between land 
being viewed as a commodity and as an inalienable resource held by the 
kinship group.   
 
Land disputes take several forms, but the three most common forms 
recorded during fieldwork include: 
• Initial agreed purchase price is increased by the landowner.  Many 
blockholders who purchased their blocks several years ago and who 
mostly have completed or near completed payment for land, are now 
finding that the landowners are revaluing blocks.  The new value, 
which can be one or two thousand kina above the initially agreed 
purchase price, must be paid by the blockholder if they wish to remain 
on the block.  Often the new price reflects the component of inflation 
since a price was initially agreed upon.  The landowners demanding 
the new price are often not the same clan members the blockowner 
initially dealt with when the block was purchased. These new 
landowners are often younger members of the clan (Box 6.3).  
 
• Blocks, or parts thereof, are resold to another purchaser without the 
knowledge or agreement of the block owner (Box 6.4).  Most of the 
initial blocks purchased were 4 hectares in size.  Generally 2 hectares 
were planted to oil palm with 2 hectares reserved for food gardens.  
Some blockholders are now losing their 2 hectare garden area as 
landowners repossess the land for resale to another purchaser.  The 
reasons why land is repossessed are extremely diverse and may 
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include lack of regular and adequate land payments to landowners, 
disputes over purchase price, and/or failure of the blockholder to 
engage in indigenous exchange with landowners (see below). 
 
• Monetary demands placed on blockowners.  A recent trend to emerge 
is the demand by landowners for money from blockholders who have 
either completed or part-completed block purchases.  These monetary 
requests usually occur when blockholders receive their monthly oil 
palm cheques. 
 
Several factors help explain why these problems are emerging.  Some members 
of the land owning group, mostly young men, feel that the money obtained 
from land sales has been unfairly distributed within the group.  To some of 
these young men, the bigmen (senior males) in the village are treating the land 
as bisnis and in so doing favouring their own individual interests over those of 
the wider land-owning group.  By not sharing the proceeds of land sales as 
expected, bigmen are seen as foregoing their customary obligations and 
responsibilities and denying the larger kin group their shared rights to the 
access and disposal of land.  It is not surprising then that some landowning 
members are now reclaiming land or demanding additional payments from 
settlers. 
 
Mixed with these grievances is the continuing perception that as kin group 
members they still retain certain rights in the land.  The concept of exclusive 
individual “ownership” of land by the settlers and the idea of land being lost in 
perpetuity is difficult to embrace in the village context where land has been 
held communally with members having inalienable rights of access.  This 
creates tensions between some settlers and land-owning members as the former 
views their purchase as providing them with absolute rights of ownership 
whereas the landowners view the transaction more as use-rights over the land 
for an extended period.   
 
Moreover, these use rights are not guaranteed by finalising payment of the 
purchase price, but rather are conditional on continued participation in 
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customary exchange and fulfilling other “traditional” obligations.  Settlers are 
thus expected to act like members of the landowning kin group and share some 
of their wealth and contribute to bridewealth and mortuary payments and other 
forms of compensation.  These obligations serve to acknowledge that settlers 
have no absolute right to their land, and that whilst a commercial land 
transaction occurred, this does not free them from customary obligations.   
Failure to meet these obligations results in harassment, theft and demands for 
money.  Many settlers who have bought land at Gaungo, do participate in 
indigenous exchange with land-owning members and have good relationships 
with Gaungo villagers, while others, for a range of reasons, interact less with 
landowners and experience greater insecurity of tenure. 
 
These informal “sales” of customary land at Gaungo and other VOPs at 
Hoskins need to be addressed by the industry to ensure that both settler 
smallholders and landowners have secure access to land in the future. 
 
6.2.2  Popondetta VOP 
Most VOP blocks at Popondetta are located on customary land with a small 
number converted to Land Tenure Conversion (LTC) blocks.  In the mid 1960s 
in an attempt to individualise land tenure and encourage export cash crop 
production in Papua New Guinea, the colonial administration introduced the 
Land (Tenure Conversion) Act 1963.  This allowed for customary tenure to be 
transferred to individual or freehold title.  In Popondetta, some areas of clan 
land were subdivided and registered as individual cash crop holdings.  The 
early LTC blocks were planted to coffee, cocoa, or rubber and later some were 
planted to oil palm.  When smallholder oil palm production expanded into 
villages, some clan leaders allocated oil palm blocks to non-land owning 
members, such as in-marrying males, sisters’ sons and in some cases, to men 
with whom they had long standing friendships.  Some of these blocks were on 
customary land and others on Land Tenure Conversion blocks.  Increasingly 
rights of access to these blocks are now being challenged by “core”, often 
younger, clan members with the result that some blocks are being reclaimed by 
clan members or a “rental” fee imposed on current block residents.  Many of 
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these problems emerge following the death of the blockholder or the clan 
leader who allocated the oil palm block.  In either case the “ownership” of the 
block is subsequently challenged for two main reasons: 
 
1. Sons of the deceased clan leader may claim that the blockholder did not 
adequately contribute to the mortuary payments or participate sufficiently 
in mortuary-related activities of their deceased father, and/or 
 
2. a blockholder or a deceased blockholder may be perceived to have 
inadequately fulfilled their customary obligations in indigenous exchange 
practices such as pondo, or may be chastised for not sufficiently sharing 
enough of the wealth gained from oil palm with land-owning clan 
members.  In the case of a deceased blockholder, his sons or other male 
relatives’ moves to take control of the block will be challenged and 
sometimes denied. 
 
Thus, the principal element in securing ongoing access rights by non-clan 
members is through continuous obligatory gift giving and the more informal 
distribution of wealth.  Such acts strengthen social relations and hence security 
of tenure.  At another level the ongoing expectations and obligations of non-
clan blockholders reinforce the concept of landowners’ inalienable rights to 
customary land, and in particular their rights to the wealth generated on “their” 
land.  Like the landowners at Gaungo, and landowners in other parts of Papua 
New Guinea, the idea of land being lost in perpetuity is inconceivable. 
 
Land disputes have resulted in an increase in the number of “abandoned” 
blocks.  Conflicts on the LTC blocks have been highlighted recently in the 
replanting programme at Popondetta where some smallholders have been 
refused permission by traditional landowners to replant unless a land “rental 
fee” is paid by the smallholder.  Such disputes often mean that these blocks go 
out of production for prolonged periods.  These “abandoned” blocks (both on 
the LSS and VOP) are now recognised as a major constraint on oil palm 
production.  There are approximately, 2,000 hectares of “abandoned” blocks at 
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Popondetta, which has reduced average yields to as low as 12 tonnes/hectare 
(ADS (PNG) 2001, 65). 
 
6.3  Disputes Over Individual Titles on LSS Blocks 
Disputes over block ownership and lease transfers on the LSS schemes are a 
common problem, especially as the original leaseholders age and die. Disputes 
over ownership and lease transfers most often erupt after the father dies when 
the eldest brother attempts to assert absolute control over the block.  This often 
alienates younger brothers.  In some cases where the leaseholder has two wives 
the lease transfer can also be disputed by sons from the two marriages.  The 
disputes surrounding deceased estates can result in the block being under-
harvested for several years until some resolution is found. 
 
Other forms of disputes over lease titles can include: incomplete payment for a 
block by a new purchaser; the sale of a block by a son/daughter/caretaker 
without the consent of family members; widowed leaseholders remarrying; the 
public tender of a block by the Rural Development Bank; and, claims of block 
ownership by caretakers.  Caretakers are often in disputes with the registered 
leaseholder if the caretaker has looked after the block for many years while the 
leasee has resided elsewhere.  In some cases the caretaker has undertaken 
poisoning and replanting, improved housing, repaid loans and planted fruit 
trees, coconuts and betel nut on the block.  In these situations, the caretaker 
sometimes views this investment in the block as a claim to ownership of the 
block and will strongly resist any attempts by the original leaseholder or 
descendants to reclaim or sell the block.  Monetary compensation is often 
demanded by a caretaker if they cannot remain on the block4.  Such disputes 
can result in reduced oil palm productivity for a protracted period. 
 
6.4  Conclusion and Recommendations 
There is a diversity of ways conflicts over land are emerging between different 
ethnic groups, between clan and non-clan members and, in the case of the LSS 
blocks, between family members.  At every level there are numerous 
opportunities for disputes to occur.  Disputes and issues surrounding land and 
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land tenure on the oil palm schemes are very complex and in this chapter we 
have briefly outlined some of the main areas of concern: 
• Growing intolerance and resentment of migrant settlers by indigenous 
landowners, and the occasional anti-settler sentiments expressed by 
provincial governments. 
• A sense of insecurity and uncertainty regarding future tenure by many 
migrant settlers, most notably amongst LSS settlers at Popondetta. 
• Perception of future land shortages among younger customary 
landowners. 
• Volatility associated with the commoditisation of customary land at 
Hoskins. 
• A limited concept by customary landowners of land being lost in 
perpetuity (despite acceptance of payment and formal agreements for land 
sales). 
• Commercial land transactions do not necessarily escape customary norms 
and obligations. 
• Principles of land tenure undergo change and reinterpretation over time. 
• Landowner values of their land and other resources, and their 
relationships with companies/settlers change over time. 
 
How these issues are dealt with and how adept the industry is at solving land 
issues will determine the future growth of the industry.  Popondetta is a 
pertinent example of how land tenure disputes can have a serious impact on 
smallholder production and threaten the future viability of the scheme due to 
the large number of “abandoned” blocks and the reluctance of growers who 
have insecure tenure to replant and invest in their blocks.  Thus, land conflicts 
and insecure tenure are critical production issues as they act to reduce 
smallholder productivity by: 
• removing oil palm stands from production; 
• impeding replanting; 
• undermining smallholder confidence in and commitment to the 
industry; and 
• limiting broader economic development. 
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Devising effective corporate and OPIC strategies to address the emerging land 
problems will be a major challenge for the industry.  There are no simple 
answers, and potential solutions will require time and commitment from all 
stakeholders.  However, some of these land tenure issues are more amenable to 
resolution than others, and the industry should begin to put in place mechanisms 
to assist with the resolution of land disputes.  With the ageing of the smallholder 
schemes, many blocks have changed hands through inheritance or sale, and the 
records are very much out-of-date.  Hoskins OPIC has recently employed a 
former Lands Officer to update its register of LSS leaseholders and to register 
the “owners” of oil palm blocks on customary land.  As the register of 
leaseholders is updated disputes over block ownership are being identified and 
frequently resolved with OPIC’s assistance.  When the record of current LSS 
leaseholders is complete, future disputes over individual LSS leases should 
occur less frequently and be resolved more quickly thus increasing smallholder 
productivity.  We recommend that smallholder lease/purchase records be 
updated for all LSS and VOP subdivisions, and these records be maintained and 
regularly updated. 
 
More difficult to resolve from the industry’s perspective are macro-scale 
disputes between customary landowners and the residents of LSSs which 
sometimes cause major disruptions to smallholder production when whole 
subdivisions are involved.  Such disputes in the past have lead to significant 
disruption of smallholder production at Hoskins, Popondetta and Bialla.  
Political solutions to these problems appear unlikely in the foreseeable future, 
but there may be opportunities to improve communication between the 
representatives of landowners and settlers for speedier resolution of disputes 
before they erupt into more widespread communal violence.  While these 
problems have deep-seated causes related to land alienation and have been 
issues for many years, violent conflicts are often triggered by unresolved 
localised incidences of criminal offences inflicted on one side by the other.  
Bringing landowner and settler leaders together at an early point to mediate 
such grievances, may help prevent the diffusion of a sense of grievance through 
one side and contain the potential for communal violence.  Through appropriate 
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mediation and not excluding customary compensation payments, the risk of 
social unrest may be lessened or averted.  How such a conflict resolution 
mechanism would be established cannot be answered here, and further 






Box 6.1.  Settler intimidation, Igora LSS, Popondetta 
 
John is from a village near Kokoda.  He and his family vacated their Igora LSS block 
in 1993 due to criminal activities, intimidation and land disputes with the local 
landowners. Their block adjoins landowners’ VOP blocks.  They were threatened 
many times with factory and home made guns.  The landowners would also come 
around at night and steal tool and household items like clothes and pots.  They also 
stole from their food gardens and often demanded money from growers.   
 
With this intimidation by landowners some settler families at Igora LSS moved to 
blocks owned by friends near the main road where they were away from the 
landowners.  They moved onto blocks in groups so that there are several families 
living on the block for security.  They only return to their blocks for harvesting and 
gardening and usually go in groups for protection.  The women do not visit their 
gardens on their own as they fear attacks.  These threats have also made it difficult 
for smallholders to set up other businesses on their blocks.  
 
We were told that some settlers who abandoned their blocks because of threats from 
local landowners now have caretakers on their blocks and some “abandoned” blocks 
have been taken over by landowners who either have moved onto the blocks or visit 









Box 6.2.  Land disputes, Iseveni, LSS, Popondetta 
 
The block was leased in 1978 to a Morobe man.  He is currently living in another 
province and his parents are looking after the block with their six children: four adult 
sons and two daughters 
 
The block relies mostly on income from oil palm and some supplementary income 
from selling items at local markets.  Anna and her sons do not have any businesses 
on their block.  They explained that by starting a business, like a chicken business 
one risks being targeted with violence by the landowners.  Anna told of a nearby 
settler who was killed a few years ago when some landowners came to his block and 
killed his pigs and then shot him when he tried to defend himself.  After this incident 
Anna and her family decided to close their pig business. Because of these problems 
with landowners Anna said that markets or off-block employment are the only way to 
earn a supplementary income. 
 
In 1998 the landowners tried to evict the settlers in this section of Iseveni.  Young 
and old men from Isevini VOP came onto the blocks and threatened the settlers with 
tomahawks, knives and spears.  They vandalised the houses and cut down coconuts 
and betel nut palms.  They told the settlers that the government did not adequately 
compensate them for the land when it was initially sold, and now the settlers had to 
leave. After this incident several settlers abandoned their blocks. Landowners then 
moved onto the blocks.  Later some of the blockowners returned to their blocks 
because they found it difficult to access land in their home villages.  Some are still 
fighting to reclaim their blocks.  They have approached OPIC and the Lands 
Department to sort out the ownership disputes.   
 
Anna said that they experience continual threats and acts of intimidation by 
landowners.  A few days before the survey period the young girl (grade 6) on the 
adjoining block was dragged from her bed and taken by a group of men and raped.  
They came armed with shotguns and stole bush knives, a spear and a torch leaving 
the family with no way to defend itself.  Following this incident settlers held a meeting 
to establish community policing on the blocks.  They want young men to form a group 
to police the area at night.   
 
Anna told us that settlers who wish to sell their blocks and return to their home 
villages often face difficulties.  If a blockowner attempts to sell the block, the 
customary landowners may attempt to reclaim the land before it is sold.  If the block 
is sold and the complete purchase price is paid before the blockowner leaves for 
another province, then this will be the end of the problems for the blockowners, but 
will mean a new set of problems for the new blockowner as he/she tries to maintain 
ownership rights over the land.  If a blockowner sells the land and only part of the 
purchase price is paid, then the new blockowner will be harassed by the customary 
landowners to pay the outstanding purchase price to them, not the previous 











Box 6.3.  Change in purchase price, Gaungo VOP, Hoskins 
 
Martin bought 4 hectares in 1987 for K2,500 after working for NBPOL for several 
years.  Martin has six children, one of whom is currently in full-time employment at 
Kimbe.  Martin explained that some “outsiders” have completed payment for their 
block, but some landowners still visit the block to request more money for the land.  
He told of some settlers who were evicted after paying in full the agreed purchase 
price.  The disputes begin when some members of the landowning group place a 
higher value on the land after seeing the block developed with oil palm.  They 
demand the settler pay the new price.  If they fail to pay the new price they are 
threatened with eviction.    
 
In Martin’s case, after paying in full the agreed purchase price of K2,500 he was 
approached by landowners in 1999 to “buy” the block again (sekon taim mi baim 
graun).  The landowners asked him for a further K1,500.  However, he refused and 
eventually they agreed on the sum of K1,000 which he is currently paying off in 
instalments.  The second time he “bought” the land, he was dealing with another sub-









Box 6.4.  Resale of oil palm block at Gaungo VOP, Hoskins 
 
In 1985 this 4 hectare block was bought by Tom for an agreed price of K3,000.  A 
few years ago, prior to completing the payments on the purchase price, the initial 
purchase price of K3,000 was raised to K6,000.  After some negotiation, a price was 
eventually agreed at K5,000.  However, after negotiations were completed the 2 
hectares reserved for gardening, was reclaimed by the landowners after some 
dispute over the purchase price and the lengthy period of payment for the block.   
 
The 2 hectares have since been “sold” for K3,000 by the customary landowners.  
Tom now “borrows” land for gardening on other blocks “owned” by kin or friends.  
The recent trend of reclaiming sections of land purchased by “outsiders” is a serious 
problem according to Tom, several other settlers, and OPIC extension officers 
working at Gaungo.  The land being reclaimed is usually not planted with oil palm, 
but has been set aside for gardening.  By reclaiming the “reserve” section, settlers 
are being denied access to gardening land, and will find it very difficult when their two 
hectare block requires replanting.  
 
Because of his insecure tenure, Tom is reluctant to invest in a permanent timber 
house.  His house is small and made of bush materials.  Generally, settlers have 
poorer housing than Gaungo villagers living on their blocks.  Settlers often refer to 







1. The Kavugara evictions occurred just prior to provincial elections. One 
electoral candidate was running on a “West for West” campaign that 
stirred up anti-settler sentiments at the time. 
 
2.  For example, the Kavugara 1993 evicitions, the burning of about a dozen 
houses at Kapore 1994, and the Buvussi 1998 road-block by customary 
landowners, were all in response to “crimes” by settlers against the local 
population. 
 
3. The Vagrancy Act was first introduced in the colonial period and was 
enforced until around 1973.  The Vagrancy Act restricted movement of 
Papua New Guineans between provinces and into towns and cities.  The 
Act was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1986.  Recent 
calls for the reintroduction of the Vagrancy Act aim to stem the flow of 
rural-to-urban migration as a means of reducing law and order problems 
in urban centres. 
 
4. Many ownership disputes between caretakers and absentee leaseholders 
in West New Britain and Popondetta were concerned with the 
compensation level payable to the caretaker for vacating a block.  In most 
cases, caretakers were seeking compensation for their labour in 
establishing, maintaining and paying off loans on the block, including 
compensation for other assets such as structures erected on the block and 




INDUSTRY AND OPIC INTERVENTIONS 
 
 
7.0  Introduction 
This and the following two chapters review the major company and OPIC 
interventions that have recently been implemented to increase smallholder 
production at Hoskins and Popondetta (Appendix 1.1 lists OPIC’s strategic 
objectives for 1999-2003 for the two schemes).  The industry’s goal is to 
increase smallholder production to 50% of total national production by 2003 
(OPIC 1998).  To achieve production increases in the smallholder sector the 
industry relies mainly on: 
 
1. Increasing smallholder productivity.  
2. Developing new areas of oil palm. 
 
In this chapter we briefly review smallholder credit schemes, fertiliser incentive 
schemes, top-up (infill) oil palm plantings on LSS blocks and the replanting 
programme.  In reviewing the main initiatives for smallholders, we highlight the 
potential of interventions to maintain or enhance household economic and social 
security while increasing smallholder production and/or productivity.  The 
positive or negative effects of smallholder interventions are assessed by giving 
consideration to their impact on income levels and distribution, risk reduction, 
access to resources, people’s capacity to meet their needs, the range of options 
and choices available to households, gender relations, and household social 
cohesion.  The analysis is not always straightforward as some interventions, 
such as replanting, may increase household economic and social security in the 
long-term, but may be perceived by smallholders to have short-term negative 
effects on household income levels.  Yet, acknowledging how interventions 
impact on household economic and social security assists us to anticipate 
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peoples responses to certain interventions and therefore can lead to better 
formulated policies and intervention strategies.   
 
7.1  Increasing Smallholder Productivity 
Chapter 3.1 indicated that smallholder yields per hectare are much lower than 
those for the plantation sector and average yields per hectare for the VOPs are 
consistently lower than those of the LSS subdivisions, with the exception of 
Popondetta (ADS (PNG), 2001).  Whilst there have been recent increases in 
smallholder yields at some of the oil palm schemes (such as Hoskins, Bialla and 
New Ireland), there is scope for further improvements in productivity.  
 
Over the last five years several company and OPIC smallholder interventions 
aimed at increasing smallholder productivity have been introduced with varying 
success.  Some of these have been advanced in part due to the strengthening and 
reorganisation of the smallholder affair units at both NBPOL and HOP.  On the 
other hand, deteriorating infrastructure, especially roads, minimal State and 
provincial government support and the increasing ratio of smallholders to OPIC 
extension officers have made potential productivity gains more difficult to 
attain.   
 
The most important recent company and OPIC initiatives include: 
Short-term 
◆   Mama Lus Frut Scheme (Hoskins and Popondetta) 
◆   Smallholder Credit Scheme (Hoskins and Popondetta) 
◆  Fertiliser Incentive Scheme (Hoskins) 
 
Long-term 
◆   Top-up plantings on LSS blocks (Hoskins and Popondetta) 
◆  Replanting programme (Hoskins and Popondetta) 
 
The Mama Lus Frut Scheme is discussed in detail in Chapter 8.   
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7.2  Smallholder Credit Schemes 
NBPOL and HOP advance interest free short-term, in-kind credit to growers 
with loans repaid through deductions from grower FFB income.   At Hoskins, 
in-kind credit is given for tools, fertiliser and seedlings with repayments made at 
50% of gross FFB income over periods of 3 months, 12 months and two years 
respectively.  The credit scheme was introduced in 1994/95 following a report 
(Campbell 1994) recommending easier access to credit for seedlings, tools and 
fertiliser to boost smallholder production.  According to company smallholder 
officers, prior to the scheme, lack of or damaged tools for regular harvesting and 
limited use of fertiliser by smallholders were significant factors explaining low 
productivity among smallholders.  King et al. (1998, 2) claim that increases in 
yields among Hoskins smallholders between 1994 and 1998 were due in part to 
the increased application of fertiliser as a result of the introduction of the credit 
scheme. 
 
At Popondetta, interest free credit facilities are available for fertiliser (for 
established blocks), tools and nets.  Repayments are deducted from grower FFB 
income at a rate of 50% of gross income where no other deductions are being 
made.  However, due to supply problems of fertiliser in the Popondetta scheme 
and transport difficulties, improvements in fertiliser use have not been as 
noticeable as in Hoskins.  Presently, at Popondetta loans for block development 
and replanting are funded through the World Bank Oro Expansion project.  
Loans are recovered by HOP with deductions of 30% of FFB gross income.  
Access to project loans closes at the end of December 2001 and other sources of 
credit will need to be arranged (Section 7.5).  There are no indications that HOP 
will extend credit for block development. 
 
At Hoskins and Popondetta, the credit schemes suffer from growers avoiding 
debt repayments and both companies have made modifications to oil palm 
payments to reduce levels of debt avoidance (Chapter 8.4 and 8.6).  However, at 
Popondetta, the problem of debt avoidance is more difficult to manage as 
growers can sell their fruit to private transport contractors where their 
production is recorded under the name of the contractor. 
 
 147
Despite problems with debt avoidance, interest-free in-kind credit to 
smallholders remains very important for maintaining and enhancing smallholder 
productivity and for ensuring the future growth of the smallholder sector.  
Because smallholders generally have difficulty securing loans from commercial 
banks, it is recommended that the interest free credit schemes currently 
provided by the companies remain in place.     
 
7.3  Fertiliser Incentive Scheme (Hoskins) 
In 2000, to further increase fertiliser application rates, NBPOL introduced an 
incentive scheme that refunded growers with K3.00 cash per bag of fertiliser 
applied.  This K3.00 refund was added to the total cost of the loan.  The cash 
refund provided a financial incentive to growers short of labour to employ youth 
groups, church groups or women to apply the fertiliser.  The incentive scheme 
was being introduced during fieldwork and therefore it was too early to assess 
the full effectiveness of the scheme.  Based on interviews with extension 
officers and growers and our observations at Kavui and Gaungo where the 
scheme was being introduced, the cash incentive was acting to free up labour 
and improve fertiliser application rates by smallholders.   
 
Prior to the introduction of the cash refund for fertiliser application many 
growers did not apply fertiliser and often bags of fertiliser were left stacked 
under growers’ houses, sometimes for many months, or remained at the 
roadside verges of blocks where they had been delivered.  Within weeks of the 
introduction of the cash incentive scheme, Kavui and Gaungo growers were 
applying their fertiliser within a week of delivery, the stipulated period within 
which fertiliser had to be applied for growers to obtain their cash refunds.  The 
apparent success of the scheme says much about the cash needs of smallholders 
and the strategies they employ to access cash.  Cash-short growers, especially 
during depressed oil palm prices, will choose strategies that meet their 
immediate short-term cash needs. The fertiliser cash incentive worked because 
it provided immediate cash benefits even though, in the longer term, overall 
debt levels increased.  This is very different to the situation described below 
(Section 7.5) where Popondetta growers are reluctant to take out replanting 
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loans.  The fact that growers were willing to go further into debt to gain 
immediate access to cash reflects not only the economic plight of smallholders 
during depressed prices for oil palm, but also how responsive smallholders can 
be to appropriate financial incentives that meet their needs.   
 
7.4  Infill Plantings on Existing LSS Blocks 
The industry is also increasing smallholder production by encouraging LSS 
growers with blocks of 6/6.5 hectares or more to plant 6 ha to oil palm.  Most 
LSS smallholders with 6 hectares or more plant 4 hectares to oil palm and retain 
2 ha for gardening land.   
 
Some growers in the Hoskins scheme have planted all 6 hectares to oil palm.  
These tend to be blocks where garden soil fertility is perceived to be very poor, 
or where several households co-reside on the block, and/or have relatively good 
access to additional gardening land adjoining or near the block.  While some 
smallholders clearly see advantages in planting the whole block to oil palm, 
many do not.   
 
This study briefly assessed the 6 hectares expansion initiative and found 
smallholders held mixed views.  Many growers with whom we spoke did not 
feel that it was appropriate for their own block, but recognised that for some 
families it could relieve some of the financial pressures on the block, where, for 
example, the soil was poor or unsuitable for gardening.   
 
The most common reason why smallholders did not view expanding oil palm 
planting to 6 hectares as appropriate for their own situations related to the 
impact such an initiative would have on gardening and household food security.  
Because of the importance of gardening for household food consumption and 
income, many smallholders felt that household food security would be 
threatened by allocating more land and family labour to oil palm production.  At 
Sorovi sub-division, Popondetta, we interviewed some smallholders who 
attended an OPIC field day last year where infill planting was encouraged.  One 
Sorovi smallholder felt that the suggestion by OPIC to plant all the block to oil 
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palm illustrated how out of touch the organisation was with the everyday 
situation of blockholders.  He remarked:  
Gaden kaikai em wanpela bikpela samting long ol blok man na meri.  
Ol OPIC lain ino save long laif long blok olsem na ol tok long planim 
wel pam long blok. 
Garden food is something that is very important to male and female 
smallholders.  OPIC staff have no understanding of life on the blocks 
and that is why they talk about planting the full block to oil palm.  
 
He also referred to the recent drop in oil prices to highlight the risks involved in 
planting the whole block to oil palm.  He added that at least with a garden one 
could rely on garden food and selling food at markets when the price of oil palm 
falls.  His wife who had also attended the OPIC meeting recalled:  
 
Olgeta settler komplain na tok prais bilong wel pam save go antap 
sampela taim tasol, na suppose prais igo daun tru bai mipela kisim 
kaikai long we na kaikai? 
All settlers complained [to OPIC] and said the price of oil palm is 
known to fluctuate, but if the price drops significantly, then where 
will we find food to eat? 
 
Another female smallholder at the meeting expressed her concerns with OPIC’s 
message to plant all the block to oil palm: 
 
…ol ino tingting long how bai mipela istap long block.  … Mi 
wari long ol pikinnini bilong mi, ol bai kaikai wanem samtimg 
sapos nogat kaikai long gaden. 
…they [OPIC] don’t think about how we will cope on the 
block.  … I worry about my children.  What will they eat if we 
don’t have garden food. 
 
These sentiments, especially those of the women, are indicative of the strong 
resistance many have to planting their full blocks to oil palm. 
 
Restricting women’s access to garden land may not be in their interest.  Women 
are expected to provide food for their families, and reduced access to garden 
land would add to their burdens as wives and mothers.  Also, women usually 
have control of income earned from selling garden food at local markets, unlike 
oil palm income which is more open to the claims of male kin. Limiting access 
to garden land and market income has, therefore, the potential to disadvantage 
not only women, but all members of the household.  Moreover, it is probable 
that some women would seek gardening land elsewhere (e.g., on State or 
 150
company land), which may result in increased environmental pressure on State 
reserve land.  If gardening land is located at some distance from the block, it 
may mean that women have less time to devote to oil palm production and 
block maintenance.  Because gardens are viewed as a means of maintaining 
household food security and lessening the risks associated with fluctuating oil 
palm prices, extension efforts may be better directed to supporting not 
undermining gardening.  This study therefore disagrees with the recent 
recommendations of a World Bank report (ADS (PNG) 2001, 83) to develop oil 
palm on the rear 2 ha of garden reserve land on LSS blocks.   
 
Another initiative to expand LSS oil palm plantings is the creation of new 
subdivided blocks on the larger LSS blocks.  The newly created “expansion” 
blocks are owned by relatives and/or the offspring of the original leaseholders 
who are issued their own harvesting card.  Because the initiative is not suitable 
for all blocks, the number of these “expansion” blocks is limited to 140.  
Approximately 63% of “expansion” blocks are between 7 and 12 hectares (ADS 
(PNG) 2001, 33).   
 
Because of time constraints, this study was unable to examine the socio-
economic impacts of these new “expansion” blocks.  However, it is possible 
another harvesting card on a block may have the effect of redistributing income 
between family members and strengthening household economic security.  For 
some blocks, the economic and social merits of the scheme are promising, 
although a more detailed analysis of the impact on access to garden land and 
inter-and intra-household social relationships is recommended. 
 
7.5  Replanting Programme 
To maintain the productivity and viability of the smallholder sector, the older oil 
palm schemes at Hoskins, Popondetta and Bialla are undertaking poisoning and 
replanting programmes as the palms mature beyond the peak production age of 
15-20 years (Table 7.1).  The focus on replanting is a recent move.  For 
example, the Bialla scheme began a replanting program only in 2000, and 
Popondetta’s replanting program was delayed until 1998. 
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At Hoskins, approximately 3,000 hectares have been earmarked for replanting, 
although the rate of poisoning and replanting over the last two years has been 
well below expectations (F. Lewis pers. comm.).  Hoskins OPIC has a 
replanting target of 500 hectares per year over the next few years.  The low 
replanting rate can be partly explained by the low priority it has been given by 
the OPIC extension services.  The OPIC field manager also reports that 
replanting has been stalled by some smallholders reluctant to forego oil palm 
income during replanting, and by younger male growers who show little interest 
in oil palm production. On the Hoskins LSSs, reluctance to replant is likely to 
be a function of population density where highly populated blocks are 
struggling already with low per capita incomes and any cut to oil palm income 
through replanting is likely to worsen their situation. 
 
Table 7.1  Area (ha) identified for replanting at Hoskins, Bialla, Popondetta 
 HOSKINS BIALLA POPONDETTA 
Total area targeted for replanting (ha) 3,000 3,600 3,600 
Source: ADS (PNG) (2001) 
 
At Popondetta a replanting program has been funded under the Oro Expansion 
project which commenced in 1993.  The replanting program began in earnest in 
1997/98 with field days and meetings with smallholders to promote the 
programme and increase growers’ awareness of replanting.  The blocks targeted 
for replanting were those planted between 1977 and 1985, in the Sorovi, Igora, 
Saiho and Aika sub-divisions.  The rate of replanting has been much lower than 
anticipated (Table 7.2) and the original replanting target of 3,600 hectares has 
since been reduced to 1,250 hectares due to lack of interest in replanting (ADS 
(PNG) 2001, 66).  By 2000, 732 hectares had been replanted.  
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1998 500 ha 28 
1999 500 ha 238 
2000 500 ha 566 
Source: OPIC statistics 
 
The low rate of replanting among existing Popondetta growers is in stark 
contrast to the enthusiasm shown by local landowners to join the industry and 
plant oil palm.  This lack of interest in replanting places doubt on the future 
viability of the scheme.  It therefore warrants some attention as to why growers 
are reluctant to replant.  As part of this study we examined replanting issues in 
interviews with smallholders, OPIC officers, company representatives and the 
Lands Department.  Smallholders were reluctant to replant for several reasons 
including high debt levels, potential short-term loss of income, tenure 
insecurity, rental arrears, poor road conditions and a view by some smallholders 
that replanting is unnecessary.  Each is discussed below. 
 
7.5.1  Smallholder avoidance of high debt levels  
Under the Oro Expansion Project, credit is made available for existing 
smallholders to purchase a 2 hectare replanting package at a cost of between 
K2,500-K2,900, including interest and depending on the inputs purchased 
(OPIC replant budget).  This covers the cost of poisoning old palms, new 
seedlings, fertiliser, chemicals and lining.  The cost has increased substantially 
from 1997 when the package was just over K1,072.  An 8% interest rate is 
charged on the replanting loan package, and loans are recovered by deductions 
of 30% from the gross income of growers. 
 
Some smallholders are unwilling to take out what are perceived as large loans 
and therefore are reluctant to replant.  For these smallholders, they may have 
existing loans with the Rural Development Bank or credit with the company, 
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and many feel that living expenses are already too high to accommodate further 
loan repayments.  Smallholders with loans from the Rural Development Bank 
are largely those with Oro Housing loans.  In January 2001, there were 105 
blocks with outstanding housing loans that were initially taken out in the late 
1970s – early 1980s when the Popondetta scheme was established.  The typical 
loan was for K7,851 (Table 7.3) and only 17 loans have been repaid in full. 
 









Mean 8,061 6,322 
Minimum 7,851 359 
1st Quartile 7,851 2,655 
Median 7,851 5,575 
3rd Quartile 7,851 8,843 
Maximum 11,110 26,700 
Total amounts 846,405 663,860 
Source: Rural Development Bank data 
 
In January, 2001, average loan arrears stood at approximately K6,322.  Because 
of the poor repayment rates, large loan arrears and smallholder difficulties in 
repaying these loans, interest has not been charged on these loans since 1995.  
According to the Rural Development Bank, many of these loan arrears 
accumulated rapidly when the Oro-for-Oro campaign emerged in the early 
1990s, when many settlers abandoned their blocks following harassment from 
local landowners.  Also, the negative experience of these smallholders is widely 
known in the subdivisions and may be a disincentive to other growers taking out 
replanting loans.   
 
Moreover, as Table 7.4 shows, for smallholders who take out a replanting loan 
and already have credit with the company and/or a Rural Development Bank 
loan (Grower A), repayments can take a substantial proportion of their gross 
income.  Replanting package loans are deducted at 30% of gross income, and 
sundry loans from the company (after the development phase for tools, fertiliser, 
nets, etc.) are deducted at 50% of the remaining balance after deductions for the 
replanting package.  If a smallholder has a Rural Development Bank loan, then 
this and credit loans with the company are deducted at 30% each of the 
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remaining balance after deductions for the replanting package are made.  Hence, 
the reduction in net income from loan repayments can be substantial, especially 
if growers take out loans for replanting. 
 
Table 7.4.  Popondetta, smallholder budget for replanting loan repayments  
 GROWER  “A” GROWER  “B” 
Gross monthly income K100 K100 
Less payment for replanting 
package (30%) 
-K30 -K30 
Less RDB loan repayments -K21 (30% of K70)  
Less credit repayments to 
company 
-K21 (30% of K70) -K35 
Net monthly income K28 K35 
 
Yet, there is an urgent need to encourage growers to purchase replanting 
packages.  World Bank funding of these loans ceases in December 2001, 
leaving the availability of low interest loans in doubt, as it is unlikely that HOP 
will extend subsidised credit for replanting.  It is also anticipated that by 2002 
seedlings will rise in price from K2.50 to K4.00.  Those blocks that do not 
undertake replanting before December 2001 are therefore likely to be 
confronted with increased costs for replanting and higher interest rates on loan 
repayments.  Any additional replanting expenses may further discourage 
growers from replanting.  
 
7.5.2  Smallholders averse to foregoing income 
Many Popondetta smallholders are averse to poisoning mature palms because of 
the forgone income this will involve, and their already high levels of debt.  
Smallholders can expect to wait up to three years before the new 2 ha plantings 
mature sufficiently to generate reasonable incomes.  They consistently 
expressed the view that the loss of income was a major disincentive to 
replanting.  This was especially the case on the 2 hectare VOP blocks where 
growers would need to rely on alternative income sources.  For VOP 
smallholders access to adequate gardening land and possibly other cash crop 
income may, however, make it easier to forego oil palm income during 
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replanting compared with LSS smallholders who have limited access to 
gardening land and very restricted alternative sources of income. 
 
On 4 hectare blocks, replanting is arguably an easier option when 2 hectares 
remain in production.  However, the low price for FFB at the time of fieldwork, 
is certainly a major disincentive to replanting for several reasons.  Growers 
repeatedly stressed that they were reluctant to remove two hectares from 
production because their reduced income would be insufficient to cover basic 
household needs.  From November to January 2001 some Popondetta growers 
said that they were postponing replanting until school fees were paid and many 
claimed they would be unable to meet the educational costs of their children if 
they replanted.  As indicated above, this is particularly true on the Popondetta 
LSS blocks where alternative income sources are limited.  Growers are also 
reluctant to acquire loans when prices are low as it means their net incomes 
after loan repayments are often insufficient to meet their basic needs.    
 
Further, as pointed out by OPIC officers, people begin to lose interest in oil 
palm production during prolonged periods of low oil palm prices.  Efforts by 
extension officers to encourage growers to replant are thus less likely to succeed 
when oil palm prices are low and when growers may be struggling to maintain 
their livelihoods.  The replanting logic of smallholders is the reverse of that of 
the plantation companies. For the company, it makes sense to replant while 
prices are low as potential revenue losses are minimised.  For the smallholder, 
the replanting option becomes more viable as oil palm prices rise because they 
are more able to reach a minimum income at which basic needs can be met.  It 
is likely that the demand for replanting will increase as oil palm prices rise over 
the next few years.   
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7.5.3  Land disputes on LSS and VOP subdivisions 
A major constraint on meeting replanting targets at Popondetta is the problem of 
land disputes on LSS and VOP blocks as outlined in Chapter 6.  Insecure and 
uncertain tenure of some settlers on LSS and VOP blocks creates a disincentive 
to make long-term investments in their blocks.  On the LSS subdivisions, where 
intimidation of settlers occurs, many smallholders expressed little interest in 
replanting.  Smallholders were concerned that re-investment and development 
of their blocks would attract the attention of local landowners and were fearful 
that they would become targets of landowner anger.   
 
In most areas of Papua New Guinea, the planting of economic trees and plants 
gives the cultivator ownership rights to the resources as distinct from the land 
on which they are grown.  As such, investment in replanting may be viewed by 
landowners as a challenge to their authority and claim to “ownership” of land 
alienated for LSS.  For this reason, some settlers are concerned that replanting 
may trigger a new round of efforts to evict “outsiders”.  Also, at present, 
intimidation and harassment of settlers discourages them from establishing 
supplementary income sources on their blocks, such as PMVs, tradestores and 
poultry projects.  Landowners claim that settlers were only ever granted rights 
to plant oil palm and thus they have no right to earn alternative income on this 
alienated land.  Many settlers, though, believe that these restrictions also extend 
to the replanting of oil palm and believe that landowners would interpret their 
efforts to replant as attempts to establish new businesses which would be 
opposed vigorously.  Although not presently harassed by landowners, some 
settlers claim that Oro-for-Oro sentiments still run deep at Popondetta, and as a 
consequence they are discouraged from replanting and making other long-term 
investments in their blocks.   
 
There are a large number of abandoned and caretaker blocks at Popondetta as a 
result of land tenure disputes.  Replanting is less likely on these blocks.  
Presently, there are approximately 2,000 hectares of “abandoned” blocks at 
Popondetta and interviewees from the Rural Development Bank, Lands 
Department and OPIC indicated that caretaker and abandoned blocks are a 
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legacy of the Oro-for-Oro campaign of the early 1990s when settlers fled their 
blocks.  While many settlers have since returned, it seems that a proportion of 
them never returned and such blocks have been managed by caretakers; or 
occupied by squatters, mostly from local landowner groups.  Many caretakers 
are living on the blocks with the consent of the leaseholder, but according to 
OPIC and HOP these blocks are not likely to be replanted.  While the absentee 
leaseholder retains “ownership” of the block and therefore can either sell the 
block or return to live on it, caretakers are unwilling to invest in replanting 
when the benefits of replanting may not accrue to them.  Also, absentee 
leaseholders may not be inclined to permit caretakers to replant because, as 
pointed out above, throughout much of PNG, the planting of economic 
trees/palms confers ownership rights on the cultivator.  Further, if the caretaker 
works to repay the loan for the replanting package, this will build up their 
ownership claim to the block.  
 
Disputes over ownership of VOP/LTC blocks are usually between landowning 
groups and settlers from other parts of Oro Province.  These settlers may have 
married into the landowning group, and the sons are now finding their 
inheritance rights challenged.  Such disputes have resulted in many 
“abandoned” and under-productive blocks.  Like the LSS blocks, opportunities 
for replanting have lead to the local landowners reclaiming blocks from non-
clan members, or demanding a “rental fee” before allowing the block to be 
replanted.  Often these demands are made by a younger generation of 
landowners and in many cases the block is either out of production or replanting 
is delayed well past the stage when it is necessary. 
 
7.5.4  Rental arrears 
All LSS blocks are subject to a land rental fee (land tax) payable to the Lands 
Department.  For a variety of reasons, many LSS blocks are heavily in arrears.  
For example, some leaseholders have not paid rental fees since the Oro-for-Oro 
campaign and now have rental arrears in excess of K1,000.  In 1999, the Lands 




Rental arrears have been a disincentive to replanting for two reasons.  First, 
many blockholders already have high levels of debt and are reluctant to take on 
further debt.  Second, until 1999, the Lands Department refused to grant 
approval for replanting of LSS blocks that had land rental arrears.  This slowed 
the progress of replanting in the early years of the program.  Under pressure 
from OPIC, the Lands Department has relaxed these restrictions and now 
permits growers to replant if they have rental arrears less than K1,000.  Despite 
this policy change many growers still believe that they must first clear their debt 
with the Lands Department before they can obtain permission to replant.   
 
7.5.5  Smallholders view replanting as unnecessary 
The palms targeted for replanting are those planted between 1977 and 1985.  
However, many growers with palms 15-20 years old (planted 1980-85) do not 
think that their palms are too tall to harvest.  These growers say that they will 
not replant while their palms are producing well and they can still harvest them.  
Given that funding for replanting will cease in December 2001, it is important 
that extension officers make growers aware of this situation as OPIC will come 
under pressure from smallholders for replanting packages when their palms 
become too tall for efficient harvesting or when the price of oil palm increases.   
 
Another group of growers who do not see the need to replant are those that can 
be described as “hobby” farmers.  These growers are more likely to be low to 
medium producers who have only a partial commitment to and interest in oil 
palm production.  For these growers, oil palm is a resource that can be tapped 
into occasionally as the need arises.  Thus for these growers to commit to a 
substantial investment of almost K3,000 for replanting is a difficult decision.   
 
7.5.6  Road infrastructure 
An ongoing problem affecting smallholder production and grower commitment 
to oil palm production is the poor and deteriorating road infrastructure that 
hinders fruit collection (Plate 1.1).  Several industry stakeholders identified poor 
road conditions in the Popondetta scheme as a major constraint on smallholder 
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productivity and was also a factor explaining the reluctance of smallholders to 
replant.  
 
Road maintenance has been neglected by the provincial administration for 
several years now, resulting in many smallholders not having their fruit 
collected for lengthy periods, particularly during the wet season.  For example, 
in March 1999 almost 25% of roads were inaccessible and in the last week of 
January 2001, approximately 774 smallholder blocks were cut-off from 
transport collection due to impassable roads.  Almost 300 of these smallholders 
had been without a harvest pick-up for nearly three months, and another 244 
had no fruit collected the previous month.  Whilst HOP continues to do patch-
up work on the roads, road infrastructure is in urgent need of maintenance and 
upgrading.  Also, poor road conditions mean that company and contractor trucks 
require continual repair work, resulting in fewer trucks available for FFB 
collection and less reliable schedules for FFB collection1.  
 
OPIC and the company acknowledge that smallholder frustration with 
unreliable fruit pick-ups and impassable roads (in some areas for up to four or 
five months) act as disincentives for growers to replant.  When growers have 
continual problems with harvest pick-ups, the relationship between the 
company/OPIC and smallholders is undermined and OPIC officers are often 
blamed for the transport problems.  Thus the role of OPIC to encourage growers 
to replant is made even more difficult and frustrating under these circumstances.  
Moreover, for growers affected by transport problems, it is understandable that 
they question both the purpose of replanting and their commitment to the 
industry.   
 
These factors are often operating together to discourage replanting.  Tenure 
security, levels of debt, potential income foregone, poor road infrastructure and 
unreliable harvest pick-ups, either singly or in some combination are major 
disincentives to replant.  These problems will not be easily overcome and issues 
such as tenure security and road maintenance require long-term solutions that 
are largely outside the control of the industry.   
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7.6  Development of New Areas for Oil Palm Production 
Alongside efforts to increase smallholder productivity, the industry is also 
encouraging the opening up of new areas to expand smallholder production.  
Development of new areas is largely restricted to VOP expansion and the 
development of mini-estates on customary land.  Expansion of LSS schemes is 
unlikely because of the difficulty of alienating land for these purposes.  VOP 
expansion and the development of mini-estates are discussed below.   
 
7.6.1  VOP expansion 
In all project areas VOP plantings are increasing (Table 7.5).  At Hoskins, for 
example, OPIC has identified 3,000 hectares of land for potential VOP 
development over the next few years, and Popondetta is currently experiencing 
rapid growth in the VOP sector.  The major expansion of VOP is occurring in 
villages that have not been part of the industry, although many are likely to have 
other cash crop holdings (Chapter 3.2.1).  Infill is also occurring to a lesser 
extent in some existing VOP areas.   
 
Table 7.5.  Numbers and areas (ha) of VOP blocks in PNG.  For 2000 















































*  projected expansion area – data from ADS (PNG) 2001 
 
Popondetta currently has a large VOP expansion programme under the Oro 
Expansion Project funded by the World Bank.  VOP planting has increased by 
over 7,840 hectares since the project commenced in 1993 (ADS (PNG) 2001), 
far exceeding the initial project target of 3,500 hectares.   
 
Enthusiasm for oil palm at Popondetta may be a partial reflection of the 
protracted depressed prices for other commodity crops such as cocoa and copra.  
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As mentioned in Chapter 3.1, smallholders actively attempt income 
diversification as a means of increasing income security.  In this way, VOP 
expansion has the potential to provide benefits to smallholders by raising 
incomes, promoting income diversification and reducing risks.  Also, with the 
recent introduction of a separate oil palm harvesting and payment card for 
women, there are potentially significant economic and social benefits to be 
gained (see Chapter 8).   
 
VOP expansion has been so rapid in Popondetta that the provision of extension 
services and transport infrastructure has not kept pace with the new blocks 
coming into production.  In some parts of the project area, road construction has 
been delayed leaving smallholders with no means to sell their fruit.  Those 
within a few kilometres of a road have resorted to carting their fruit by 
wheelbarrow to the nearest collection point.  At the beginning of 2000, OPIC 
reported that approximately 6,000 tonnes of FFB/month were being “lost” as 
producing blocks were unable to get their fruit to the mill because of access 
problems (L. Ruki pers. comm.).  The lack of infrastructure development and 
deterioration of existing infrastructure is a serious constraint on VOP 
productivity in Popondetta.  
 
7.6.2  Mini-estates 
A new initiative of the industry is mini-estate development on customary land.  
Mini-estates are arranged under lease, lease-back regulations in which 
customary landowning groups register as Incorporated Land Groups (ILGs).  
The ILG then leases the designated land to the State which then leases it back to 
the ILG (the lease is registered under the Land Registration Act).  The ILG then 
sub-leases the registered land parcel to the company on a 20 or 40 year lease.  
The company manages the estate, and the land owning group receives annual 
land rental fees and royalty payments.  At Hoskins, ILGs are also issued with 
company shares.  The shift to mini-estate production is driven largely by the 
restrictions on private companies obtaining alienated state land for plantation 
development and in part by the interest of local landowners to enter agricultural 
sub-lease agreements with the oil palm companies2.    
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In 2000, NBPOL had seven mini-estates totalling approximately 7,128 hectares 
(Table 7.6).  The company also has plans to develop a further 19 mini-estates in 
the near future, in total an area of approximately 11,900 hectares.  In 1998, 
Higaturu Oil Palms negotiated their first mini-estate agreement and now have 
six mini-estates totalling 2,051 hectares.  Proposals for further mini-estates are 
being assessed which include up to 6,000 hectares on the Dobuduru grasslands 
(ADS (PNG) 2001).  Both companies report enthusiastic interest in mini-estates 
by customary landowners.  Milne Bay Estates and Poliamba have also recently 
entered into mini-estate arrangements with ILGs, and have plans to expand 
mini-estate production over the next few years.  At Milne Bay, mini-estates 
occupy almost 2,000 hectares and plans for a further 11,000 hectares are under 
consideration (ADS (PNG) 2001). 
 
Table 7.6.  Mini-estate development in 2000 and proposed expansion 












11,900  N/A 6,000  11,000  3,000  
Source: interview data and adapted from ADS (PNG) Report 2001 
*Customary landowners have not entered into mini-estate arrangements with HOPL.  Instead four 
Landowner Development Corporations have pooled their land and are self-managing their own oil palm 
plantation (ADS (PNG) 2001). 
 
Mini-estates are a recent development and are undergoing rapid expansion.  Yet, 
the long-term socio-economic impacts are little understood and difficult to 
predict.  In a recent World Bank report (ADS (PNG) 2001) on the smallholder 
oil palm sector in PNG, several concerns were raised relating to current mini-
estate arrangements.  These included: 
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• No obligations for the company in some lease arrangements to replant 
palms at the end of the 20 year lease period (Popondetta and Milne Bay)3. 
• Limited financial/investment advice and assistance offered to landowners 
to ensure long-term economic development and security. 
• Landowner dependency on royalties and rents encouraged by non-
participation of landowners in mini estate management. 
• Possible environmental impacts. 
 
Landowners’ ongoing reinterpretation of land tenure principles, the changes in 
landowner interests over time and inter-generational issues all pose potential 
risks for the future of oil palm developments on leased land.  Studies of 
Incorporated Land Groups (ILGs) in other industries in Papua New Guinea, 
such as mining and forestry, point to some of the flaws and problems that have 
emerged under the conventional method of ILG incorporation (e.g., Kameata 
2001; Duncan and Duncan 1997; Kalit and Young 1997).  Problems identified 
in these studies include: lack of information or knowledge among ILG members 
to make informed decisions on lease arrangements; exclusion of secondary 
right-holders from sharing in benefits; inter-generational issues under long-term 
contracts; and, the individualisation of communal land.  All have the potential to 
lead to land disputes and/or ongoing conflicts among clan members.  Whilst 
lease, lease-back arrangements enable customary landowners to develop oil 
palm on their land, we recommend further analysis of the various mechanisms 
currently used in Papua New Guinea to address customary land ownership and 
resource development before more mini-estate arrangements are finalised.   
 
A particular concern is how to ensure that the benefits from mini-estate 
development flow to women and groups holding secondary rights in the 
resource.  Women, for example, risk being marginalised from the financial 
benefits of mini-estate development, given the way cash crops are generally 
incorporated into rural households in Papua New Guinea where men tend to 
claim ownership of the crop and the resultant income.  Mini-estates therefore 
may have adverse effects on women and may widen existing income and 
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resource access disparities between landowning males and women/secondary 
right-holders. 
 
7.7  Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
One of the greatest obstacles to increasing smallholder productivity in the long-
term is the reluctance of smallholders to replant.  Although there is still a need 
to increase smallholders application of fertiliser, there are indications at some 
locations that appropriate interventions are resulting in higher application rates 
of fertiliser amongst smallholders.  Devising suitable incentives for replanting is 
more difficult as the factors explaining the reluctance of smallholders to replant 
are complex and vary between LSS and VOP smallholders.  A key reason is the 
short-term loss of income as 2 hectares of oil palm are removed from 
production.  Many VOP smallholders have only 2 hectares of oil palm, so unless 
they have alternative income sources to support them until the new palms come 
into production they will delay replanting as long as possible, and certainly well 
past the point where yields have begun to decline.  On the Hoskins LSSs, 
reluctance to replant is more likely to occur on highly populated blocks with 
low per capita incomes.   
 
Smallholders’ propensity to replant is also influenced by tenure security, 
existing and projected debt levels, income foregone, quality of road 
infrastructure and the reliability of harvest pick-ups.  The relative importance of 
these factors varies between Popondetta and Hoskins and cannot be overcome 
easily, particularly in Popondetta where tenure insecurity and road maintenance 
are proving difficult to resolve and require long-term solutions that are partly 
outside the control of the industry.  However, there are several initiatives that 
the industry could adopt to encourage replanting.  These include: 
 
• Extend credit to Popondetta smallholders beyond 2001.  Many 
Popondetta smallholders expressed the view that oil palm prices in late 
2000 were too low to allow them to replant.  Therefore, with recent price 
rises in oil palm, demand for replanting packages will increase as growers 
are more able to secure an acceptable minimum income.  With this in 
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mind, it may be appropriate to consider extending credit for replanting for 
the next few years and concentrate extension efforts on replanting stands 
of oil palm planted before 1980.  A staged replanting effort over the next 
five years would ensure that oil palm smallholdings established in the 
initial burst of oil palm expansion are all replanted.  
 
• Restructure loan repayments during periods of depressed oil palm 
prices so that loan repayment rates are lower. The value of credit schemes 
to smallholders could be enhanced significantly by making repayment 
rates more flexible to take account of fluctuations in oil palm prices.  
When prices are low, loan repayment rates could be reduced to lessen the 
impacts on growers.  This would help maintain smallholder interest in oil 
palm production during periods of low prices and also reduce incentives to 
avoid loan repayments. 
 
• Promote income diversification.  The development of supplementary 
incomes would increase the propensity of smallholders to replant and 
assist them to develop a long-term perspective on oil palm investment and 
production rather than on immediate short-term returns to meet their 
immediate and pressing needs.  
 
• Encourage the cultivation of profitable market crops on newly 
replanted blocks to provide an income source until new palms come into 
production.  In areas poisoned for replanting, many smallholders already 
cultivate garden crops for sale at local markets.  This should be 
encouraged by the industry and ways identified to promote the cultivation 
of high value crops (e.g., tobacco, peanuts, bananas, green leaf vegetables 
and chillies) to compensate for short-term losses in oil palm income. 
 
• Rather than poison a full 2 hectares of palms, remove three rows per 
year and replant them from the age of 15 years (J. Chester pers. comm.)4.  
This would probably be much more attractive to smallholders as they 
would not lose the income of a full 2 hectares of oil palm. 
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Easier access to credit and interventions that enhance household income security 
in the short-term are likely to increase replanting rates amongst smallholders. 
 
Resource disputes between the companies and Incorporated Land Groups have 
not emerged in relation to mini-estates.  However, given the expansion of mini-
estates and the conflicts that have arisen between landowners and other private 
resource developments based on the lease, lease-back model (e.g., mining and 
forestry), future disputes cannot be ruled out.  We therefore recommend that the 
industry undertake an investigation of the land tenure issues and potential long-
term risks associated with the introduction of mini-estates.  We suggest that the 
investigation also examine how other industries and landowners using the lease, 
lease-back model are resolving conflicts.  This would provide useful information 
for the oil palm industry. 
 
Finally to maintain the productivity and future viability of the smallholder 
sector, the industry must be mindful of the importance of ensuring smallholder 
initiatives do not inadvertently act to undermine social stability in the 
smallholder sector.  The promotion of infill on LSS blocks where smallholders 
are encouraged to plant 6 hectares of oil palm is a case in point.  This initiative 
while perhaps increasing total smallholder production, has the potential to 
undermine food security by removing land from food garden production.  
During periods of depressed oil palm prices, the potential for social instability in 
the smallholder sector is likely to increase as the insurance value of food 
gardens is eroded by the 6 hectare policy.  Smallholder discontent and social 
instability on LSS schemes inevitably leads to lower productivity. 
 
For the long-term sustainability of the smallholder schemes it is imperative that 
the industry give more priority to enhancing smallholder food security.  Some 
key points relating to food garden production were identified in Chapters 3 and 
4 and are worth restating here:  
 
• Gardens provide most of the daily household food needs, especially on the 
LSS schemes.    
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• Access to food gardens reduces the vulnerability of smallholders to 
fluctuating oil palm prices and increases food security.  
 
• Garden produce is an important source of supplementary income, 
especially for women. 
 
• Exchanges of garden labour and garden food plays an important role in 
strengthening social relationships and building a sense of community. 
 
• Women’s social status is closely linked to their gardening activities and 
skills. 
 
In light of the above we recommend that the industry reassess its 6 hectare 
policy on LSS blocks.  Also, these issues should be taken into account when 
planning future developments in the smallholder sector, especially when 
devising initiatives to expand smallholder oil palm plantings.  In Chapter 9 
we stress that social stability and household security in the smallholder sector 
equally are important for the long-term viability of the industry as more 






1. The recent introduction of a skip bin system at Popondetta where tractors 
with trailers collect smallholder FFB and cart it to a central truck 
collection point has helped overcome some of the problems of poor 
accessibility. 
 
2. In Papua New Guinea non-citizens cannot legally engage in direct dealings 
for access to customary land.  They can only access customary land that 
has been registered under the Land Registration Act.  Once registered, the 
land is no longer under customary tenure, but is alienated to the State.  
Under the lease, lease-back system the state foregoes its use rights to the 
land when it leases the land back to the registered land owners (ILG).  The 
ILG can then enter into joint business ventures with a company. 
 
3. The decision not to replant at Milne Bay was seen by the company as a 
way to allow a choice to be made by landowners at the end of the lease.  If 
landowners wish the company to replant then the lease will be extended or 
they may choose to end the lease and undertake another enterprise, or 
replant for their own account (J. Chester pers. comm.).   
 
4. This only works if palms are felled or poisoned in an east-west direction as 
this allows the maximum amount of sunlight to reach the seedlings (J. 









8.0  Introduction 
A long-term concern for the oil palm industry has been the high rate of loose 
fruit wastage among smallholders.  When fruit is harvested, or over-ripe, oil 
palm fruitlets become dislodged from the main bunch and can account for up to 
14% of the harvest.  Until recently, much of this loose fruit was left to rot on the 
ground.  The loss of revenue has long been recognised by the industry (Turner 
and Leach 1980; Landell Mills 1991), and in a report on the West Nakanai 
scheme almost 20 years ago, poor loose fruit collection by smallholders was 
estimated to result in oil losses valued at K1.2m per year (Turner and Benjamin 
1982).   
 
Efforts to improve loose fruit collection have been attempted with little success 
at Hoskins over the last two decades (see Turner and Benjamin 1982).  Rates of 
loose fruit collection varied among smallholders, with high producers collecting 
more loose fruit than low to medium producers (Landell Mills 1991).  
Conservative estimates suggest that between 60-70% of loose fruit was not 
collected (Lewis 2000).   
 
In 1997 to improve loose fruit collection OPIC at Hoskins introduced the Mama 
Lus Frut Scheme (MLFS) which involved direct payment of women for 
collecting loose fruit.  Women were issued with their own harvest nets and 
harvesting payment card (B card) which enabled them to sell loose fruit and 
receive their own monthly payment cheque.  This chapter presents an 
assessment of the MLFS.   
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The research findings indicate significant financial benefits of the scheme for 
the company and women, and greater participation of women in oil palm 
production.  As the first part of the chapter reveals, the benefits of the mama 
card have been much more than increased income and involve more qualitative 
improvements in quality of life for smallholders.  The mama card has increased 
the range of options and strategies that households can pursue thereby 
strengthening household economic and social security.  The additional income 
has been especially beneficial for blocks with several co-resident households 
and blocks with diverse family types and needs.   
 
This discussion of the MLFS is largely confined to the Hoskins scheme where it 
has been operating since 1997.  At Popondetta the scheme was being introduced 
at the time of fieldwork, so little information is available to assess its impact.  A 
very brief overview of the Popondetta scheme is provided. 
 
In the second part of the chapter we identify the factors that underpin the 
success of the MLFS and which might be useful for devising other types of 
payment schemes to address under-harvesting and increase the flexibility of 
smallholder production systems.  One of the main benefits of the mama card is 
that it has helped increase the range of production strategies available to 
families and has opened up new ways of allocating oil palm labour and income.  
We examine the principles of the mama card and consider how these could be 
applied in a new payment system to bring young men, whose labour is currently 
under-utilised, into oil palm production. 
 
8.1  Mama Lus Frut Scheme - Hoskins 
The collection of loose fruit on smallholder blocks is considered to be a female 
task.  There is a clear gender division of labour in oil palm harvesting, with 
males responsible for the physically demanding task of cutting the oil palm 
bunches, and women, the collection of loose fruit.  An important factor 
explaining poor loose fruit collection by women was the lack of financial 
reward for their work.  Prior to the MLFS, smallholder production was recorded 
on a primary payment card (A card) held by the husband or male head of the 
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block and payment made to the male primary cardholder.  On most blocks, little 
of this income filtered through to women because wives received lower priority 
than other claimants to the income from oil palm (see Section 8.1.3).  Because 
of the lack of certainty of payment for their labour women, understandably, 
withdrew most of their labour from oil palm production to concentrate their 
efforts in gardening where they had greater control over production and the 
income derived from selling food at local markets.  Thus, a harvesting card for 
women aimed to entice women into oil palm production by remunerating them 
directly for their labour.   
 
After an OPIC smallholder survey identified strong support among both men 
and women for the Mama Lus Frut initiative, ten women from Sarakolok LSS 
were selected to trial the scheme in early 1997.  As other women became aware 
of the trial and the opportunity to earn their own income from loose fruit, they 
were eager to join the scheme and approached OPIC for their own nets and 
harvesting cards.  What was initially planned as a six month trial of the MLFS 
was abandoned after two months due to the overwhelming interest and pressure 
from women to join. 
 
By the end of September 1997 over 500 LSS women had joined the scheme and 
by the end of the year the number had risen to 1,612 (Figure 8.1).  With the 
introduction of the scheme to the VOPS in 1998, numbers further increased to 
just over 2,800 women by the end of December 1998.  At the end of August 
2001, 3,271 women had their own payment cards, representing 67% of all 
smallholder blocks.  The harvesting card has become known amongst 
smallholders as the “mama card” and the primary card is now called the “papa 
card”.  
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Figure 8.1.  Numbers of Hoskins women in the Mama Lus Frut Scheme 1997-2000. 
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8.1.1  Financial benefits of the Mama Lus Frut Scheme 
The financial benefits for the company and women have been substantial.  
NBPOL has experienced large increases in production and revenue.  In 2000, 
approximately 60,686 tonnes of loose fruit were collected, representing a value 
of just over K4.5 million (OPIC data).  Approximately 26% of smallholder oil 
palm income is now paid to women through the mama card, and in 2000 women 
earned an average weekly income of K27.75 per person which is 93 per cent of 
the average weekly wage for low-skilled rural workers in formal employment in 
Papua New Guinea.  Given that 79% of all rural workers in formal employment 
in Papua New Guinea are “low-skilled” (Levantis 2000, 79), there is little 
income disparity between women collecting loose fruit and the majority of rural 
workers.   
 
Prior to the LFMS, women’s main source of income was marketing garden 
foods at local markets.  This income was usually supplemented with a small 
portion of the oil palm cheque given to them by their spouse.  The amount they 
received varied greatly.  Whilst some women received what they considered a 
reasonable share of the cheque, most spoke of the meagre contribution made by 
their spouse to the household budget.  Many women said the cash received from 
their husbands was only enough to buy some store food for the family a day or 
two immediately following pay day.  Additional money to buy personal items, 
children’s clothes or durable household goods such as pots or mattresses was 
rare.  Men on the other hand, according to women, had enough cash to indulge 
in personal consumption (significantly, beer consumption and gambling) which 
was viewed by women as wasteful and irresponsible. 
 
The financial independence accorded many women by the mama card has made 
it much easier for women to provide for their families.  As one extension officer 
explained, women no longer have to worry if their husbands disappear into 
Kimbe (town) after they receive the oil palm cheque as women now have their 
own money to buy food and other essential household items.  One female 
smallholder remarked:  
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Nau mipela ol mama, mipela ino moa wari long ol papa, bikos mipela 
nau ihamamas bikos mama card ikatim daun olgeta hevi insait long 
wanwan family.  Nau mama ifeelim hamamas bekos em igat inap moni 
long usim long em iet nau…  Taim mama card ikamap, bikpela senis 
ibin kamap long mipela ol mama na pikininni meri.  Nau ol mama 
ihamamas bekos ol ikisim moni long mama card.  Long papa card ol 
isave bekim long dinau long bank, long kompani long tools, seedlings 
na sharim wantaim pikinini man.  Mama em “concentrate” long mama 
card moni bilong em.  Wanem samting mama ineedim or ilaik mekim, 
em ino inap askim papa.   
Now, we women don’t need to be concerned about the men because the 
mama card has reduced all our family burdens.  Women are happy 
because they have their own money to use.  When the mama card was 
introduced, major changes occurred for us as mothers and daughters.  
Now, women are content because they are earning money from the 
mama card.  With the papa card, loans must be repaid to the bank or to 
the company for tools and seedlings, and the [papa] cheque is shared 
with sons.  Women concentrate on the mama card [and with this 
economic independence there is no need to] bother men about what 
[women] need or want to do. 
 
The final comment regarding women’s greater financial autonomy was 
highlighted by most women in interviews.  For women, greater access to cash 
was welcomed, but it was the fact that they had more control over the income 
and hence less financial reliance on their husbands that was most important.  
 
Although many women commented positively on their increased control of 
income, there are certain obligations on women regarding the expenditure and 
distribution of the mama cheque.  For example, the majority of women 
interviewed referred to the expectation that the money should be shared with 
immediate family members and kin.  Not to do so would result in the woman 
being labelled ‘greedi’.  Also, the consistency of responses to queries on what 
the mama cheque was spent on suggests that there are well-defined notions of 
how ‘mama moni’ should be used.  Most women, for example, spent the money 
on a limited range of goods such as food, clothes for household members, 
cooking utensils, durable household items such as mattresses or sleeping mats, 
repaying store credit, and school fees.  Gifts to kin, and cash channelled into 
customary exchange were also important.  Some women receiving relatively 
large mama cheques were able to save part of the income (Box 8.1). 
 
To assess the new expenditure patterns arising from the introduction of the 
mama card we interviewed tradestore owners from Buvussi, Kavui (2), and 
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Buluma subdivisions, and the manager of the “New Didiman Stoa” at Kimbe.  
Because of the difficulties in gaining a quantitative measure of the impact of the 
mama card we asked each store manager/owner to identify changes they had 
observed in their business since the introduction of the Mama Lus Frut Scheme.  
All noted significant changes, though not always expressed in terms of 
increased sales.  Some of the changes they identified included: 
 
• Increased sales of food and/or household items such as saucepans, plates 
and cups.  The New Didiman Stoa manager noted a marked increase in 
sales of mattresses in the first two years of the scheme.   
• Increased use of credit by women at local tradestores. 
• More female customers. 
• Some women by-passing local tradestores on paydays to travel to town to 
shop in the larger and less expensive stores to purchase food, clothes and 
household items (noted by two LSS tradestore owners).   
 
In summing up the changes to his business following the introduction of the 
MLFS one Kavui tradestore owner remarked: 
…ol papa ikisim pei ol igo hamamasim ol iet long drug na spak.  Mama 
isavim moni long famili….Nupela kago ikam insait long stoa, olsem 
bepo mi baim liklik kago, nau mi baim planti.  Dinau long meri igo 
antap nau, bikos ol igat moni….Bepo mama card ikamap ino planti 
meri tumas isave dinau long stoa.  
…Men spend their cheque on cigarettes and beer while women allocate 
their money to family needs.  In the past, I purchased only a few items 
for the store, but now I buy more.  Store credit limits for women have 
been increased since women have more income now.  Not many women 
had access to store credit before the mama card was introduced.   
 
 
Another Kavui tradestore owner recalled: 
 
… Bepo ol meri istap long market moni na oli save kam long stoa 
wanwan taim.  Nau ol igat moni long mama card, na planti isave kam 
long stoa bilong mipela.  Ol papa isave baim smok tasol, ol mama isave 
baim kaikai, rais, tinpis na bisket… 
Before, women relied on market income and seldom made store 
purchases.  Now, they have their own money and many of them come to 
our store.  While men buy cigarettes, women buy food like rice, tinned 
fish and biscuits. 
 
Differences in male and female expenditure patterns are illustrated nicely in the 
above comments.  That women do spend a higher proportion of cash income on 
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food and family needs partly explains why the introduction of the Mama Lus 
Frut Scheme has been viewed by most smallholders, OPIC and company 
smallholder officers as improving the social environment on blocks.  Also, as 
both women and men told us on numerous occasions, for women the mama card 
has greatly enhanced their ability to meet their household responsibilities and 
expectations as wives, mothers and sisters.  Because women are more inclined 
to share their income and buy food for the household, even though the amount 
of money earned from loose fruit is less than the FFB income, the net benefits to 
families are disproportionably higher.  As a general statement, a kina paid to 
women has more impact on family well-being than a kina paid to men.  
However, as mentioned below, women do not always have complete control 
over the mama card, and do not always firmly assert their ownership over the 
use of the mama card, the collection of loose fruit or the money earned. 
 
For some women the increased financial independence has enabled them to start 
their own small businesses or additional income earning activities.  Those we 
noted were poultry businesses, purchases of bales of second-hand clothing for 
sale at local markets, purchases of kerosene stoves for selling cooked food at 
local markets and the development of informal credit schemes for women.  
Most of these economic activities had only recently emerged and it is expected 
that such small businesses will expand in the future as women develop new 
ways of increasing the benefits from the MLFS.  
 
8.1.2  Increased participation of women in oil palm production 
The increased participation of women in loose fruit collection has resulted in a 
more general interest in oil palm production amongst women.  Extension 
officers noted a change in their relationship with female smallholders.  They 
contend that prior to the MLFS, most women were not interested in issues 
pertaining to block management and maintenance.  Several female smallholders 
told us that previously if extension officers visited their blocks in their 
husbands’ absence they would ask them to return later in the day when their 
husbands returned.  Many women, she said, were not especially interested in 
extension officers’ visits and did not really see why they should be involved in 
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discussions of oil palm production when, afterall, their main efforts were in 
garden production.   
 
Although men retain control of the block, women say they are now more 
involved in block management.  The smallholder Mama Lus Frut representative 
(a female smallholder from Kapore) on the OPIC Hoskins Local Planning 
Committee, commented in reference to the changes in women’s attitudes to oil 
palm: 
...Narapela senis ibin kamap long mipela ol mama, em bipo mama ino 
konsern long wok long blok.  Tasol nau em iken wok long blok bekos tru 
long dispela mama card em ken managim wok blok sapos papa bilong 
em ino stap.  Sapos igat hevi long blok olsem ol ino bekim dinau na ol 
bank ikam long askim long papa, mama iken toktok wantaim ol wokman 
long bank long wanem hevi istap long block.  Nau mama na papa 
isharim responsibility long blok. 
...One of the changes that happened to us women since the mama card 
was introduced is that before the introduction of the card women were 
not really involved with [oil palm] production.  Now, because of the 
mama card, she can work on the block even if her husband is not 
around.  If problems arise on the block such as bank officers visiting to 
see the male head about late loan repayments, women can now deal 
with them.  Now men and women share responsibility for 
[management] the block. 
 
Although not all men and women now share responsibility for the block, 
extension officers have observed more women weeding and applying fertiliser 
and have also noted their increased attendance at field days.  Some women are 
now using chisels to harvest small bunches from young palms to place on their 
nets.  The MLFS has opened opportunities for women to influence oil palm 
production and agronomic strategies, and it is likely that with the growing 
involvement of women in oil palm production, such changes will continue as 
new agro-socioeconomic strategies develop amongst smallholders in response 
to the increased participation of women. 
 
8.1.3  Mama Lus Frut and the broadening of livelihood strategies 
In terms of what the scheme was supposed to do, that is, increase loose fruit 
collection, bring women into oil palm production and increase their income, it 
has been an outstanding success.  For the remainder of this section we discuss 
the ways in which households have adopted the mama card to meet their 
everyday needs and desires. The mama card has helped households meet their 
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needs and strengthened livelihoods through improving income distribution and 
labour arrangements within households, opening up new avenues for men to 
contribute to the household economy, reducing reliance on garden income, and 
enabling households to meet short-term cash demands and social obligations. 
 
New income distributional mechanisms 
On blocks with two or more households, the mama card has been extremely 
beneficial in spreading money across families and in particular to women where 
a rotation (markim mun) system is operating (Box 8.2).  Before the introduction 
of the mama card there was only one cheque rotating among households.  The 
mama cheque means there are two cheques each month rotating on a block.  
Many multiple household blocks now have the papa cheque going to the male 
head of one household and the mama cheque going to the female head of 
another household.  This has meant more frequent income for households.  On 
these blocks where the mama cheque is rotated among co-resident households, 
women are often expected to share some of their cheque with other women on 
the block.  In some cases a revolving credit system has evolved among the 
women on the block whereby credit is extended until the borrower receives her 
mama cheque.  The revolving credit system means that there is a continual flow 
of money among women.  
 
On multiple household wok bung blocks, loose fruit collection is usually rotated 
monthly among the resident adult women.  The loose fruit income received by 
the female head of the household can exceed the share of the FFB cheque 
received by her husband.  Some of the loose fruit income received by women is 
spent on their husbands, adult sons, or shared with younger children or other 
women on the block.   
 
The mama card has been especially helpful where diverse family types and 
needs exist on a block as it has enabled family members to arrange more 
equitable and convenient ways of allocating income.  In one case, a blockowner 
had acquired a new block at Bialla and his widowed brother remained as 
caretaker on the original Hoskins block (Box 5.4).  The brothers had arranged 
for the papa cheque from the Hoskins block to be deposited into the 
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blockowner’s bank account to repay the loan on the new Bialla block, while the 
mama card was used by the caretaker.  When the circumstances of the two 
brothers changed, such as hosting visitors from home, the income distribution 
could be altered by adjusting the proportions of fruit allocated to the two cards.   
 
In another case, a couple and their children lived on the block with the 
husband’s elderly widowed mother who looked after the three young children of 
her deceased daughter.  The mama card, although in the name of the 
blockowner’s wife, was given to the widowed mother to help her feed, clothe 
and look after her grandchildren.  The husband and wife shared the papa 
cheque.  At Gaungo VOP, we found several instances where the mama card was 
given to widows residing on blocks with their sons or daughters’ families.  By 
giving elderly widowed women the mama card, it has given them some 
economic independence, thus enabling them to continue to be involved in their 
communities in culturally meaningful ways.   
 
Female autonomy in oil palm production 
One obvious outcome of the mama card is that women now have more control 
over their own labour processes - they can decide when and if they collect loose 
fruit and they can now organise their own cash and labour transactions.  Among 
our survey households there were several instances of women engaging in 
labour exchange by inviting female relatives from other blocks to assist with the 
collection of loose fruit and share in the proceeds of the mama cheque.  For 
example, a woman may invite her brother’s wife or a daughter-in-law from 
another block to collect loose fruit and share the proceeds of the mama cheque.  
This may be to help other female relatives short of money, but more 
importantly, in the eyes of the women, it is done for social and cultural reasons.  
It may also provide some women with access to more frequent incomes if these 
labour exchanges occur between LSS or VOP divisions with different paydays 
and between blocks using rotation payment systems.  The net effect of the 
resultant increase in labour flexibility is improved oil palm production as inter-
block co-operation in production increases.  Increased labour flexibility is 
therefore one way of overcoming under-harvesting as a result of illness or short-
term labour shortages.  
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New ways for men to contribute to the household economy 
The mama card provides an avenue for women to be rewarded for their work on 
the block and to be recognised financially for their role in the household.  One 
of the unexpected outcomes of the introduction of the mama card is that most 
men put FFB bunches on the mama card as a contribution to the up-keep of the 
household1.  When asked about this contribution, men generally reply ‘mi 
halpim mama tasol’.  They recognise that the money from the mama cheque is 
spent mostly on the household - food, children’s clothing, household goods, and 
to pay for health services.   
 
An important reason why husbands do not mind placing fruit bunches on the 
mama card is that the cash is unseen.  Men find it much easier to hand over fruit 
rather than cash.  Bunches are not as fluid as cash and, therefore, the demands 
on bunches are less.  When fruit is converted to a monthly pay cheque there are 
numerous demands on the cash, such as debt repayments, store credit to be 
repaid, money owing to hired labourers, the financial demands of immediate 
and extended family, and social pressures to gamble and participate in beer 
drinking parties.  Often these demands greatly exceed the value of the cheque 
and this is when conflicts emerge within the family or with others over the 
disbursement of the cheque.  The cashless transaction where the husband places 
FFB on the mama card (worth maybe K5, 10, K20) circumvents these 
competing demands. 
 
It is also likely, that by putting fruit bunches on the mama card, it frees the 
husband of any further obligations to give some of the papa cheque to his wife.  
Women say they no longer worry if their husbands disappear all day after 
collecting the papa cheque as they now have their own money to feed the 
family.  Oil palm resembles other cash crops introduced to Papua New Guinea 
(like coffee) where men claimed ownership of the crop and control over the 
income (see Overfield 1998).  This is particularly true of oil palm where men 
have a strong feeling that they “won” the block.  Women now have their own 
source of income and many families have clearly distinguished the different 
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roles and ownership of the cheques and this has helped reduce intra-familial 
conflict while enhancing the economic independence of women.  
 
Increased access to credit for women 
Another outcome of the Mama Lus Frut Scheme is that women now have 
improved access to store credit.  Although women did have access to store 
credit prior to the mama card, amounts and frequency of purchases on credit 
were low.  Because of their improved financial position women often seek store 
credit to buy store food when their oil palm cheques have been spent.   
According to tradestore proprietors, women are much more likely than men to 
repay credit and repay it on time.  One tradestore owner noted when discussing 
women and credit: 
…ol [women] igo long town na pinisim moni long kaikai.  
Orait nogat moni nau, na ol istap long garden.  Long namel 
long lus wik ol ineedim tinpis, or rais samting, ol ikam dinau 
long stoa bilong mi…  Long payday, ol itingting long dina, na 
ol ikam bekim….  Sampela man ino save bekim dinau hariap… 
…women go to town and spend their money on food.  When 
the money runs out they rely on their gardens.  Between 
monthly [oil palm] payments when money is short and they 
need tinned fish or rice they come to my store for credit.  On 
paydays, they come and repay their debts.  Some men don’t 
repay their store credit quickly...   
 
The increased use of store credit has provided women with greater choices and 
more flexibility to meet their domestic responsibilities.   
 
Conflict resolution 
Smallholders referred repeatedly to the role of the mama card in reducing inter- 
and intra-familial conflict.  Women and extension officers referred to the drop 
in family disputes, especially domestic violence since the scheme was 
introduced.  Previously, with only the papa cheque there were disputes over its 
disbursement.  Many men clearly saw it as “their” money, while their wives also 
saw it as being partly “theirs”.  For many women it was this constant struggle 
for cash to purchase essential household items while their husbands frittered 
away oil palm income that caused many arguments over the distribution of oil 
palm income.  Thus, the denial of what women saw as their rightful claims on 
oil palm income was a constant source of conflict in many households, often 
leading to domestic violence around payday.  The economic independence the 
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mama card has accorded many women, and the greater flow of cash into a 
block, has significantly reduced social conflict within many smallholder 
families.  
 
The mama card appears to have been very helpful for women on blocks where 
conflicts occurred regularly between brothers.  For example, on blocks where 
three or more brothers were disputing their shares of the papa cheque, the 
women were unlikely to get a look in at all.  Hence, the mama card has not only 
resulted in less conflict between men and women, but also less conflict between 
brothers.   
 
Decreased reliance on garden income 
Where women reside on LSS blocks that have limited access to garden land the 
mama card appears to be especially beneficial.  For these women experiencing 
land shortages, growing food for sale at markets has always been restricted and 
they have relied heavily on their husbands for money.  The mama card has 
increased their income options, provided a much needed alternative income 
source and has created some financial independence. 
 
Meeting short-term needs and social obligations 
On many blocks, the mama card is used to meet specific short-term needs.  For 
example, school children are sometimes allocated the card for a month to earn 
money to pay school fees, or it is allocated to a married son/daughter or close 
relative for a month to help them out of a financial difficulty.  The latter we 
were told is more common on VOP blocks where kin networks are more 
extensive.  In a meeting with women at Gaungo, they provided examples of the 
mama card supporting relatives and married sons/daughters living in Kimbe or 
on company compounds.  The card is “loaned” to them to meet unusually high 
expenses such as school fees, travel, or for large store purchases.  Other women 
at the meeting referred to the card being given to a relative for a month to help 
raise a brideprice or for some other customary payment.  One woman added in 
reference to the mama card being “loaned” to relatives said:  
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…dispela pasim em yu bai painem long ol planti assples lain.  
Mipela save lukluk long ol wantok na famili igat hevi or 
wari…..Sampela laik baim skul fee bilong ol pikininni, ol save kam 
na askim long usim card.  Mipela givim ol.  Planti wok kastom 
kamap long ples, em mipela wokim olsem.  Husat i laik wokim 
custom, olsem baim meri, stretim dai man, first born pikinnini em 
mipela givem card long ol. 
…this behaviour is found mainly in the villages.  We look after 
members of our immediate and extended families who are having 
problems.  Some of them need to pay school fees for their children 
and they will come and ask to borrow our card which we lend them.  
We still have many traditional customary obligations in the village 
that we meet in this way [by using the mama card].  Whoever needs 
to fulfil customary obligations such as brideprice payments, 
mortuary payments, or customs for the first born child, the card is 
given to them. 
 
One of the reasons why the mama card can be used in a range of ways is that it 
is unencumbered with loan deductions.  Most smallholders either have credit 
with the company or commercial banks, and monthly loan repayments are 
deducted from the papa card.  These deductions can be as high as 50% of gross 
earnings which limits the ways the papa card can be used.    
 
To conclude this section, it appears that the mama card has been very beneficial 
because it has expanded the options and choices open to families and given 
them greater flexibility in how work and income are allocated.  This flexibility 
is especially useful given the complexity of family situations and diverse family 
needs and has enabled smallholders to better manage their own situations.  By 
strengthening people’s ability to meet their household needs and desires, the 
mama card has improved social stability and economic security on the blocks.  
The ways in which the mama card has opened up new methods of allocating oil 
palm labour and income, provide important insights for thinking about other 
smallholder payment systems to increase smallholder productivity by expanding 
further the range of labour and income opportunities for smallholders.  This is 
explored in Section 8.5 below. 
 
8.2  Problems of the Mama Lus Frut Scheme 
There is no evidence to suggest that the Mama Lus Frut Scheme has socially or 
economically disadvantaged any specific group of smallholders.  Indeed, the 
data overwhelmingly suggest that smallholders, especially women, have 
experienced marked economic and social benefits since the scheme’s inception.  
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However, several problems have begun to emerge that have the potential to 
undermine the viability of the scheme and limit the economic rewards for 
women. 
 
One emerging problem is the abuse of the MLFS by blockowners with debt.  
This has implications for female smallholders, the companies and the 
commercial banks.  Because the mama card is free of loan deductions, some 
men are regularly placing all or most of the FFB on the mama card to avoid loan 
repayments.  This has created some difficulties for the company and 
commercial banks in recovering loans from smallholders.  In these instances, 
women lose control of the mama card and may also be denied income earned on 
the card.  If this misuse of the card continues to expand, the benefits of the 
scheme for women will be lost and may lead to women once again withdrawing 
their labour from oil palm production.  Women may therefore revert to putting 
more emphasis on garden production for local markets because they have more 
control of this income source.  Also, should this scenario develop, loose fruit 
collection will decline as a consequence.   
 
It needs to be noted that many smallholders, including men, are strongly 
opposed to this abuse of the scheme, and feel that the actions of these 
individuals may lead the company and OPIC to cancel the scheme.  Many to 
whom we spoke argued that the majority who are not abusing the system should 
not be penalised for the actions of a few errant individuals.  Some smallholders 
made suggestions as to how the situation could be addressed (see below). 
 
A related problem that has emerged is the theft of the mama cheque by male 
household members, usually younger sons.  OPIC and the company are working 
to overcome these problems by encouraging women to open bank accounts.  In 
late 2000, approximately 18% of women had their cheques paid direct to their 
bank accounts.  Also, from January 2001, loan repayments will be deducted on 
the mama card where misuse of the scheme is occurring.  NBPOL’s computer 
payment system first attempts to recover the monthly loan repayment from the 
papa cheque.  If insufficient fruit has been weighed on the papa card to meet the 
minimum monthly loan repayment, the programme then checks the mama 
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payment to recover the balance of the outstanding minimum loan repayment.  It 
should be noted that deductions from the mama cheque only occur in instances 
where production has deliberately been shifted to the mama card to avoid loan 
repayments. 
 
Smallholders opposed to the misuse of the mama card have suggested other 
strategies for strengthening the identification of loose fruit collection as 
women’s work.  These include:  
 
• strengthening the gender identity of the scheme by having a separate 
truck (painted red) that collects only loose fruit.  The truck would become 
known locally as the “mama truck” and would collect loose fruit one day 
after FFB collection, thus allowing women extra time for more thorough 
loose fruit collection. 
 
• providing separate scales for the weighing of loose fruit.  Trucks would 
have a smaller set of scales weighing up to a maximum of 800kg.  This 
would make it more difficult for men to have their one tonne nets of FFB 
weighed on the “mama” scale. 
 
Although the misuse of the mama card is being addressed it is likely that for 
some women their increased economic independence will be continually 
challenged by male household members resistant to the new economic 
relationships emerging within households.  .   
 
A further issue which the company and OPIC is addressing is the problem of poor 
quality loose fruit being placed in the nets for collection.  An OPIC awareness 
programme is in place to resolve this problem and several OPIC field days for 
female smallholders have been conducted. 
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8.3  Explaining the Success of the Mama Lus Frut Scheme 
Despite the problems identified above, the MLFS at Hoskins has been a 
resounding success.  The scheme is one of the few examples in export cash crop 
production in Papua New Guinea where a gender-focused agricultural extension 
initiative has translated into significant economic and social benefits for women 
and the wider community.  Understanding why the scheme has been so 
successful can assist with the identification of principles that underpin effective 
smallholder interventions in the oil palm industry and, potentially, other 
smallholder export crops.  The key principles we identified as contributing to 
the success of the scheme related to: 
8.3.1  Payment for labour guaranteed 
As mentioned in Section 8.1 low rates of loose fruit collection by women prior 
to the MLFS were the result of limited remuneration for their labour and lack of 
payment certainty for their labour contribution to loose fruit collection.  Women 
relied on their husbands to give them some of the oil palm income on paydays, 
but the social pressures on men to redistribute this income and engage in beer 
drinking meant that wives, who received less priority in this redistribution than 
other claimants, often missed out or received an amount less than the value of 
their labour contribution.   
 
The under-utilisation of women’s labour was correctly identified by OPIC as 
resulting from an ineffective payment mechanism for their labour.  OPIC saw 
that this problem could be overcome by a payment system that guaranteed direct 
payment to women for their labour.  Because loose fruit collection is a separate 
process from harvesting fresh fruit bunches (FFB) and loose fruit can be easily 
distinguished from FFB, it was relatively easy for the loose fruit to be stacked 
and weighed separately from the FFB, thereby making it possible to guarantee 
payments to women.  Thus, a “labour contract” between the company and 
women was able to fulfilled. 
 
The separate payment card for women also means that it is easier for men to 
remunerate women’s labour for other forms of work such as block maintenance 
(and also to contribute to the upkeep of the household).  Payment for work in 
 187
fruit by placing FFB on the mama net means that men are able to circumvent the 
often considerable social pressures on them to redistribute income when this 
income is in the form of cash.  In this way, payment in fruit rather than cash is 
more likely to lead to the “labour contract” being fulfilled between husband and 
wife. 
 
8.3.2  Significant financial and social benefits for women   
A major factor that helps explain the success of the scheme is the significant 
financial and social benefits it has delivered to women.  The increased economic 
independence of women, their greatly improved ability to meet their everyday 
household responsibilities of feeding and caring for their families and the new 
ways of allocating labour and income have vastly increased the choices and 
options available to women.  These benefits have strengthened household 
livelihood security, and the success of the MLFS indicates how responsive 
smallholders can be to financial incentives that meet their needs. 
 
8.3.3  The way it was introduced 
Prior to the scheme’s implementation, OPIC surveyed and assessed the views of 
both male and female smallholders on the idea of a separate payment system for 
women.  Following widespread support from smallholders, a small group of 
women were chosen to pilot the new payment system which allowed OPIC to 
assess the feasibility and viability of the scheme and identify potential problems 
before formally introducing it to all subdivisions.  These initial planning 
procedures ensured that, first, there was a need and a desire in the community 
for such a scheme; and, second, because smallholders’ views were taken into 
account in planning the intervention, their acceptance and uptake of the scheme 
was much more likely.   
 
Also, OPIC hosted a series of meetings at the various subdivisions during the 
introductory stages of the scheme to explain how the scheme would work to the 
benefit of both men and women.  During these meetings the new scheme was 
promoted as women’s work and income.  However, extension officers were 
careful to engender support for the scheme amongst men by stressing the wider 
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family benefits to be obtained.  The latter was crucial for the success of the 
scheme.   
 
8.3.4  Employment of female extension officers   
With the introduction of the scheme OPIC employed a female extension officer 
to administer and support the scheme.  With the rapid growth of the MLFS, two 
more female extension officers were employed and a “Women’s Extension 
Unit” has been incorporated into OPIC’s organisational structure at Hoskins.  
By employing female extension officers OPIC was able to promote the scheme 
directly to women which helped reinforce the MLFS as an initiative for women.  
The female extension officers also conducted field days and community 
meetings with women, which publicly demonstrated to all smallholders OPIC’s 
commitment to women’s participation in the oil palm industry.   
 
Moreover, female extension officers provide a direct link to OPIC for women 
smallholders to voice their concerns and opinions.  Previously, women’s 
concerns about oil palm would, if at all, have been raised with male extension 
officers through their husbands.  This access to female extension officers has 
helped OPIC to identify and respond to problems as they emerge, often in 
association with female smallholders.   
 
It is not surprising that the employment of female extension officers is a factor 
in the success of the MLFS.  Evidence from the wider rural development 
literature suggests that the employment of female extension officers plays a 
considerable role in encouraging the involvement of women in agricultural 
development.  However, as pointed out by one female extension officer at 
Hoskins, there is little doubt that the high level of acceptance and support given 
to female officers by senior staff and male extension officers has been an 
important factor in the success of the scheme at Hoskins.  Whilst there are 
usually difficulties for Papua New Guinean women employed in male-
dominated workplaces, the acceptance of female officers by male field staff is 
attributable to the strong and emphatic support from the senior divisional 
managers, field and project managers.  The leadership shown by senior OPIC 
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staff at Hoskins in incorporating female staff into the organisation has facilitated 
their acceptance by male colleagues and smallholders alike.  
 
8.3.5  Continued support of the scheme by OPIC and NBPOL   
The scheme has been carefully monitored and informally evaluated during its 
three years of operation.  Continual monitoring of the scheme has enabled 
problems to be addressed as they arise.  For example, as discussed above, since 
the scheme’s inception, OPIC and the company have worked to counter 
attempts by some men to take control of the mama card.  As a result, there have 
been some modifications to the scheme and each modification has served to 
maintain the MLFS’s viability and to ensure that the benefits of the mama card 
continue to flow to women.  In modifying and developing the scheme, OPIC has 
worked closely with the community seeking their input through community 
consultation during meetings, field days, and informal discussions with 
smallholders.  The recent appointment of a “Mama Lus Frut” smallholder 
representative to the OPIC Local Planning Committee has strengthened the 
input of women smallholders.  The representative is a voice for female 
smallholders bringing their concerns and problems to Local Planning 
Committee meetings for discussion (Box 8.3). 
 
The successful working relationship between OPIC and the community in the 
development and modification of the scheme ensures ongoing community 
support for the scheme.  Community participation has engendered a sense of 
shared ownership and responsibility for the scheme amongst smallholders.  This 
sense of shared ownership and responsibility for the scheme often came through 
in interviews when smallholders suggested how to prevent men from misusing 
the scheme (Section 8.2).  Their ideas and enthusiasm for the MLFS reflected 
strong community support for the initiative.  
 
8.3.6  Few structural/cost barriers to participation in the scheme 
The relative ease with which women can join the scheme is also important in its 
success.  To participate in the scheme, all that is required is a harvesting net, a 
payment card issued by the company, and a strong bag or access to a 
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wheelbarrow to cart the fruit to the roadside collection point.  There is no 
significant financial outlay nor specific skills or special training required and no 
special agricultural tools needed which makes the scheme open to most women.  
Also, the fact that elderly widows are participating in the scheme suggests that 
age is not a significant barrier to participation. 
 
Similarly for the company, there were relatively few modifications required to 
their operating systems to implement the MLFS, and any changes that have 
occurred have been well rewarded by substantial increases in revenue. 
 
8.3.7  Easy incorporation of loose fruit collection into existing gendered 
work roles  
Oil palm harvesting has a distinct gender division of labour, and loose fruit 
collection is considered women’s work.  Yet, very few women collected loose 
fruit prior to the introduction of the mama card.  Thus, the loose fruit mama 
scheme did not challenge male work roles in oil palm, nor did it require a major 
shift in women’s labour patterns which may have stifled uptake of the scheme.  
Loose fruit collection continues to be viewed as wok bilong ol meri [women’s 
work] and, to date, men have not contested this female work domain.  While 
some men are challenging women’s new economic independence there is no 
evidence to suggest that men are encroaching on loose fruit collection because 
of its separate remuneration.  On the other hand, since the introduction of the 
mama loose fruit scheme, more women are using chisels to harvest younger 
palms.  This labour shift by women to harvest younger palms with the fruit 
weighed on the mama card appears to have evolved independently.  Where we 
observed this, it went unchallenged by husbands. 
 
Not only has loose fruit collection fitted well with existing gendered work roles, 
but it has not entailed a substantial increase in women’s workloads. In the post-
harvest surveys conducted among smallholders at Hoskins, Kavui women spent 
on average 1.5 to 2 days per harvest collecting loose fruit and Gaungo women, 
approximately 1 day.  Young children often assisted with collecting the loose 
fruit and at Kavui, men often helped to wheelbarrow the loose fruit to the road.  
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The less time spent collecting loose fruit among Gaungo women can be 
explained by the smaller block size and more extensive kin networks drawn 
upon for loose fruit collection.  Rarely was the issue of hard or burdensome 
work raised in discussions with women (including elderly women) regarding the 
collection of loose fruit.  Only a few women mentioned the strain on the back 
from bending over collecting loose fruit and none mentioned time or work 
conflicts between loose fruit collection and their other work roles.  Also, for 
most women on multiple household blocks where the mama card is rotated 
between the households, loose fruit collection may only take place every second 
or third month.  To what extent the collection of loose fruit has added to (or 
reduced) women’s overall work burden cannot be quantified.  It is reasonable to 
suggest though, that the Mama Lus Frut Scheme has improved livelihood 
security for women and probably lessened pressure on garden production for 
local markets. 
 
That women so enthusiastically incorporated loose fruit collection into their 
existing work routines suggests that they recognised the financial advantages of 
any additional work associated with loose fruit collection and/or the value of 
shifting some of their labour away from food gardening or other economic 
activities.  On the basis of last year’s average annual income from loose fruit 
collection (K1,443), and with an average of 2 days per harvest by LSS women, 
women are earning K27.75 per day in loose fruit collection.  This compares 
very favourably with the average income per market day of K10.91 (Chapter 
3.1.5).  Given that labour expended in garden production is not included in this 
figure for market income, the returns to women’s labour in oil palm production 
are substantially greater.  
 
The additional work of loose fruit collection is not so burdersome that it has 
required women to forego or substantially reduce labour input into other 
activities like subsistence gardening or marketing food to the detriment of 
household welfare.  Where women may have reduced their labour inputs in 
other activities, it is likely that it is not as a result of competing demands for 
labour, but because the significant additional income has enabled them to 
reduce their total workloads.  All women we interviewed on the LSS schemes 
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continued to sell food weekly or fortnightly at local markets.  While marketing 
remains an economic necessity for many women, though offset to an extent by 
loose fruit mama income, it remains a highly valued social activity for women 
where they gather to gossip, exchange stories and catch up with news.  It is 
unlikely that women would forego marketing because of the high social value 
that they attach to it.  Conceivably, if loose fruit collection were to curtail 
women’s participation in marketing then there may have been limits to their 
involvement in oil palm.  Thus, the additional labour of loose fruit collection 
has been incorporated into existing work routines without adverse impacts on 
women’s other work roles and responsibilities. 
 
8.4  Mama Lus Frut Scheme - Popondetta  
The Mama Lus Frut Scheme was initially trialed in June 2000 among a group of 
women at Sorovi LSS and Sarakuata VOP.  The trial followed from a 1999 
survey of women at Sorovi and Aeka subdivisions which indicated that 98% of 
women were interested in such a scheme.  Like Hoskins, the Mama Lus Frut 
Scheme was welcomed by women, with some collecting loose fruit before being 
issued with a harvesting net or harvest payment card.  Following the trials in 
August 1999, 300 women registered for mama cards.  During the initial months 
of the scheme, meetings were conducted with women smallholders to promote 
the scheme.  By January 2001 there were 1,050 women in the scheme.  In 2000, 
728 tonnes of loose fruit were collected with a total value of K38,659 (ADS 
(PNG)  2001).  Two female extension officers have also been recruited. 
 
Whilst the economic and social benefits of the scheme are beginning to emerge 
at Popondetta, the MLFS has encountered more difficulties than at Hoskins.  
Soon after its introduction, men began using the mama card for FFB to avoid 
loan repayments.  The avoidance of loan repayments in Popondetta has been an 
ongoing problem for some time, and the introduction of the mama card (at a 
time of low oil palm prices) has provided an additional means to do this.  To 
address this problem the company is now making deductions on the mama card 
if loan repayments are not met on the primary card.  Also, to overcome the 
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problem of placing FFB production on the mama card the company has placed 
an upper limit of one tonne per pick-up on the mama card.  
 
The less successful introduction of the mama card at Popondetta has to be 
placed within the broader context of problems at Popondetta.  There has been a 
high level of debt avoidance in Popondetta for several years and this is probably 
due to several inter-related factors.  As discussed in Chapter 7.5.1 on replanting, 
Popondetta growers tend to have higher levels of debt associated with World 
Bank loans, Oro housing loans and relatively high arrears of rental fees owing 
to the Lands Department.  Also, with the introduction of private contractors for 
FFB collection, many growers are able to avoid loan repayments by selling their 
fruit directly to contractors rather than the company (several of our sample 
blocks had little or no production recorded against them).  The mama card 
provided another opportunity to avoid loan repayments. 
 
Further, since the Oro-for-Oro campaign of the early 1990s when local 
landowners attempted large-scale evictions of settlers, many smallholders feel 
their tenure is insecure.  In these circumstances, they tend to maximise short-
term returns at the expense of long-term investment in their blocks.  Thus 
defaulting on loan repayments is a rational response to what they perceive as an 
uncertain future in Popondetta. 
 
At the institutional level there appears to be less commitment to the MLFS by 
OPIC.  In some respects this is understandable given the priority of the World 
Bank Oro Expansion Project in Popondetta.  With funding due to cease in 
December 2001, OPIC is concentrating its efforts on achieving the project’s 
planting and replanting targets.  This means institutional support for the scheme 
has been less strong than the support for the scheme in Hoskins, with the result 
that OPIC and the company are not able to respond as effectively to problems as 
they emerge.  Difficulties experienced at Popondetta relate largely to the timing 
of the introduction of the Mama Lus Frut Scheme: the scheme was introduced at 




8.5  Alternative Payment Schemes 
Drawing on the successful principles of the Mama Lus Frut Scheme this section 
explores the potential of an alternative payment system to further increase 
smallholder productivity and bring into production presently under-utilised 
labour.  One area where smallholder productivity and total production could be 
increased is by tapping the labour potential of the large numbers of 
underemployed youth on the LSS schemes, especially those from highly 
populated blocks.  Like the mama card this new payment initiative would 
introduce greater labour flexibility by facilitating inter-block labour flows so 
that there is a better match between the demand and supply of labour.   
 
Before discussing this initiative in detail it is useful to identify the key 
principles of the Mama Lus Frut Scheme that would also be applicable to a new 
initiative seeking to increase labour flexibility.  These include: 
 
1. Direct payment for labour by the company.  By paying women directly for 
loose fruit collection, NBPOL removed much of the uncertainty surrounding 
payment to women when they relied on their husbands to remunerate them 
from the papa cheque.  As pointed out earlier, the other social demands on 
the papa cheque meant that men often found it difficult to retain a portion of 
the monthly cheque for their wives.  Direct payments from the company to 
women removed the uncertainty of payment for women thus enabling a 
labour contract between the company and women to be fulfilled.   
 
2. Cashless transactions are attractive forms of payment for blockholders.  For 
the reasons outlined above, many blockowners are reluctant or unable to pay 
cash for labour.  Yet, most men are willing to place FFB bunches on the 
mama card which they see as their financial contribution to the upkeep of 
the household.  Prior to the introduction of the mama card many men were 
reluctant or unable to hand over a share of the oil palm income to their 
wives and this was the cause of many domestic disputes.  It is much easier 
for men to give FFB to their wives rather than cash because competing 
claims on fruit are virtually absent.  So, the cashless transaction of placing 
FFB on the mama card circumvents the excessive demands on cash, and 
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women are effectively guaranteed a contribution to the household from their 
husbands. 
 
3. Allowed for flexible labour practices and new payment arrangements to 
emerge.  Because of the absence of loan deductions on the mama card, it has 
enabled more flexible labour practices and payment systems to emerge both 
within and between blocks.  Some examples of the labour flexibility 
afforded by the mama card are lending the card to children to pay school 
fees, to visitors for the purchase of travel tickets home, or to help relatives 
out of financial difficulties.  It has also become an important avenue for 
women to organise their own cash and labour transactions.  This not only 
raises women’s social status, but increases oil palm production as inter-
block co-operation in oil palm production rises.  The enhanced labour 
flexibility provided by the scheme has increased smallholders’ motivation to 
produce oil palm as they are now more able to meet their socio-economic 
needs and obligations.   
 
Also, the existence of two payment cards on the one block has opened up 
multiple ways of allocating oil palm income within and between households.  
This has enabled smallholders to tailor their labour and income strategies to 
their own particular situations on the blocks.  This is especially useful to 
smallholders given the complexity and diversity of family situations and 
needs now characterising Hoskins LSS.  In essence, the mama card has 
broadened the range of options and choices open to families and has given 
them greater flexibility in how work and income are allocated, usually in 
ways that have tended to raise smallholder productivity.   
 
8.5.1  A new smallholder initiative – the mobile card 
In reviewing the reasons for the success of the Mama Card we can begin to see 
how the principles of a new payment system that guarantees payment for labour 
and allows for greater labour and payment flexibility might work.  The idea here 
is to introduce an initiative to facilitate across-block labour flexibility to raise 
productivity while at the same time enhancing livelihood opportunities for 
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smallholders, thus ensuring their support for such a scheme.  In terms of a target 
group for this intervention, it is important that potential participants in the 
scheme have the labour capacity to commit fully to the scheme.  The MLFS was 
successful because a previously unremunerated group of people (women) were 
brought into oil palm production.  Another group available to participate in such 
an initiative is the large number of under-employed young men, many of whom 
are the sons of settlers living on highly populated blocks.  For the industry they 
represent an under-utilised resource who, if given the correct incentives, could 
significantly raise smallholder productivity and output. 
 
Despite high levels of under-utilised labour (especially on the LSSs at Hoskins 
and probably Bialla), there is much under-production, particularly on the VOPs.  
The problem is that there is a mismatch between the labour availability on a 
block and the labour demand on a block.  Labour shortages can be ongoing as in 
the case of young families, elderly settlers without sons living on the block, or 
blockowners with multiple blocks or off-block employment.  Labour shortages 
can also be temporary, the result of illness, or, as in the case of coastal VOPs, a 
seasonal abundance of fish or better returns on other cash crops.   
 
One way to correct this mismatch is to encourage greater labour mobility 
between blocks so that under-employed labour on highly populated blocks is 
utilised on labour-short blocks.  Prior to the mama card, some labour mobility 
between blocks occurred in a limited way, mainly within the realm of kinship-
based labour exchange or through the hiring of youth groups.  However, the 
employment of youth groups has been very limited and many groups have 
failed, usually as a result of the labour contract not being fulfilled because of the 
blockholder’s under-payment of hired labour.  The reasons for under-payment 
are the same as those explaining men’s reluctance or inability to pay cash 
income to their wives (Section 8.3.1).   
 
What we envisage is a new harvesting payment card targeted largely at young 
men which differs from the existing mama and papa cards in that it is not tied to 
a particular block.  The new card would be mobile in the sense that it would be 
used as a means of payment for harvesting and block maintenance labour on any 
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LSS or VOP block which requests labour.  Ideally, the mobile card would be in 
the name of an individual person who has ultimate responsibility for the card’s 
use.  This team leader would head a work group of three to eight young men 
with, preferably, each member of the work group from a different block.  The 
team leader would be responsible for negotiating labouring contracts with 
blockowners, and for the remuneration of the work team.  Negotiated contracts 
would be specified in a simple written form signed by the blockowner and team 
leader and lodged with OPIC.  These forms would only be referred to in cases 
where disputes arise between blockowners and the work team. 
 
Payment for the labour of the work team would be in FFB with a specified 
amount or proportion of the harvest weighed on the mobile card.  The remaining 
FFB would be weighed on the blockowner’s papa card in the normal way.  In 
this way the reluctance or inability of blockowners to pay cash for labour is 
circumvented, and the work team is guaranteed timely payment.  Also, because 
the transaction is cashless, this labour arrangement may be much more 
attractive to blockholders because they are not required to outlay any cash in 
advance, nor is it necessary for them to retain a portion of their monthly oil 
palm cheque for the payment of hired labour.  Thus the probability of the 
blockholder not complying with the labour contract is reduced.   
 
For blockholders experiencing labour shortages and VOP smallholders with a 
range of cash crops and subsistence options, the mobile card offers a way to 
significantly increase income without additional inputs of their own labour.  
Also, for smallholders experiencing temporary disruptions to oil palm 
production through illness or cultural proscriptions against working during 
mourning periods, for example, the mobile card offers a means to maintain 
productivity and income. 
 
For the work team, the benefits are likely to be significant, especially if they are 
able to negotiate contracts with VOP blockholders where productivity is lower 
and many blocks are not in production.  A work team of three to eight would be 
able to harvest a block fully in less than half a day.   
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Apart from significant productivity gains in the smallholder sector, a mobile 
card has the potential to deliver considerable social benefits at two levels.  First, 
a substantial proportion of presently under-employed youth in the smallholder 
sector could be brought into oil palm production with significant financial 
rewards for participants and their families.  Second, at a broader level, this 
initiative is likely to contribute to greater social stability at Hoskins (and 
probably Bialla too).  Presently, the numbers of under-employed youth are 
growing and levels of disaffection and alienation are increasing as they become 
more marginalised from the economic benefits that oil palm has brought to the 
province.  The future social sustainability of the scheme relies in part on the 
ability of stakeholders to find meaningful employment for these people.  The 
mobile card would be a step in this direction. 
 
In the longer term, if such a scheme were introduced, it is likely that, like the 
mama card, smallholders would develop new ways to meet their needs that are 
difficult to anticipate.  Many of these would be positive, but as with any new 
introduction there are likely to be some risks.  Such risks may include the 
avoidance of loan deductions, theft of FFB, difficulties of monitoring the 
production of individual blocks, and the possibility that some Mobile 
cardholders would use coercive methods to make unfair contracts with 
blockholders. 
 
Most of these problems could be avoided from the outset by using two card 
imprints on the weigh document: the blockholder’s card imprint alongside the 
imprint of the mobile card.  Blockholders using a mobile card to avoid loan 
deductions would therefore be identified quickly.  This would also reduce 
opportunities for theft of fruit and continue to allow the company and OPIC to 
track the production of individual blocks.  Finally, the use of a simple standard 
contract specifying the terms of the contract signed by the blockholder and team 
leader and lodged with OPIC would discourage misuse of the card. 
 
 199
8.6  Conclusion 
The Mama Lus Frut Scheme has received universal acclaim amongst 
smallholders – wives, husbands and children – and has substantially increased 
revenue for the oil palm companies.  Importantly, it has helped bring into oil 
palm production a large section of the smallholder population that previously 
had only limited involvement in production, which has greatly added to the 
social stability of the schemes.  Levels of domestic disputes and violence have 
fallen and women are much more able to fulfil their roles as wives and mothers.  
Women’s greater economic independence has directly improved smallholder 
output.  Thus, as the MLFS exemplifies, successful interventions that give more 
people access to oil palm income, help to distribute oil palm income more 
widely throughout the community and increase household income security, 
offer households broader choices and enhance social stability.  
 
Further, with greater involvement of women in the industry, the MLFS has 
opened opportunities for women to influence oil palm production and 
agronomic strategies, and it is likely that such change will continue as new 
agro-socioeconomic strategies develop amongst smallholders in response to the 
increased participation of women.  Already, new flexible labour and payment 
practices are emerging as smallholders find ways to use the card to meet their 




Box 8.1. Mama cheque expenditure patterns on Kavui LSS, 
Hoskins 
 
Kavui LSS: Multiple household wok bung 
The mama cheque on this block is rotated and in September 2000, Patricia received 
K290.00.  The money was spent in the following way: 
PMV fares into Kimbe for herself and the family; 
Store bought food – rice, tinned fish and fresh meat; 
Market food; 
Clothes for the children (a pair of long trousers and several shirts); 
A pair of trousers for her husband; 
A sleeping mat for the children; 
Three dinner plates; 
A skirt for herself; 
K9 credit repaid to local tradestore; 




Kavui LSS: Single household wok bung 
In September 2000, Florence received a mama cheque for K84.40.  It was spent as 
follows: 
K20 to her husband; 
K10 to her mother living on a nearby block; 
K20 credit repaid to local tradestore; 
A sleeping mat for her mother-in-law living on the block opposite; 
Store bought food – rice, tinned fish, tea and biscuits. 




Kavui LSS: Single household wok bung 
In October, Maria received a mama cheque for K150.  Most was shared with kin in 
the following way: 
K50 given to a female relative for helping with the collection of loose fruit; 
K25 given to first born son. 






Box 8.2  The mama card and new income flows, Kavui LSS, 
Hoskins 
Twenty six people (seven households) live on this block.  The block practises a 
rotation (markim mun) production system for both the mama and the papa card.  
The women on the block pointed out that with so many households on the block, 
the mama card has helped with increasing the flow of money and store bought 
foods among the women on the block.  Women now have access not only to their 
own mama cheque, but can call on other women on the block for a small share of 
their mama cheque if they are short of cash.  This money is usually repaid.  The 
women talked in terms of this increased flow of money and food as helping them 
better meet their domestic and social obligations.   Before the introduction of the 
mama card the women relied solely on gardens as their source of income.  
Because of the large number of households on the block, women continue to rely 
heavily on gardening for both household consumption and for cash income.  





Box 8.3.  OPIC Mama Lus Frut Meeting, Galai LSS, 
Hoskins 
 
Mama Lus Frut meeting at Galai, Section 2 
Meeting conducted by OPIC: Divisional Manager, one male extension officer, two 
female OPIC extension officers and the LPC Mama Lus Frut representative.  
 
The senior female extension officer, Elizabeth, began the meeting.  She told the 
women she had two main points to cover:  
1.   FFB being placed on the mama card.   
2.   Bank accounts for women.  
 
Elizabeth mentioned that the company and OPIC were concerned that the mama 
card had been used on some blocks to weigh most of the FFB bunches.  The men 
were using the mama card to avoid deductions on their papa card.  She told the 
women that the mama card would be suspended on those blocks abusing the 
system.  Elizabeth added that this would only occur on those blocks with outstanding 
loans.  She emphasised that the weight on the mama card cannot exceed that on the 
papa card if there is debt on the block, but also reassured women that if there were 
no debt on their block, then it was acceptable to place some FFB on the card.   
 
Elizabeth (LPC woman Representative) also made her position clear to the women.  
She told the women that ‘olgeta wari na hevi bilong yu, i mas kam pastaim long mi.  
Mi mausmeri bilong yupela’.  She told the women that if the men insisted on placing 
bunches on their net they should report this to the OPIC officers.  The women at the 
meeting appeared pleased with what they were hearing.  They agreed to the idea of 
suspending the mama card and believed it would teach men a lesson.  One woman 
said it would also teach some women a lesson not to let their husbands take control 
of the mama card.  As the discussion broadened, many women raised a common 
‘wori’ that their sons were often the ones that abused the mama card.  One women 
told how at the last harvest, her son gave the mama card to the next block.  She was 
unaware what had happened.  She told the officers that she is now interested in 
opening her own bank account so the money can be deposited directly in her 
account.   
 
The OPIC officers then talked about the plans to have more women open bank 
accounts for direct credit into their accounts and discussed in detail what the women 
must do to open an account.  After the meeting, women who were interested in 
opening a bank account gave their names to the OPIC officers.  They also thanked 
the OPIC officers for conducting the meeting and mentioned that would they like 








1. We are not referring here to those who are attempting to abuse the system, by 








CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
9.0  Conclusion 
Over the last decade there have been large increases in smallholder production 
associated with the expansion of smallholder oil palm.  However, improving 
smallholder productivity remains a major challenge for the industry.  
Smallholder productivity per hectare is much lower than that of the estate 
plantations, and VOP productivity is consistently lower than the LSSs.  The 
lower productivity of smallholders is attributable to: 
• under-harvesting; 
• lack of fertiliser use; 
• poor block maintenance; 
• low replanting rates. 
 
This research has shown that underlying these production issues are a complex 
set of socio-economic factors that interact to influence production and help 
explain the lower productivity of smallholders.  The key factors identified as 
affecting smallholder productivity include: 
 
Alternative economic and social activities of smallholders 
A key finding of this study is that smallholders pursue a diverse range of 
livelihood strategies in addition to oil palm.  The range of non-oil palm 
economic and social activities allows smallholders some flexibility and greater 
household economic and social security in the face of fluctuating commodity 
prices (Chapter 3).  As the study revealed, smallholders, especially VOP 
smallholders, shift in and out of oil palm production depending on household 
needs and circumstances, relative returns on oil palm and alternative income 
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sources, and general level of commitment to oil palm.  Non-oil palm activities, 
however, are only a problem for the industry when they constrain labour 
availability for oil palm harvesting or act as a disincentive to long-term 
investment in the block.  On the more populated blocks, especially the multiple 
household rotation (markim mun) blocks, non-oil palm activities provide an 
essential supplementary income.  Because of the larger numbers of people 
residing on these blocks, supplementary income sources are unlikely to lead to 
labour shortages for oil palm.  Indeed, on the more populated blocks there is 
often under-employed labour despite diversification into non-oil palm income 
generating activities.  
 
Under-harvesting resulting from alternative demands on labour is more likely to 
occur on single household blocks and VOP blocks.  VOP landowners with an 
adequate subsistence base (more land) are under less economic pressure than 
LSS settlers to harvest oil palm.  Moreover, their incentive to invest in oil palm 
(e.g., replanting and hiring labour) is also likely to be lower than that of LSS 
settlers, and non-oil palm labour demands probably have higher priority than on 
the LSS schemes.   
 
Population and economic pressures on the LSSs 
Chapter 4 revealed that population density is increasing steadily on the older 
LSS schemes as second generation settlers marry, have children and remain 
living on the block as their other residence options such as returning “home” or 
buying land become more constrained through time.  Consequently, the single 
household block is being replaced by the multiple household block.  Potential 
harvesting labour has increased with population growth, and on some multiple 
household blocks this has translated into consistently high levels of production.  
However, for other multiple household blocks, especially rotation (markim mun) 
blocks, population and economic stresses are adversely affecting oil palm 
productivity.  On rotation (markim mun) blocks, there is a higher probability of 
inter-household disputes occurring which can disrupt harvesting and lead to the 
withdrawal of some harvesting labour.  Also, there is an expectation on these 
blocks that labour remuneration should be commensurate with labour input, 
and, compared with VOP and single household blocks, there is limited in-kind 
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payment for labour.  As discussed below, because of the excessive demands on 
cash on paydays, payments for labour on the more populated blocks are 
sometimes not made, leading to disputes and disruptions to oil palm production. 
 
The populated rotation (markim mun) blocks, may be less productive than 
populated wok bung blocks because there are fewer block residents involved in 
each harvest round and there is a higher probability that block maintenance will 
be neglected and replanting delayed.  The economic pressures on highly 
populated blocks work in several ways to affect production.  For instance, the 
economic pressure to harvest may be driving regular harvesting on some 
populated blocks, but at the same time, the short-term need for cash may also be 
discouraging long-term investment such as replanting which would lower 
income in the short-term.  As noted below, the short-term cash needs of 
smallholders have implications for how initiatives to improve grower 
productivity are designed and implemented. 
 
Under-utilisation of available labour 
As the discussion of the Mama Lus Frut Scheme illustrates (Chapter 8), low 
rates of loose fruit collection by women prior to the scheme were the result of 
limited and/or uncertain remuneration of their labour by their husbands.  The 
reluctance or inability of men to pass on some of the income to their wives was 
mainly due to the numerous demands on the monthly oil palm cheque such as 
debt repayments, credit repayments at tradestores, money owing to hired 
labourers, the financial demands of immediate and extended family, and the 
social pressures on men to gamble and participate in beer drinking parties.  
Often these short-term cash demands greatly exceeded the value of the cheque 
with the result that women were often inadequately remunerated for their 
labour.  This was a frequent cause of domestic disputes and led many women to 
withdraw their labour from oil palm production.  
 
Non-compliance with a “labour contract” because of delayed, partial or non-
payment of labour is often the cause of disputes which can lead to the 
withdrawal of labour, disruptions to harvesting, or a shift in production 
strategies from shared (wok bung) harvesting to rotation (markim mun) 
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harvesting.  In the latter’s case, if income disputes remain unresolved, then a 
household may harvest alone as members of co-resident households withdraw 
labour.  This can lead to the paradoxical situation on highly populated blocks 
where there is under-employed labour while there are labour shortages for 
harvesting.   
 
Land Disputes 
Disputes over land tenure occur at a variety of scales: landowner claims for 
compensation for land alienated for LSSs and private plantations (and potential 
future conflicts between customary landowners and company development of 
mini-estates); the rising incidence of disputed ownership of oil palm blocks 
“purchased” by settlers from customary landowners; and, intra-family disputes 
over individual block titles, especially over inheritance.  Land disputes lower 
smallholder productivity by removing oil palm stands from production, 
impeding long-term investment in oil palm (e.g., replanting), undermining 
smallholder confidence in and commitment to the industry, and creating social 
instability. 
 
The maintenance of social stability in the smallholder sector is a crucial issue.  
Social instability whether in the form of landowner-settler conflicts or inter- and 
intra-household block disputes sometimes lead to major disruptions to oil palm 
production.  Social instability is also a disincentive to smallholder investment 
thereby reducing long-term productivity.  The social environment is therefore a 
critical production factor in that stable and cohesive families and communities 
help build an environment in which oil palm production can be maintained and 
increased.  Hence, identifying ways to facilitate social stability in the 
smallholder sector is at least as equally important as more direct agronomic 
strategies to raise grower productivity.   
 
9.1  Finding Solutions 
The above discussion suggests that if extensions efforts to raise smallholder 
productivity are to be successful, they must acknowledge that the smallholder 
sector is now comprised of complex social and economic units employing a 
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range of strategies to maintain livelihoods, of which oil palm is one.  The oil 
palm block managed by the single nuclear household is no longer common and 
is rapidly giving way to complex multiple household blocks on the older 
schemes.  As a consequence of these socio-economic and demographic changes, 
economic diversification is occurring and new oil palm labour arrangements, 
harvesting practices and methods of distributing income are emerging. 
 
 
What is also clear from this study is that smallholders are not passive acceptors 
of change, and nor are they conservative and resistant to change.  Smallholders 
may be considered to be risk averse, for example, with regard to their reluctance 
to replant, but there is considerable evidence that smallholders are active agents 
of change.  They are certainly innovators, keen to identify and develop 
opportunities and industry initiatives that they see as enhancing livelihood 
security (e.g., the Mama Lus Frut Scheme).   
 
Before summarising the recommendations of this study and outlining possible 
future smallholder interventions for the industry it is worthwhile to explore 
briefly why and how smallholders adopt new extension services or farming 
practices.  One way of analysing the success or otherwise of industry and OPIC 
initiatives is in terms of their compatibility with smallholder livelihood 
strategies.  As described in Chapters 3 and 4, smallholders pursue a range of 
livelihood opportunities alongside oil palm production to enhance household 
economic and social security and ensure household well-being.  Some extension 
interventions can be viewed as strengthening or adding to smallholder 
livelihood strategies, others may be judged by smallholders as incompatible or a 
threat to livelihood strategies, while some interventions may be perceived to 
have a neutral effect.   
 
This study suggests that in a process of weighing up an intervention, 
smallholders are often focusing on how a potential intervention fits into and 
strengthens their existing livelihood strategies and objectives.  This assessment 
can be in terms of how a potential intervention reduces risks (e.g., income, food 
and land insecurity) and how it expands opportunities (e.g., new mechanisms of 
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income distribution, broader choices and promotes social harmony).  For 
example, VOP expansion in Popondetta is eagerly embraced by villagers as 
most see the additional income and further diversification of their cash crop 
holdings as strengthening their economic well-being.  Replanting at Hoskins 
and Popondetta, on the other hand, is viewed by many smallholders as 
undermining their income and food security in the short-term, and thus poses a 
difficult barrier for the industry to overcome.   
 
Table 9.1 uses the concept of compatibility with livelihood strategies to assess 
the acceptance and success of three smallholder interventions: the Mama Lus 
Frut Scheme, replanting and the LSS six hectare infill policy.  As outlined in the 
previous chapter, the mama card was eagerly adopted because it widened the 
range of options and choices available to households and therefore was 
perceived to be adding to or enhancing household livelihood strategies.  
Replanting is more difficult to promote because in the short-term it is 
considered by smallholders to undermine livelihood strategies by increasing 
short-term risks and vulnerability.  The six hectare infill policy, although being 
taken up by some leaseholders of the larger LSS blocks (> 6 hectares), is not an 
attractive option for many LSS smallholders. 
 
Table 9.1. Acceptance and resistance of smallholder interventions 
MAMA LUS FRUIT REPLANTING 6 HECTARE INFILL 
POLICY 
• increases income and 
economic security 
• increases range of 
production and income 
strategies for households 
• promotes a harmonious 
social environment 
• increases options and 
choices available to families 
• strengthens people’s 
capacity to meet their needs 
• compatible with overall 
livelihood strategies 
short-term 
• reduces income  
• increases economic 
insecurity through higher 
debt levels 
• can increase insecurity of 
tenure 
• increases risks, therefore 
incompatible with 
livelihood strategies 
• reduces options and choices 
to households 
 
• reduces options and choices 
available to some  
households 
• reduces food security 
• reduces access to gardening 
land and increases reliance 
on off-block garden land 
• undermines people’s 
capacity to meet their daily 
needs 
• incompatible with 
livelihood strategies 
• more vulnerable to impacts 
of falling oil palm prices 
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Industry initiatives perceived to conflict with or undermine livelihood security 
are therefore much less likely to be adopted by smallholders.  For the oil palm 
industry seeking to increase smallholder productivity, it would be worthwhile to 
evaluate the potential of new smallholder initiatives in terms of their short and 
long-term impacts on existing livelihood strategies.  This means adopting a 
broader perspective on smallholders rather than focusing solely on oil palm.  
Understanding how the range of smallholder livelihood strategies interact to 
enhance household economic and social security will provide insights into how 
particular interventions are likely to be received by growers.  Where a potential 
conflict is identified between livelihood security and a new initiative, steps 
could be taken to address this conflict so that smallholders’ adoption rate of new 
initiatives is increased.  Finally, by recognising the diverse circumstances of 
block residents (e.g., single and multiple household blocks and caretakers), and 
therefore that smallholders pursue different combinations of livelihood 
strategies, extension efforts in the smallholder sector could be better tailored to 
meet the individual circumstances of smallholder households. 
 
Using the concept of compatibility with livelihood strategies as a means to 
assess the appropriateness of industry and OPIC interventions is not to suggest 
that some initiatives such as replanting should be abandoned.  For a household’s 
long-term economic and social security replanting is necessary.  Rather, the 
concept of livelihood compatibility, enables the identification of likely 
difficulties and obstacles to the introduction of potential interventions, and 
therefore allows extension efforts to incorporate these considerations into the 
design of extension strategies.  At another level, companies can build on 
households’ livelihood strategies to facilitate the introduction of smallholder 
interventions.  For example, encouraging VOP smallholders to replant during 
high prices of other commodity cash crops they control, or encouraging the 
cultivation of profitable garden crops such as tobacco, peanuts or pineapples as 
income substitutes may improve the uptake rate of replanting packages.   
 
Finally, the concept of livelihood compatibility for designing smallholder 
interventions draws attention to some key issues that should be considered in 
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the planning of any company or OPIC initiative in the smallholder sector.  Apart 
from maintaining a high level of participation of smallholders in the design and 
development of new initiatives, as far as possible, initiatives should seek to: 
• increase incomes and well-being; 
• promote sustainable livelihoods through increasing household choices 
and food and income security; 
• strengthen people’s capacities to meet their basic needs; 
• contribute to a stable social environment; 
• facilitate the distribution of income within and between households; 
• not undermine security of land tenure and access to gardening land; 
• avoid creating inequitable access to income or resources (e.g., land); 
and 
• be compatible with household livelihood strategies aimed at 
maintaining economic and social well-being. 
 
9.2  Recommendations 
The main recommendations of the study have been discussed in detail in the 
relevant chapters of this report (Chapters 4.3, 6.4, 7.7 and 8.5).  The 
recommendations aim to increase smallholder productivity, engender 
smallholder support for the companies, OPIC and the industry more generally, 
and thus contribute to the long-term social and economic sustainability of the 
smallholder sector.  The key recommendations are to: 
 
1. introduce a more flexible payment system to increase the participation 
rate in the industry of under-employed youth – mobile card (Chapter 
8.5.1); 
2. develop supplementary income sources that do not lessen the viability 
of oil palm production (Chapters 4.3, 7.7); 
3. maintain and enhance food security (Chapters 4.3, 7.7); 
4. address land tenure issues (Chapter 6.4); 
5. provide incentives for replanting (Chapter 7.7); 
6. broaden the focus of field days to include family planning and advice 
on banking and budgeting (Chapter 4.3); 
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7. evaluate new industry initiatives in the smallholder sector in terms of 
their impacts on livelihood strategies. 
 
9.2.1 Introduce a more flexible payment system – the mobile card 
Smallholder productivity and total production would be increased significantly 
with the introduction of a new harvesting card (the “mobile” card) designed to 
facilitate labour mobility between blocks (Chapter 8.5.1).  Rather than being 
tied to a particular block like the papa and mama cards, the mobile card would 
be used as a payment mechanism for hired labour on any LSS or VOP block 
requiring labour.  Because the blockowner hiring labour would pay in fruit (a 
share of the harvest), the reluctance or inability of blockowners to fulfil the 
labour contract by paying cash for labour is overcome.   
 
The target of such an initiative would be the large group of presently under-
employed young men, many of whom are settlers’ sons residing on highly 
populated blocks.  Youth groups of three to eight young men would be 
encouraged to form.  Each group would be headed by a team leader in whose 
name the mobile card would be issued and who would be responsible for the 
card’s use.  Payment for labour would be in FFB by weight or proportion of the 
crop harvested agreed with the blockowner.  Thus, youth groups would be 
guaranteed payment for their labour, unlike the present situation where 
uncertainty of payment is a major disincentive to labour mobility. 
 
Discussion with VOP and LSS smallholders at Hoskins reveal considerable 
interest and support for such an initiative.  Indications of support were from 
both young men and blockowners who would be likely to employ such groups.  
A mobile card has the potential to lead to significant productivity increases in 
the smallholder sector.  The financial rewards for the company and smallholders 
are therefore likely to be substantial.  There are also likely to be considerable 
social benefits for the scheme more generally as an increasingly under-
employed and alienated group of young men are brought into production. 
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9.2.2  Develop supplementary income sources 
With population growth smallholders are diversifying their income sources in 
the pursuit of livelihood opportunities to ameliorate the impacts of declining per 
capita incomes from oil palm.  Income diversification is therefore likely to 
continue with population growth. 
 
Income diversification is positively associated with population density which 
suggests that the development of supplementary income sources is not drawing 
labour away from oil palm production.  Therefore, the industry should not view 
these developments as a threat to labour supply in the smallholder sector, but as 
a new stage in the evolution of these schemes.  As generational changes lead to 
more complex social and economic units, there are opportunities for the 
industry to capitalise on these changes if social stability can be maintained and 
new ways are sought to tap under-utilised labour to raise smallholder 
productivity.  The proposed introduction of a mobile card is an example of the 
latter (Section 9.2.1).   
 
Further, we recommend that the industry as a whole encourage and promote 
successful initiatives that emerge from smallholders themselves.  Diversification 
through cash cropping (e.g., vanilla, betel nut), small businesses, profitable 
market garden crops and animal husbandry are potential supplementary sources 
of income that would be most helpful for highly populated blocks and those 
undertaking replanting (Chapter 3.1).  As outlined in Chapter 7.7, the 
development of supplementary incomes would increase the propensity of 
smallholders to replant and allow them to develop a long-term perspective on 
oil palm production.  Further income diversification through the promotion of 
small business development would also add to household income security. 
 
Income diversification has a positive influence on the social sustainability of the 
schemes by lessening the social and economic pressures that lead to conflict and 
social instability.  This was clearly an outcome of the Mama Lus Frut scheme 
where many women (and men) reported significant improvements in social 
relationships within the household, particularly between husbands and wives.   
 
 214
9.2.3  Maintain and enhance food security 
A key finding of this study is that garden food production is very important to 
LSS and VOP smallholders in terms of labour demands and food consumption 
(Chapter 4.3).  Garden produce is also an important supplementary income for 
women and residents of highly populated blocks.  Access to food gardens 
reduces smallholders’ vulnerability to fluctuating oil palm prices and increases 
food security.  The importance of gardens for food security is reflected by the 
dominance of garden foods in diets, especially for LSS settlers.  More than 
three-quarters of all meals at Kavui LSS consist entirely of food garden 
ingredients, and store food consumption among LSS settlers is concentrated 
within the first week of the monthly oil palm cheque.  Thus, a reassessment of 
OPIC’s 6 hectare infill policy is strongly recommended.  Moreover, after 20 
years of intensive cultivation of the rear 2 hectares of garden land on LSS 
blocks, the industry should consider new initiatives to improve the soil fertility 
of garden land.  Several suggestions for raising soil fertility are described in 
Chapter 4.3.2.   
 
9.2.4  Land tenure issues 
Land disputes and insecure land tenure are critical production issues as they 
reduce smallholder productivity by removing disputed stands of oil palm from 
production, disrupting oil palm work, undermining growers’ confidence and 
commitment to the industry and discouraging long-term investment such as 
replanting.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 6.4, devising effective strategies to address these issues 
will be a major challenge for the industry, particularly disputes between 
landowners and settlers.  However, disputed block “ownership” arising from 
contested inheritance claims, or disputes between caretakers and leaseholders, 
could be resolved more quickly than they are currently by maintaining an up-to-
date register of block “ownership”.  Hoskins OPIC has commenced this process 
and we recommend that other schemes follow suit. 
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Much more problematic for the industry are the macro-level disputes between 
customary landowners and settlers when whole subdivisions are locked out of 
production during conflicts.  An added risk here is that intimidation of settlers 
by landowners will become institutionalised as is almost the case in Popondetta 
where settlers are unable to diversify their incomes or invest in their blocks for 
fear of violent harassment by customary landowners.  Landowner-settler 
disputes are ultimately dependent for their resolution on a political solution, 
which appears unlikely in the foreseeable future.  In the short-term, however, 
OPIC and the companies may have a role in bringing together leaders from both 
communities for mediation/resolution of localised incidences of conflict before 
they erupt in widespread communal violence. 
 
9.2.5  Provide incentives for replanting 
Smallholders’ propensity to replant is influenced by tenure security, existing 
and projected debt levels, income foregone, quality of road infrastructure and 
the reliability of harvest pickups (Chapter 7.7).  The relative importance of these 
factors varies between Popondetta and Hoskins and between the larger LSS 
holdings of oil palm and two hectare VOP holdings.  Amongst the more 
important recommendations discussed in Chapter 7.7 are: 
• extending credit for replanting to Popondetta smallholders beyond 2001; 
• lowering rates of loan repayments during periods of depressed oil palm 
prices; 
• promoting income diversification; 
• encouraging smallholders to cultivate profitable market crops on newly 
replanted blocks to provide income until new palms come into production; 
and 
• investigate replanting strategies that do not take a full 2 ha of oil palm out of 
production at the same time. 
 
9.2.6  Banking/budgeting 
The companies at both Hoskins and Popondetta are switching from cheque 
payments to smallholders to direct credit of smallholders’ bank accounts.  OPIC 
is assisting smallholders to open bank accounts in preparation for this change, 
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but many smallholders, particularly women, have little or no experience of 
banking or budgeting using bank accounts (Chapter 4.3).  Bank staff should be 
encouraged to participate in OPIC organised field days to advise on bank 
services and budgeting, given that a large and growing number of their 
customers are smallholders.  
 
9.2.7  Family planning 
Finally, much of the change in the smallholder sector documented in this study 
is either directly or indirectly a consequence of population growth (Chapter 
4.2.2).  The available evidence suggests that population growth rates are 
increasing on the LSSs as the option of returning “home” is becoming more 
constrained by time and distance, and as population pressure at “home” makes 
village relatives less willing to accept the return of long-term absentees. 
 
It must be stressed that in the light of continued population growth the 
recommendations contained in this report do not provide permanent solutions; 
at most, they offer some breathing space.  Without broader regional and national 
development to absorb the expanding numbers of people on the LSS schemes 
(and from many other densely populated regions of PNG), this breathing space 
will be very short.  Therefore, in the absence of any significant level of national 
development to generate sufficient employment for the rural under-employed, 
effective family planning strategies are urgently required for the longer term 
social and economic sustainability of the smallholder oil palm sector.  Family 
planning in the smallholder sector should be a priority of all stakeholders in the 
industry.  Family planning officers from the Health department should 




ADS (PNG). 2001.  Study of the Smallholder Oil Palm Sector.  Achievements 
and Potential for Future Development, Port Moresby, Papua New 
Guinea. 
 
Benjamin, C. 1977.  A survey of food gardens in the Hoskins Oil Palm Scheme, 
Papua New Guinea Agricultural Journal 28(2-4), 57-71. 
 
Campbell, C.T. 1994.  Hoskins (West Nakanai) Oil Palm Scheme.  Report Into 
Low Production in the Smallholder Sector and Remedies Available.  West 
New Britain, Papua New Guinea. 
 
Carrier, J.G and Carrier, A. H. 1989.  Wage, Trade and Exchange in Melanesia.  
A Manus Society in the Modern State.  University of California Press, 
Berkely.  
 
Carswell, G. 1997.  Agricultural intensification and rural sustainable 
Livelihoods: a “think piece”, IDS Working Paper, No. 64. 
 
Chambers, R. and Conway, R. 1992.  Sustainable rural livelihoods: practical 
concepts for the 21st Century, IDS Discussion Paper, No. 296. 
 
Cheetham, R.J. 1963.  The development of indigenous agriculture, land 
settlement and rural credit facilities in Papua and New Guinea, Papua and 
New Guinea Agricultural Journal 15(3& 4), 67-78. 
 
Christensen, J. 1986.  The development of the oil palm industry in Papua New 
Guinea: past present and future, Harvest 11(4), 136-141. 
 
Crocombe, R. (ed) 1971.  Land Tenure in the Pacific, Oxford University Press,  
Melbourne.   
 
Curry, G. & Koczberski, G. 1999.  The risks and uncertainties of migration: an 
exploration of recent trends amongst the Wosera Abelam of Papua New 
Guinea, Oceania 70(2), 130-145. 
 
Dalzell, P.J. & Wright, A. 1990. Analysis of catch data from an artisanal coral 
reef fishery in the Tigak Islands, Papua New Guinea, Papua New Guinea 
Journal of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 35(1-4), 23-36. 
 
de Janvry, A. & Sadoulet, E. 2001.  Income strategies among rural households 
in Mexico: the role of off-farm activities, World Development 29(3), 467-
480. 
 
Duncan, R. and Duncan, R. 1997.  Improving security of access to customary-
owned land in Melanesia: mining in Papua New Guinea, in P. Lamour 
(ed), The Governance of Common Property in the Pacific Region, 
National Centre for Development Studies, The Australian National 
University, Canberra. p73-88. 
 
 218
Ellis, F. 2000.  Rural Livelihoods and Diversity in Developing Countries.  
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Goddard, M. 2001.  From rolling thunder to reggae: imagining squatter 
settlements in Papua New Guinea, The Contemporary Pacific, 13, 1-32. 
 
Grieve, R.B. 1986.  The oil palm industry of Papua New Guinea. Australian 
Geographer, 17, 72-76. 
 
Hulme, D. 1984.  Land Settlement Schemes and Rural Development in Papua 
New Guinea, Unpublished PhD thesis, James Cook University, 
Queensland.   
 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 1965.  The Economic 
Development of the Territory of Papua New Guinea.  John Hopkins Press, 
Baltimore. 
 
Jonas, W.J. 1972.  Timber production in the Hoskins area, in J.P. Longayroux, 
Fleming, T. Ploeg, A., Shand, R.T., Straatmans, W.F. and Jonas, W. (eds), 
Hoskins Development: The Role of Oil Palm and Timber, New Guinea 
Research Bulletin No. 49, Australian National University, Canberra, 
p153-72.   
 
Jones, L. T. and McGavin, P.A. 2001.  Land Mobilisation in Papua New 
Guinea.  Asia Pacific Press, The Australian National University, 
Canberra. 
 
Kalit, K. and Young E. 1997.  Common property conflict and resolution 
Aboriginal Australia and Papua New Guinea, in P. Lamour (ed), The 
Governance of Common Property in the Pacific Region, National Centre 
for Development Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra. 
p183-208. 
 
Kameata, R. 2001.  Using land groups in resource development.  Focus, Post 
Courier, Wednesday, 18th April, 2001. 
 
Kean, P. 2000.  Economic development in the Siki settlement scheme, West 
New Britain, Critique of Anthropology 20(2), 153-172. 
 
Keig, G. 2001.  Rural population growth in Papua New Guinea between 1980 
and 1990.  Asia Pacific Viewpoint 42(2/3), 255-268. 
 
King, G. A., Lewis, F.J. and Yambun, J.J. 1998.  Adoption of fertiliser by 
smallholders in West New Britain, paper presented at the International Oil 
Palm Conference Nusa Dua, Bali, September 23-25. 
 
Koczberski, G. and Curry, C. 2000.  Improving the productivity of the 
smallholder oil palm sector in Papua New Guinea: a study of bio-physical 
and socio-economic interactions.  Draft discussion paper presented to the 
 219
Scientific Advisory Committee to the Papua New Guinea Oil Palm 
Research Association, Dami Research Station, 18th October. 
 
Koczberski, G. Curry, G.N. & Connell, J. 2001.  Full circle or Spiralling out of 
control? State violence and the control of urbanisation in Papua New 
Guinea, Urban Studies 38(11), 2017-2036. 
 
Konimor, J. 1991.  Report on visit to Milne Bay Estates and Higaturu Oil Palm 
Pty Ltd.  Dami Research Station, West New Britain. 
 
Landell Mills Ltd. 1991.  Smallholder Oil Palm Productivity Study, Volume 1: 
Main Report, Bath, United Kingdom. 
 
Leach, J.R. and Benjamin M. 1984.  West Nakanai Oil Palm Scheme.  Advisory 
and Agronomic Report No. 12.  1984. 
 
Levantis, T. 2000.  Papua New Guinea: Employment, Wages and Economic 
Development.  Asia Pacific Press and Institute of National Affairs, 
Canberra/Port Moresby.   
 
Lewis, F. 2000.  The ‘Lus Frut Mama’ Scheme: Developing Opportunities for 
Women in Agriculture.  An Initiative of the OPIC Hoskins Project and 
New Britain Palm Oil Limited, unpublished report, OPIC, Kimbe, Papua 
New Guinea. 
 
Longayroux, J. P. 1972.  Hoskins Oil Palm Project: an introduction, in J.P. 
Longayroux, Fleming, T. Ploeg, A., Shand, R.T., Straatmans, W.F. and 
Jonas, W. (eds), Hoskins Development: The Role of Oil Palm and Timber, 
New Guinea Research Bulletin No. 49, Australian National University, 
Canberra, p1.-6. 
 
New Britain Palm Oil Limited. 1999.  Prospectus. 
 
Oil Palm Industry Corporation of Papua New Guinea. 1998.  Five Year 
Strategic Plan 1999-2003 and Five Year Business Plan 1999-2003.  Port 
Moresby. 
 
Overfield, D. 1998.  An investigation of the household economy: coffee 
production and gender relations in Papua New Guinea. Journal of 
Development Studies 34(5), 52-72. 
 
PNG Oil Palm Producers Association. 1998.  PNG Oil Palm Producers 
Association Yearbook., Farmset Limited, Goroka. 
 
Ploeg, A. 1972.  Sociological aspects of Kapore settlement, in J.P. Longayroux, 
Fleming, T. Ploeg, A., Shand, R.T. , Straatmans, W.F. and Jonas, W. 
(eds),  Hoskins Development: The Role of Oil Palm and Timber, New 





Reardon, T. 1997.  Using evidence of household income diversification to 
inform study of the rural nonfarm labour market in Africa, World 
Development 25(5), 735-747.   
 
Reason, P. 1998.  Three approaches to participatory inquiry, in Denzin, N.K. & 
Lincoln, Y. (eds), Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry, Sage Publication, 
California, p261-291.   
 
Turner, P.D. & Benjamin, M. 1982.  West Nakanai Oil Palm Scheme.  Advisory 
and Agronomic Report No. 10-1982.  December 1982. 
 
Turner, P.D. and Leach, J.R. 1980.  West Nakanai Oil Palm Scheme.  Advisory 
and Agronomic Report No. 7 -1979.  January, 1980. 
 
Ward, R.G. & Kingdon, E. (eds)  1995.  Land, Custom and Practice in the 
South Pacific, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne. 
 
Zimmer-Tamokoshi, L. 1997.  Everyone (or no one) is a winner: Gende 
compensation ethics and practices, in, S. Toft, (ed), Compensation for 
Resource Development in Papua New Guinea.  Law Reform Commission 
of Papua New Guinea and Resource Management in Asia and the Pacific, 












The primary objective of the Hoskins projects is to create employment and income generating 
opportunities for the farm families and their communities to improve their general livelihood.  It 
would be attained by implementing project programs especially through: 
 
a) Increasing oil palm plantings by smallholders in the planned period to boost production 
and employment in the area.  It will be achieved through developing a potential 5,000 
hectares to be planted consisting of: 
 
• LSS top up, plantings of existing LSS blocks.  It entails planting up a full 6 hectares on the 
6.5 hectare blocks instead of 4 hectares.  A lot of blocks are 6 hectares but the extra two 
hectares are old palms which growers were told to poison. 
 
By targeting the remaining senile palms for poisoning and replanting with new planting 
material the growers income will increase dramatically.  Other blocks which are not using 
the spare two hectares will be encouraged to plant, either by the lessee or his children 
(this could see the introduction of the “C” harvest card system). 
 
Of the 1,645 LSS blocks an average of 4.66 ha/block is planted (7,74 ha).  If this can be 
raised to an average of 5.5 ha block a further 1,300 ha could be planted. 
 
• VOP, potential large areas for new plantings available as the interest is good for over 
3,000 ha development.  However, all require good access roads which will need funding. 
 
b) Use of present resources for efficiency to maximise returns from oil palm growing and 
better management of related enterprises.  This could be attained through: 
 
c) Better management of existing blocks and plantings to increase yields per hectare from 
15 tonnes in 1997 with good acceptance of fertiliser and reasonable seasons it is 
planned to increase this to 18.5 tonnes per ha by 2003.   
 
This is achievable by: 
• Planting with better yielding planting materials to revitalise lower producing blocks. 
• Introducing the “B” card or “Loose Fruit Mama” initiative, it is estimated that almost 
half the present loose fruit is not reaching the mills. 
• Introducing the “C” card system.  Children can plant their own oil palm on their 
parents blocks and receive income. 
 
d) Existing roads, people living along existing roads but have not planted oi palm will be 
identified and introduce oil palm planting. 
 
e) Mini Estates, is seen as one of the potential new initiatives by companies and growers in 
WNBP to boost smallholder oil palm expansion.  It gives the opportunity to open up more 
areas to smallholders which would expand the involvement of OPIC services in Hoskins 
in the medium to long term. 
 
f) Staff, OPIC personnel vary from excellent to very poor in their productivity or 
performance.  The move away from the public service attitude of “job for life” mentality 
must be continued.  With better training and job attitude change, OPIC would be 
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screening staff to retain those performing and weed out non-performers.  This would 
eventuate a situation where OPIC will increase extension officer to farmer ratio from 




The key objective of the project is the enhancement of smallholder oil palm growing in the 
Bialla project area which would lead to improving the general livelihood of the farm families 
and its surrounding communities.  This objective will be achieved by: 
 
a) Providing efficient extension services to make farmers productive and become managers 
of oil palm growing and diversified enterprises. 
 
b) Better staff development and training programs will improve the performance of each 
staff and will have the capacity to develop productive farming communities. 
 
c) Increase area under smallholder oil palm from 9,279 at present to about 11,000 with 
possible VOP expansion by 2003.   
 
d) Co-ordinate oil palm growing activities to achieve yield per hectare of about 20 tonnes by 
2003. 
 
e) Bialla project will be self-supporting in funding its operations with expected OPIC levy of 
K1.4 million (K3.50 per tonne from smallholder and equal amount from companies). 
 
f) Trim Bialla project staff strength by increasing extension officer to farmer ratio from 




The general objectives of the Popondetta and the Oro Expansion projects are to enhance 
smallholder oil palm fruit production as the means to generate employment, incomes and 
improve overall livelihood of farm families and their surrounding communities.  These will be 
attained by the following: 
 
a) Facilitate and assist smallholders to become efficient producers so as to enhance their 
livelihood through being better business managers as oil palm growers and associated 
enterprises. 
 
b) Facilitate for OPIC staff to become a competent and productive service provider to the 
smallholder through better co-ordinated staff development and training programs. 
 
c) Area under smallholder oil palm would be over 13,285 hectares by 2003, which 
comprises of Popondetta, 6,285 ha and Oro Expansion 7,000 ha. 
 
d) Manage extension programs to improve smallholder productivity levels through efficient 
fertiliser application programs, provision of tools and produce 166,788 tonnes of fruit by 
2003 from the current 96,000 tonnes a year. 
 
e) Improve monitoring of fruit harvesting, collection and facilitate with HTPL and private fruit 




The main objective of the project is that of creating employment, incomes and better the 
livelihood of farm families engaged in oil palm growing and for the surrounding communities.  
This would be attained by successfully implementing project plans and programs to: 
 




b) Project staff development and empowerment for them to improve performance 
especially, extension service delivery systems. 
 
c) Improve and maintain infrastructural development, especially the maintenance of harvest 




Clearly, like the other projects its objective is to provide employment and income earning 
opportunities for those in the scheme and for those surrounding communities.  This would be 
attained by: 
 
a) Providing more efficient smallholder training on the aspects of managing an oil palm 
growing enterprise and associated business management. 
 
b) Improving yield levels from the present 8 tonnes per hectare to 15 tonnes. 
 
c) Expanding smallholder oil palm plantings to reach about 1,025 ha by 2003. 
 
d) Developing and train extension officers especially to empower them by developing their 
competencies. 
 
e)  Developing and educating farmers through the development of their competencies to 










OPIC’s MISSION STATEMENT AND FIVE YEAR STRATEGIC PLAN (1999-2003) 
 
The Oil Palm Industry Corporation (OPIC) will by 2003 facilitate and sustain significant 
benefits to oil palm smallholders and their families and work towards increasing production of 
Fresh Fruit Bunches. 
 
These benefits will be employment as trained, skilled and competent block managers and 
business persons with: 
• A reliable regular income. 
• Enhanced self esteem, living standards, and relationships with others in the community. 
• A voice in the industry’s direction. 
• An opportunity to share new knowledge about the oil palm industry, and  
• Who will be living in an area that has enhanced physical and social infrastructure. 
 
Others who will benefit as a result include villages in the smallholder areas, milling 
companies, government agencies, smallholder representative groups and a range of 
commercial service organisations.   
 
To enable these benefits OPIC will: 
 
Respect, encourage and educate growers by: 
• Facilitating technical, logistical, financial, marketing and social capacity and expertise. 
• Orientating new growers. 
• Strengthening smallholder representative groups, and 
• Developing highly competent growers 
 
Provide industry stability through 
• The Papua New Guinea Oil Palm Research Association (OPRA) 
• Milling companies 
• Community organisation 
• Government agencies, and 
• International institutions 
 
Sustain OPIC services by improving 
• Social and physical infrastructure 
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• The capacity of OPIC staff 
• The financial security of OPIC, and 
• OPIC’s standing in the industry 
 
Protect the future by being 
• An environmental guardian, and 
• A lobbyist to government and industry groups 
 
OPIC’S STRATEGIC PRIORITIES 
OPIC has identified five strategic areas where its operations must be addressed with new 
emphasis over the next 5 years.  These are: 
 
Government support for OPIC and smallholders 
With the initial period of guaranteed financial support for OPIC coming to an end it is essential 
that governments review their understanding of the oil palm industry in Papua New Guinea 
and of actions that can be taken to ensure the industry’s stability and sustainability. 
 
OPIC services to smallholders 
An inevitable decrease in the ratio of extension worker to smallholders and the need for each 
worker to deal with increasingly complex situations requires a greater level of 
interdependence between extension officers and smallholders.  This necessitates the 
emergence of new attitudes, knowledge, skills and leadership across the industry. 
 
Smallholder viability 
The capacity of each grower to meet the cost of production, enhance their quality of life 
(education, health and mobility for example) and contribute to community development 




The rapid expansion of the industry and enthusiasm for village plantings has heightened 
OPIC’s awareness of the need for careful environmental monitoring of the industry.  New 














Date:   block no:  block owner:  
 
Q1.  Record of activity being carried out by each adult on arrival at block 
NAME ACTIVITY LOCATION 
   
   
   
   
 
Q2.  Absentees at time of interview  
NAME ACTIVITY LOCATION 
   
   
   
 
 
Q3. Work allocation for each adult family member for yesterday morning and afternoon:  
a) Asde long moning yu bin mekim wanem kain wok?   
b) Asde long apinun yu bin mekim wanem kain wok? 
 
NAME  ACTIVITY (1/4 DAY 
UNITS) 
* AM  
 
 





















* AM  
 
 






Q4. Long las wik (Tunde) inap long nau, yu bin wok long dispela blok, olsem katim/sprayim 
gras, prunim pangal? (Don’t ask in week after pick-up) 














Q5.  Taim yu bin mekim dispela wok long dispela blok, husat man or meri i sindaun long 








   
  
 
   
  
 
   
  
 
   
  
 
   
 
Q6. Long las wik (Tunde) inap long nau, yu bin halpim narapela man or meri long wok bilong 









   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
Q7. Long las wik (Tunde) inap long nau, yupela bin mekin sampela wok olsem komuniti wok, 
lotu wok, or skul wok or nogat? 







   
 
Income and expenditure 
Q8. Long las wik (Tunde) inap long nau, yu bin salim sampela samting long maket or nogat? 
NAME DAY MARKET ITEM  kina 
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Q9. Long las wik (Tunde) inap long nau, yu bin salim sampela samting long narapela man or 
meri or long stoa or nogat?  Olsem kakaruk, brum … 
NAME RELATIONSHIP? 
/STORE 
ITEM AND QUANTITY PRICE 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 





Q10. Long las wik (Tunde) inap long nau, yu bin baim sampela samting long stoa or or maket 
or nogat? 
BUYER ITEM  BAIM WER KINA 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
 
Q11. Long las wik (Tunde) inap long nau, wanpela man or meri ibin givim sampela mani or 
heap kaukau, taro, tinpis or rais long yupela or nogat?  Olsem, man or meri ibekim dina long 
yu. (first, ask about money, then food) 





    
    
    
    
 
Q12. Long las wik (Tunde) inap long nau, yupela ibin givim sampela mani or heap kaikai long 





AMOUNT GIVEN REASONS WHY? 
    
    
    
    
 
Q13. Long las wik (Tunde) inap long nau, yu bin givim sampela frut bunch long narapela man 





AMOUNT GIVEN REASONS WHY? 
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Q14. Nau long moning yu bin kaikaim wanem kain kaikai? Asde long apinun yu bin kaikaim 
wanem kain kaikai? (ask if food from own garden) (ask each person over 12 years) 




















Q16.  Sampela lain or wantok ibin kam stap wantaim yupela long dispela wik or nogat?  
VISITOR’S NAME RELATIONSHIP REASON FOR VISIT DURATION 
    











QUESTIONS ASKED AFTER EACH PICK-UP ROUND 
 
Q1.  Last week did you have any bunches or loose fruit collected by the truck?  Yes/No. 
 
Q2.  Hamas nets ol iskalim long papa card ________; long mama card ________? 
 
(Popondetta) Q3.  Em kompani truck or kontractor truck iskalim? _________________ 
 
Q4. What plantings were harvested ? 
1st planting yes/no comments 
 
2nd planting yes/no comments 
 




Q5.  Household members who helped with last fruit bunch harvest.  Husat ibin work long 
block long dispela week  
NAME ACTIVITY/ 
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Q6. Taim yu bin wok long block, yu wok wantain husat? AND/OR  










      
      
      
      
      
      
 
Q7.  Husat bia kisim next papa cheque this pay? 
______________________________________________ 
 
Q8.  Household members who helped with loose fruit harvest 
NAME ACTIVITY/ 











   
  
 
   
  
 
   
  
 
   
 
Q9.  How was loose fruit transported to the road? 
 
Q10.  Were any bunches put on the mama card? 
Yes/No.  If yes: 
how many bunches who cut the bunches who transported 
bunches to the road 
   
   
 
Q11. Ask if no loose fruit collected - Why was loose fruit not collected: 
____________________________________________________________ 
 





Q13.  Did anyone give you bunches/loose fruit this harvest? 
NAME OF GIVER RELATIONSHIP OF 
RECEPIENT TO 
GIVER 
AMOUNT GIVEN REASONS WHY? 
    
    
    
    
 
 





AMOUNT GIVEN REASONS WHY? 
    
    
    
    
 
Q15.   
















       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
 
